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Valuing Federalism
Barry Friedman*
INTRODUCTION
"Value" is a word of many meanings. It can be used to refer
to something believed to have worth, as in "I value your friend-
ship." In a different sense, "values" are a set of ideals or beliefs,
as in 'Tfamily values." In yet a third sense, "value" or "values"
implies a metric, as in "what is the value of X" or "how much
value should I attach to that?"
In speaking of "valuing federalism," this Article relies
upon all three of these senses of the word. The central point is
that we do not value (care about) federalism as much as we
might because we have made too little effort to value (weigh or
measure) the worth of the values (ideals) federalism is said to
serve. Initially, one might question this assertion. After all,
politicians talk at length of the importance of federalism, es-
pecially today when the awkward term "devolution" is very
much on the lips and minds of those who govern.' Constitu-
tional decisions of the nation's highest court contain paeans to
* I would like to thank Erwin Chemerinsky, Elizabeth Garrett, Vicki
Jackson, Ed Rubin, and David Shapiro for their generous assistance with this
project. I also want to thank the organizers of the conference for which this
paper was prepared, both at the University of Minnesota Law School, and at
the Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank. The conference prompted an ex-
tremely fruitful exchange among lawyers and economists about issues of fed-
eralism. Jim Gaylord provided extremely valuable research assistance, for
which I am grateful.
1 See, e.g., Kenneth Jost, The States and Federalism, 6 CQ RE-
SEARCHER 795 (1996) (discussing current issues in federalism); David S.
Broder, Ready or Not, Governors, Here Comes the Devolution, WASH. POST,
Feb. 2, 1997, at C2 (describing the current shift of power to state govern-
ments); Linda Feldmann, Who Pays Tab?: States Balk at Federal Goals,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MoNITOR, Feb. 3, 1997, at 1 (noting the National Governers
Associations resistance to new state funded welfare programs). "Devolution"
refers to the movement of regulatory authority from the national government
to the state and local levels.
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the federal system.2 And academic literature richly extols the
oft-expressed reasons underlying the American invention of
divided government.3 Much of this is just talk, however, evi-
dencing little real effort to understand the tangible benefits of
a federal system, or to take account of when governmental
power sensibly is exercised at one level or another.
Here are two specific examples, developed at length below
to prove the point, but also in the hope of correcting it. First,
the literature of political economics reveals a fertile under-
standing of the justifications for regulating at the central or
national level, rather than retaining regulatory authority in
the states.4 Despite this, the judicial doctrine of federalism is
virtually bereft of any mention or understanding of the principles
spelled out in that literature. These principles are not discarded
as controversial; they simply are ignored. Second, the Supreme
2. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) ("This federal-
ist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people numerous advantages.
It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the di-
verse needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen in-
volvement in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and experi-
mentation in government; and it makes government more responsive by
putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry."); Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) ("IT]he States occupy a special and
specific position in our constitutional system....' The 'constitutionally man-
dated balance of pow& between the States and the Federal Government was
adopted by the Framers to ensure the protection of 'our fundamental liberties.'")
(citations omitted).
3. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Auton-
omy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1988)
[hereinafter Merritt, Guarantee Clause] (identifying four advantages of fed-
eralism: checks on the central government, greater accessibility, diversity,
and enhanced opportunities for experimentation); Michael W. McConnell,
Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CI. L. REv. 1484, 1491-
1511 (1987) (book review) (arguing that federalism secures the public good,
protects private rights, and preserves the spirit and form of popular governments).
4. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT (1962) (reviewing political organization from a political economics
viewpoint); FEDERALISM AND THE CANADIAN EcONOMrc UNION (Michael J.
Trebilcock ed., 1983); WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION,
SIGNIFICANCE (1964) (examining federalism's effects on American society);
Gordon Tullock, Federalism: Problems of Scale, 6 PUB. CHOICE 19 (1969)
(analyzing optimal government size in terms of economies of scale and exter-
nalities). This work is often incorporated into environmental federalism lit-
erature. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95
MICH. L. REV. 570, 613-52 (1996); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Inter-
state Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2341, 2346 (1996); Richard B. Stewart,
Pyramids of Sacrifice?: Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementa-
tion of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1210-19 (1977).
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Court, commentators and politicians frequently reel off the
supposed values of federalism, i.e., the reasons for retaining
regulatory power at a level lower than that of the national or
central government. Despite this, the academic literature is
surprisingly devoid of any serious study of these supposed val-
ues, or any sustained attempt to measure their true worth.5
The values of federalism are invoked regularly in much the
same way as "Mom" and "apple pie": warm images with little
content.
In short, we do not value federalism, because we have no
idea what really is at stake.6 On the state side of the balance,
we do not know whether retaining governmental authority at
the subnational level fosters democracy, or even what we nec-
essarily mean by this. We have not determined whether states
really are laboratories for experimentation, and under what
circumstances experimentation will flourish. We do not know
if state governance enhances accountability. And so on. On
the national side of the balance, there has been careful study of
the reasons for exercising national or central control, such as
the need to provide public goods, eliminate negative externali-
ties from state regulation, avoid races to the bottom, or provide
a national floor on fundamental rightsY But, except for perhaps
the latter, the law of federalism pays basically no attention to
any of this.8
5. Larry Kramer makes this point, observing that there is a good deal of
work on the theoretical notions of the values of federalism, but "very little on
how to get from Point A to Point B-little, that is, on the conditions needed for
this competition to flourish and so to achieve the ends sought. Little on how
federalism really works." Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1490 (1994). Kramer's project is an effort to understand
how federalism "really" operates, addressing the relationship of party politics
and governmental administration to the federal system, which does much, in
Kramer's word, to "broker" the relationships between state and federal gov-
ernments. See id. at 1523.
6. Of course, there is the chance that if the values of federalism were
examined carefully, we might value state and local governance less than we
now do. The intuition motivating this Article, however, is just the opposite.
One very real possibility is that careful scrutiny of the values of federalism
simply will improve our ability to discern when matters of governance should
be entrusted to one governmental unit or another.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 368-386 (detailing the benefits derived
from national control).
8. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, Turning Federalism Inside Out: Intrastate
Aspects of Interstate Regulatory Competition, 14 YALE J. ON REG., 149, 150
(1996) (discussing how the policy and constitutional talk of federalism fail to
overlap). Rodriguez studies how the differing internal architectures of the
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In the face of both these failures, the trend over the long
term is toward centralization. Indeed, there are centripetal
forces, such as technological development and a strong em-
phasis on free trade, that ensure that this trend toward cen-
tralization will continue. In the face of such pressures, federalism
will not be valued absent serious study of the true worth of the
values it is said to foster.
This Article suggests that a federal system is something
we should value, but that in order to do so we need to devote
serious study to the problem of valuation.9 The Article is not a
states affect state policymaking and foster the interests of federalism.
9. In a recent article, Steven Calabresi addresses the problem of the
valuation that is the subject of this Article, but argues "probably counterin-
tuitively" that "the historical case for American federalism is stronger than
the economic case." Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and
Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv.
752, 788 (1995). Although Calabresi surely is correct that American federal-
ism is historically embedded in our culture, see infra notes 288-289 and ac-
companying text, the fact is that federalism's history has not always been a
noble one, see infra notes 215-216 and accompanying text. For that reason,
among many others, the concern here is on valuing the very real benefits of
federalism in today's world, rather than offering historical support for federalism.
Obviously there has been a recent movement, in the national legislature and
in the Supreme Court, favoring a shift of power to the states. As has been
frequently observed, however, the Supreme Court's shift is unlikely to be en-
during absent some set of standards more determinate than what the Court
has offered of late. See Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings and Judicial
Signals: A Positive Political Reading of United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 757, 759-60 (1996) [hereinafter Friedman, Signals] (discussing
the analytical ambiguity of the Lopez decision); Lawrence Lessig, Translating
Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 206. As for Con-
gress, it is possible to point to substantive legislation transferring power to
the states, and to procedural safeguards such as the recent Unfunded Man-
dates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (to be codi-
fied in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.), which purports to focus congressional
attention on the problem of imposing mandates on state and local government
without adequate funding for those mandates. There is reason to be skeptical on
both counts. For a critical analysis of UMRA, see Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing
the Political Safeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
of 1995, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1113 (1997), discussing at length the loopholes in
UMRA and questioning the extent to which its procedural safeguards will
make a difference. One might similarly be skeptical of a devolutionary
movement that shifts responsibility to the states while essentially retaining
ultimate decisional authority in the national government. See Aid to Families
with Dependent Children Act, 42 U.S.C. § 603(h) (1994) (providing for reduc-
tion in funding if state program deviates from federal requirements); Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) (1994) (setting
forth elaborate requirements for state plans). There is an evolving literature
which questions the extent to which Congress should be permitted to attach
conditions to spending grants. See generally Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Fed-
eral Spending after Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (1995) (addressing the
[Vol. 82:317
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reactionary call for returning authority to the states. As the
two final sections make clear, there are numerous real benefits
to centralized authority, and those benefits should not be denied
on the basis of glowing but essentially empty rhetoric about
federalism. 0 At the same time, however, intuition suggests
that there are very real and tangible benefits to diffusing
power under some circumstances. These benefits also should
not be lost, either because of a failure to study and understand
them, or, worse yet, because of an unthinking drive to centralize.
It seems uncontroversial to suggest that our goal should be to
maximize the benefits of regulation at many levels of govern-
ment, yet the law of federalism makes little attempt to do so.11
Part I provides an overview of the doctrine of federalism,
the point of which is that constitutional law values federalism
almost not at all. Despite often glowing political and legal
rhetoric regarding "Our Federalism,"2 the doctrine speaks vol-
umes about how we really regard our federal system. Until re-
cently that doctrine 3 has accorded barely any weight to the
conflict between Spending Clause doctrine and Commerce Clause doctrine);
Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism's
Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85 (arguing that Dole's conditional spending
scheme violates the notion of delegated powers); Albert J. Rosenthal, Condi-
tional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103 (1987)
(concluding that the constitutionality of conditional spending schemes is de-
pendent on the area Congress is addressing); George Brown, Stealth Stat-
ute-Corruption, The Spending Power, and Rise of 18 U.S.C. § 666, at 14
(1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("The federal govern-
ment seems to be in the process of using a statute based on the spending
power as a general anti-corruption statute aimed at officials of subnational
entities, primarily state and local governments."). Nonetheless, Professors
Inman and Rubinfeld argue in a recent piece that welfare reform was very
much about federalism. See Robert P. Tnman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Rethinking
Federalism, 11 J. EcoN. PERSPECTIVE (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at 13-
18, on file with author).
10. See infra Parts HI & I. See also Kramer, supra note 5, at 1502
("There are, after all, two sides to federalism: not just preserving state
authority where appropriate, but also enabling the federal government to act
where national action is desirable."); Lessig, supra note 9, at 135-36
(discussing the balance envisioned by federalism).
1L See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 5, at 1503, 1513-14 ("Put another way,
the test for federalism today can't turn on which approach looks more like the
original scheme in some crude, surface-like manner. It must be: Which ap-
proach does a better job of finding the appropriate balance between state and
federal authority in today's world?").
12. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,44 (1971).
13. This Article focuses much attention on the impact that consideration
of the values of federalism might have on the doctrine of federalism. Such
impact is not limited to the courts, however. In adopting UMRA, Congress
had to determine which bills would be affected by its provisions and which
1997]
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state side of the federalism balance, and even now lacks any
clear understanding of why national authority should be exer-
cised at some times rather than at others. For the most part,
the doctrine of federalism is a doctrine of blind and uncompre-
hending deference to national authority. We are all aware of
this in a vague sense, but when the broad doctrinal story is
pieced together, the lack of any applied understanding about
how a federal system should operate is really quite stunning.
To the extent recent doctrine is shifting-and there are signs of
such a shift--that shift is insufficiently rooted in a clear under-
standing of federalism to assure much generative or staying
power.
Part II addresses the question of why it might be that the
law of federalism fails to account accurately for the values of
our federal system. This Part argues that certain centripetal
forces operate to push much of the work of governing to the
center. Although this Part assesses what is assuredly a global
trend, special attention is devoted to the forces at work in the
United States, in order to explain both the genesis of this cen-
tripetal movement and why it is likely to continue.
Part III addresses the calculus of federalism, arguing that
there are benefits both to centralizing under certain circum-
stances and to dispersing power under others. Attention is de-
voted first to identifying the reasons why we might prefer to
retain authority in the states. Despite frequent invocation,
those reasons are not well developed in the literature, and woe-
fully little attempt has been made to measure their actual
worth. Next, attention is given to the arguments as to when
national authority should be exercised, arguments drawn in
part from a vast literature on the political economy of regula-
tion. Political economists have developed these arguments at
length, but constitutional law largely ignores them. Part III
urges that legal scholars of federalism join together with those
in other disciplines to enhance our knowledge of the values of
federalism. Appropriate balance cannot be maintained in a
federal system without some willingness to confront and un-
derstand the question of when national or local power properly
is exercised.
Perhaps there is little point in trying to reassert federal
values that the world seems eager to abandon. Yet, it is
would not, itself a judgment resting on a careful understanding of the values
of federalism. See Garrett, supra note 9, at 1138-45 (arguing that definitions
in the bill do not necessarily track the principles of federalism).
322 [Vol. 82:317
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equally possible that in the face of strong centralizing tenden-
cies, paying attention to those values neglected at the center
becomes all the more important. As Benjamin Barber has
pointed out, the result of unrelenting centralization often is a
sort of "Big Bang," shattering an unthinkingly enforced unity.14
Federalism can serve as a stabilizing force in large democratic
unions.15 As events in the European Union and the Balkan
States have revealed, failure to protect local sovereignty
threatens broader unions. Yet localism will not find adequate
respect unless and until we understand its value and develop a
means of weighing the benefits of centralization against those
of decentralization.
I. FEDERALISM UNVALUED
To all appearances, the United States has a federal sys-
tem. This generally means that regulatory authority is divided
between a national government and many state governments.
Those governments are free, within constitutional bounds, to
develop and pursue their own regulatory agendas, supported
by the power to tax and spend. State power is divided even fur-
ther among countless substate governments, be they counties,
cities, towns, municipal authorities, school boards, or any other
place that democratic government operates. This further subdivi-
sion may be critically important for the values that federalism is
said to represent, but for present purposes what is important is
that in a formal legal sense shared regulatory responsibility
derives from the relationship between nation and state.16 It is
to the law regarding this relationship that we might look to see
14. See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD v. MCWORLD 240 (1995).
15. Jenna Bednar argues, seemingly to the contrary, that federal systems
are inherently unstable. See Jenna Bednar, Federalisms: Unstable by Design
2 (Apr. 15, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). While her
work is illuminating, it does not necessarily undermine the point made above.
First, her study suggests that federalism can undergo significant tension and
survive. See id. at 20. Second, a federal structure may be the only way to
bring together certain peoples under one government. See Jenna Bednar &
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path": A Theory of
the Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1470-75
(1995) (describing incentives of national and state actors to cheat on the fed-
eralism deal).
16. The relationship between state and national authority is discussed
infra text accompanying notes 112-116.
1997] 323
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whether, and to what extent, federalism has any special value
in the United States. 17
When we turn to the doctrine-the constitutional law of
federalism-what we learn is that in the United States the
federal system is valued very little.1 8 The rules that apply to
exercises of authority by the national and state governments
focus almost single-mindedly on nationalization, looking barely
at all to the benefits of decentralization. 19 The doctrine lacks a
coherent vision of when national authority or state authority
should be exercised, as well as a clear understanding of the
true worth of federalism. Instead, the doctrine is a set of inde-
terminate, largely incoherent rules that by and large permit ad
hoc decisions by judges. Given the centripetal forces outlined
in Part H, it is little surprise that in applying these rules,
judges usually find in favor of national authority. It is a tacit
premise underlying this section that the doctrine of federalism
ought properly to attempt to take serious account of the bene-
fits and disadvantages of allocating responsibility to one gov-
ernment unit or another. The argument here is for a more
analytical federalism. Some Justices have favored greater def-
erence to state autonomy, relying primarily on originalist un-
derstandings." Others have favored tremendous deference to
17. This Article deals with the distribution of legislative or regulatory
authority between national and subnational governments, not with the divi-
sion of judicial power between those governments. Erwin Chemerinsky has
pointed out the paradox that Supreme Court doctrine does little to address
the distribution of legislative authority, even as it requires the federal courts
often to defer to state judicial process. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of
Federalism, 47 FIA L. REV. 499, 504-08 (1995).
18. Of course, law is not the only force that shapes society. See, e.g., Cass
R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 915
(1996) (identifying social norms, social roles, and social meaning as society-
shaping factors). Judith Resnik makes the important point that in the face of
the ongoing tug-of-war between national and state authority, many new forms
of cooperation have sprung up that defy traditional categorization. See Judith
Resnik, Afterword: Federalism's Options, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 465 (1996).
19. See Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 501 ("The Court's decisions about
federalism rarely do more than offer slogans about the importance of autono-
mous state governments. Occasionally, the Court mentions that states are
important as laboratories of ideas or that state governments are crucial as a
check on the tyranny of the national government. But the Court never elabo-
rates on the values of federalism and rarely explains how the values of fed-
eralism relate to the Court's holdings.").
20. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, at 2370-75 (1997)
(evaluating the Brady Act against statutes enacted by the first Congresses
and against The Federalist); id. at 2385 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Although
this Court has long interpreted the Constitution as ceding Congress extensive
324 [Vol. 82:317
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the national Congress, favoring the post-New Deal collapse of
judicial authority.21 Rather than privilege either of these
methodologies and the extreme results that sometimes accom-
pany them, the doctrine of federalism-properly enforced by
the judiciary--ought to work in a way that maximizes the
benefits of shared governmental regulation.
authority to regulate commerce (interstate or otherwise), I continue to believe
that we must 'temper our Commerce Clause jurisprudence' and return to an
interpretation better rooted in the Clause's original understanding.")
(citations omitted).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 604 (Souter, J., dis-
senting) (1995) ("The modem respect for the competence and primacy of Con-
gress in matters affecting commerce developed only after one of this Court's
most chastening experiences, when it perforce repudiated an earlier and un-
tenably expansive conception of judicial review in derogation of congressional
commerce power.").
22. Although beyond the focus of this Article, there are sound reasons for
judicial enforcement of the federalism doctrine. Given the incentives identi-
fied in Part II, infra, there is little reason to believe that members of Congress
will represent state interests in making regulatory decisions. See Calabresi,
supra note 9, at 796. There are those who have taken a different view. See,
e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS (1980) (discussing the proper role of the Supreme Court and conclud-
ing that the Court should not decide constitutional questions regarding the
doctrine of federalism); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Feder-
alism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954) (values of federalism protected
adequately in national Congress). The Supreme Court seems to have flirted
with the abstentionist position. See infra notes 193-200 and accompanying
text. The Court's reliance on Choper, and particularly Wechsler, is somewhat
stunning given the many persuasive critiques of their position. See John C.
Pittenger, Garcia and the Political Safeguards of Federalism: Is there a Better
Solution to the Conundrum of the Tenth Amendment?, PUBLIUS, Winter 1992,
at 1, 2-10 (questioning the soundness of Wechsler's position); Martin H.
Redish & Karen L. Drizin, Constitutional Federalism and Judicial Review:
The Role of Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 15-23 (1987) (stating tex-
tual and historical grounds for judicial review of federalism questions). Of
particular note is Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money and State Sovereignty: The
Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847 (1979). Kaden's devastating critique of
Wechsler's and Choper's positions in light of the actual practice of American
politics is oft-cited, but then equally often ignored.
The theme of this Article is that the judiciary ought to enforce limitations
on national authority, at least in some instances. A provocative recent article
by Jack Rakove argues that the very origins of judicial review were somewhat
to the opposite conclusion: The judiciary would be necessary to enforce limi-
tations on state authority explicit in the constitutional plan. See Jack N.
Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 1031, 1041-50 (1997).
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A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PLAN
The Framers of the Constitution divided power among the
national government and the states. Framers of other federations
have used different strategies for this division of power.23 The
American constitutional plan is a familiar one. The American
solution was to specify, or "enumerate" the powers of the na-
tional government, leaving the residue to the states.24 The
Framers anticipated that the national powers would be few
and limited, and expected that the vast bulk of authority would
remain in the states.2 5 Of course, as the country grew and
times changed, the impetus for the exercise of national
authority increased. Part II explains that such growth was at
times both inevitable and legitimate. But the point of this Part
is that the doctrine of federalism contains little or no theory of
when national authority should be found to exist under a spe-
23. Australia followed the United States' lead in limiting its government
to specific powers by express grant. See AUSTL. CONST. ch. I, pt. V, §§ 51-52;
LESLIE ZINES, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE COMMONWEALTH 78, 87(1991). The Canadian Constitution also contains an enumeration of powers,
but this was "for greater Certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality of
the foregoing Terms of this Section." CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1867) pt.
VI, § 91; see also ZINES, supra, at 77. The Canadian plan in fact gives the
provinces limited powers, leaving to the national government the large residue.
See ZINES, supra, at 77; see also Neil Finkelstein & Russell Cohen, Sugges-
tions for the Decentralization of Canada, 75 CANADIAN B. REV. 251, 254-55
(1996) (discussing the strong centralist orientation of the Canadian Constitu-
tion); Catherine Valcke, Quebec Civil Law and Canadian Federalism, 21 YALE
J. INT'L L. 67, 89-101 (1996) (discussing the small sphere of provincial legisla-
tive competence). By contrast, the German Basic Law sets forth one of the
most elaborate enumerations, comprising exclusive powers, concurrent pow-
ers (found only implicitly in the U.S. Constitution), and framework powers
(which allow the federal government to lay down basic principles to be fleshed
out by the states). See GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GGI arts. 71 & 73, 72,
74-74a, 75 (F.R.G.). See generally DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 35-52 (1994) (outlining exclusive federal
authority, concurrent authority and framework authority); DONALD P. KOMMERS,
THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY 75, 92 (2d ed. 1997).
24. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. amend. X (MThe powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
25. See Kramer, supra note 5, at 1495 & n.18 (arguing that there was
consensus among the Framers that the powers of the national government
would be limited).
[Vol. 82:317
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cific enumerated power.26 Rather, national authority has just
grown, like topsy.
The lack of a coherent theory explaining when national
power should be exercised may in part be traced to the found-
ing. The Framers present at the Constitutional Convention
originally approved a resolution that Congress would exercise
legislative power "in all cases... to which the states are sepa-
rately incompetent or in which the harmony of the United
States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legis-
lation."27 Fearing that this formulation would fail to constrain
national authority, however, the Framers subsequently opted
for what they believed was a better tactic to limit national
authority-the enumeration of specific national powers.28 As it
turned out, their specific division of power has done little to
check the trend of centralization. Ultimately, the decision may
not have mattered; the experience of many differently struc-
tured federations shows the same tendency to centralize
authority.29 Nonetheless, as Part Il explains, the Framers'
26. See Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, The 11th Amendment and the
Potential Evisceration of Ex Parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 495, 499 (1997)("[No coherent principle yet ties together the Court's emerging federalism
jurisprudence .... ").
27. NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONvENTION OF 1787 REPORTED
BY JAMES MADISON 380 (1984).
28. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 292 (1936) ("The conven-
tion however, declined to confer upon Congress power in such general terms
[as those given in the Virginia Plan]; instead of which it carefully limited the
powers which it thought wise to entrust to Congress by specifying them,
thereby denying all others not granted expressly or by necessary implica-
tion."); Douglas G. Smith, An Analysis of Two Federal Structures: The Articles
of Confederation and the Constitution, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 249, 281 (1997)
(discussing how delegates to the Constitutional Convention rejected the Vir-ginia Plan's "functionalist" approach of defining federal powers in terms of the
competence of the state governments).
29. "Common to federal systems, however, is a historical trend towards
centralization where the federal government assumes more power and asserts
the power to trump." Denis J. Edwards, Fearing Federalism's Failure: Sub-
sidiarity in the European Union, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 537, 541 (1996). On this
trend in Australia, see ZINES, supra note 23, at 79 ("[T]he power of Australian
central government has grown and continues to grow, while that of the States
has waned, to a degree that would have astonished the framers.") and Harry
Gibbs, The Decline of Federalism?, 18 QUEENSL. L.J. 1, 7 (1994) (discussing
"the way the Constitution has step by step descended downwards from the
original idea of federalism"). On this trend in Germany, see CURRIE, supra
note 23, at 101 ("[Tlhere seems to have been a general tendency toward in-
creasing central authority in Germany."). However, in Canada, the federation
which began with the strongest central government, the trend has been to-
ward greater provincial authority. See General Motors of Can. Ltd. v. City
1997]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
original, rejected formulation at least contained the seeds of a
coherent doctrine of federalism.
Taking the constitutional plan as a given, the question is
how national power could be, and was, expanded. Engage in
the following mental exercise: Imagine our constitutional struc-
ture-enumerated national powers and residual state authority-
and consider the various ways that national authority could be
expanded well beyond its original bounds. There seem to be
obvious candidates. First, the enumerated powers could be in-
terpreted quite broadly. Second, implied powers-also broadly
construed-could be piled atop explicit ones. The first two op-
tions have an air of legitimacy, but there are other candidates.
Third, the distinction between enumerated and unenmerated
powers simply could be ignored. Fourth, the courts could step
in to displace state authority, even when the national legisla-
ture has not done so. As will be evident, all of these have oc-
curred, and all in a fashion that fails to take into account in
any serious way the countervailing interests of decentralized
authority.
B. THE EXPANSION OF THE ENUMERATED POWERS: THE
COMMERCE POWER
Over time, the scope of the enumerated powers has grown
enormously. Though the analysis presented here is limited to
the commerce power,3" one should not lose sight of the fact that
the national government possesses many other importait pow-
ers. Among these national powers are the war power,31 the
Nat'l Leasing [1989] S.C.R. 641, 658 ("Yet, as the American courts broadened
their commerce clause until it meant essentially what the Fathers of Confed-
eration had sought for Canada, so have the Privy Council and the Canadian
courts reacted against the hopes of the framers of their constitution and have
decentralized commercial control."); PETER W. HOGG, CONsTITUTIONAL LAW
OF CANADA 110 (3d ed. 1992) (noting the steady growth in the power and im-
portance of the provinces); ZINES, supra note 23, at 79-86 (discussing how ju-
dicial decisions have rendered the central government weaker than in any
other federation).
30. Concerns .about commerce also were a primary motivation to replace
the Articles of Confederation with the Constitution. See JETHRO K. LIE-
BERMAN, THE ENDURING CONSTITUTION 350 (1987) ("e issue that most ag-
gravated [the Framers] prompting the Philadelphia Convention, was com-
merce."); see also JOHN A. KASSON, THE EvOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE HISTORY OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE
141-45 (1985) (arguing that the necessity of a central authority with the power
to regulate commerce was 'strongly appreciated and universally understood"
among the colonies).
31. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
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treaty power,32 and other less encompassing powers such as the
power to prescribe a uniform rule of bankruptcy.33
The commerce power was given broad definition from the
outset. In Gibbons v. Ogden34 the Supreme Court was asked
whether a steamboat monopoly awarded by New York was in-
consistent with Congress's power to regulate commerce. Of
course, central to Gibbons was the question of what constituted
commerce. John Marshall's definition of commerce for the
Gibbons Court was sweeping. In holding, unexceptionally, that
commerce included navigation, Marshall further explained
that commerce "comprehend[s] every species of commercial in-
tercourse" both foreign, and interstate. The power to regulate
commerce is the power "to prescribe the rule by which com-
merce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in
Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost
extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are pre-
scribed in the Constitution."3 6 Not only was the definition in
Gibbons sweeping, the Court's opinion also suggested that the
power was bounded only by the extent to which Congress chose
to limit itself in exercising the power.
One might naturally have assumed that the question of
what constituted "commerce" was, like all constitutional ques-
tions, appropriate for judicial resolution.37 In this fashion the
power of Congress might have been kept within bounds by a
vigilant judiciary. In Gibbons, however, the Chief Justice sug-
gested that the only recourse for overreaching by Congress was
the ballot box: "The wisdom and the discretion of Congress,
their identity with the people, and the influence which their
constituents possess at elections are, in this, as in many other
instances,... the sole restraints on which they have relied, to
secure them from abuse."38
32. See id. art. H, § 2, cl. 2.
33. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
34. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
35. Id. at 193, 194.
36. Id. at 196.
37. See Kramer, supra note 5, at 1495 & n.18 (arguing that the Framers
intended that the courts would play a role in policing the limits imposed on
the powers of the national government); see also Gary Lawson & Patricia B.
Granger, The "Proper' Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation
of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE IJ. 267, 281 (1993) (arguing that the judiciary
should have the power to review the necessity and propriety of executory laws).
38. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 197.
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Though sweeping in tone, the breadth of the Gibbons deci-
sion was limited by the then-prevailing notions of "dual sover-
eignty," the notion that constitutional power was held in wa-
tertight compartments, each government supreme within its
sphere.39 States could not regulate within the realm of the na-
tional government's enumerated powers, and neither could the
national government exercise the states' police powers.40 The
national government's authority within its sphere could be
quite broad without trampling on state authority, thereby pre-
serving a large residuum of power in the states.
Both the operation of this theory as well as the weak logic
that held it together were apparent in the Court's decision in
Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co.41 In Willson the issue
was whether the state could charter a company to build a dam
on a navigable body of water.42 An easy answer might have
been "no," the Supreme Court having held in Gibbons that
navigation was commerce. 3 The Court nonetheless found the
charter to be within the police power of the state:
39. Thomas Dye argues that the idea of dual sovereignty was in conflict
with the Framers' ideas of intergovernmental competition. If the powers of
the national and state governments were cabined, they could not compete
with one another for the affection of the citizens. See THOMAS R. DYE,
AMERICAN FEDERALISM 7 (1990).
40. The concept of dual sovereignty is evident in the language of Gibbons.
Of the national government, the Court said, "the sovereignty of Congress,
though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects." Gibbons, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 197. So far as the states' police powers were concerned:
[n]o direct general power over these objects is granted to Congress;
and, consequently, they remain subject to State legislation. If the
legislative power of the Union can reach them, it must be for national
purposes; it must be where the power is expressly given for a special
purpose, or is clearly incidental to some power which is expressly
given.
Id. at 203-04.
In a recent case, Justice Scalia uses the term "dual sovereignty" in quite
another fashion, remarking, "the Framers rejected the concept of a central
government that would act upon and through the States, and instead de-
signed a system in which the state and federal governments would exercise
concurrent authority over the people." Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct.
2365, 2367 (1997). Scalia's notion of dual sovereignty apparently addresses
the means by which the respective governments may exercise their power,
rather than the legitimate ends of that power.
41. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
42. See id. at 250.
43. See also Lessig, supra note 9, at 156 ("If what determined constitu-
tionality was the effect of a given law, Willson should have been no different
from Gibbons."). In both Willson and Gibbons, the person challenging the
regulation was licensed to ply the waterway in question. In Gibbons, the
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The value of the property on its banks must be enhanced by exclud-
ing the water from the marsh, and the health of the inhabitants
probably improved. Measures calculated to produce these objects,
provided they do not come into collision with the powers of the gen-
eral government, are undoubtedly within those which are reserved to
the States.44
By simply labeling the regulation at issue "police," the Su-
preme Court managed to avoid the appearance of any conflict
between state power and that of the national government.45
The dam of dual sovereignty collapsed in the famous case
of Cooley v. Board of Wardens,46 and when it did the way was
cleared for the waters of national authority to overwhelm the
"reserved" powers of the states. Cooley addressed the question
of whether the states could, consistent with allocation of the
commerce power to the national government, require certain
vessels to take on (and pay) a pilot when coming into or leaving
port.47 As in Willson, the Court could have resolved the prob-
lem simply by deeming the regulation an exercise of the police
power. Instead, the Supreme Court conceded that this regula-
tion was one of "commerce."48 That being so, under the view
expressed by Marshall in Gibbons, the states would lack
authority whether or not Congress had acted. Although gladly
acknowledging that the regulation of pilotage was a commer-
cial regulation, the Cooley Court held nonetheless that states
were not disabled from acting in the area, at least so long as
Congress itself had not displaced state authority.49 Thus, for
Court held the license superseded state law, while in Willson the Court
reached the opposite conclusion. See id. at 156-57.
44- Willson, 27 U.S. at 251. It was also true that in Gibbons Congress
had acted, whereas with regard to the charter at issue in Willson, Congress
had not. See id. at 252 ("We should not feel much difficulty in saying that a
state law coming in conflict with [an act of Congress] would be void. But Con-
gress passed no such act."). Thus, the difference in the cases might be ex-
plained by modern-day preemption doctrine. Marshall certainly relied on
Congress's action or inaction, but as the quotation in the text illustrates, Will-
son still seems to place the decision squarely on the police power.
45. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 29 (1937) (-Marshall
plainly implies that the Delaware statute falls outside the ban of the
'dormant' Commerce Clause, because it is not a regulation of commerce, but of
'police.'").
46. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
47. See id. at 311-12.
48. See id. at 316-17.
49. See id. at 320-21. Of course, this did not mean states could act any
time that Congress had not. As will be evident, the Cooley Court drew the
sensible distinction between areas in which national uniformity was neces-
sary, and areas in which state diversity was appropriate. The distinction did
not last. See infra text accompanying notes 50-63 (describing the Supreme
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the first time states could regulate even if what they were
regulating was "commerce."
Of course, when barriers fall, they tend to allow movement
in two directions. Ultimately the elimination of dual sover-
eignty would permit Congress to go tripping into areas that
some might have once thought to be the exclusive province of
states. Between the time of Cooley and the New Deal, however,
the Supreme Court tried to hold back the expansion of con-
gressional authority by drawing somewhat formal distinctions
between what was "commerce" and what was a matter wholly
internal to a state and properly left to the police powers of the
state.5 0 Instructive is Patterson v. Kentucky,51 in which the
Court decided, in an opinion by Justice Harlan, that a state in-
spector could condemn the use of a "burning oil," despite the
fact that the oil's inventor had received a letter-patent from the
United States. Even while assuring that the "court has never
hesitated, by the most rigid rules of construction, to guard the
commercial power of Congress against encroachment in the
form or under the guise of State regulation," 2 the Supreme
Court upheld the state law at issue as "in the best sense, a
mere police regulation, deemed essential for the protection of
the lives and property of citizens."53 Patterson recognized the
difference between an exercise of state police power and the
national commerce power, but did little to clarify how to tell
one apart from the other. Instead, the Court merely stated
that the "police power extends, at least, to the protection of the
lives, the health, and the property of the community against
the injurious exercise by any citizen of his own rights."54
Court's turn to formalist tests).
50. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 407 (2d ed.
1988) (describing the Court's national/local subject matter analysis during the
decades following Cooley); Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism
and the Unshackling of the States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 508 (1997)
[hereinafter Gardbaum, New Deal] (discussing the Cooley Court's limited pre-
sumption of free movement of goods applicable to only some subjects of interstate
commerce and subsequent shift to a more inclusive norm of free interstate
commerce); Patrick C. McGinley, Trashing the Constitution: Judicial Activ-
ism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the Federalism Mantra, 71 OR. L.
REV. 409, 414 (1992) ("For decades after Cooley, this 'national'/qocal' interpre-
tive approach was utilized by the Court.").
51. 97 U.S. 501, 505 (1879).
52. Id. at 506.
53. Id. at 504.
54. Id. The Court appeared to acknowledge that, despite its application
of formal distinctions, consistent with the Cooley doctrine what was commerce
could also be the subject of police regulation. For example, the Patterson
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As is common knowledge, in the years between 1890 and
1937, the Supreme Court famously aroused the ire of the nation
by relying upon formal distinctions as to what was commerce
and what was not in order to tie Congress's hands in a number
of areas in which national authority was seen as a necessity.5
In decisions like United States v. E.C. Knight Co.,56 Hammer v.
Dagenhar5 7 (The Child Labor Case), and ALA. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 58 the Supreme Court struck
down progressive legislation and New Deal measures that en-
joyed wide support among the citizenry. The Court attempted
to distinguish "commerce" from "police" power,59 "direct" effects
on commerce from "indirect" ones, 60 and what was in the
"stream" of commerce from what was outside it.6 1 Typical of
the Court's reasoning was its explanation for why the complete
monopolization of sugar manufacturing was beyond Congress's
commerce power: "Commerce succeeds to manufacture and is
not a part of it."62 The Supreme Court's motivation for relying
on formal categories was its oft-expressed concern that if Con-
gress was permitted to regulate this or that under the com-
merce power, there would be nothing left to the realm of state
police regulation. 63
Court explained that a bale of goods in commerce might be "laden with infec-
tion" and thus destroyed as an exercise of the police power of a state. Id. at
505.
55. See, e.g., GEOFFREYR. STONE ETAL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 194-95 (3d
ed. 1996) (discussing pre-New Deal categorical definitions of commerce used
to limit congressional power).
56. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
57. 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled in part by United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941).
58. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
59. See B.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 13 ("It is vital that the independence of
the commercial power and of the police power, and the delimitation between
them, however sometimes perplexing, should always be recognized and ob-
served....").
60. See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 546 ("In determining how far the federal
government may go in controlling intrastate transactions upon the ground
that they 'affect' interstate commerce, there is a necessary and well-
established distinction between direct and indirect effects.").
61 See id. at 543 (holding that defendants' activities were not "in a
'current or 'flow' of interstate commerce").
62. B.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 12.
63. See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 546 ("If the commerce clause were con-
strued to reach all enterprises and transactions which could be said to have
an indirect effect upon interstate commerce, the federal authority would em-
brace practically all the activities of the people and the authority of the State
over its domestic concerns would exist only by sufferance of the federal gov-
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In 1937, however, the Supreme Court did an about face,
expanding Congress's power under the Commerce Clause in a
series of decisions that showed greater practical appreciation
for the workings of an integrated national market. Typical was
the decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,6 up-
holding Congress's power to regulate labor practices in the
steel industry.6 Although giving lip service to the concept that
"[t]he authority of the federal government may not be pushed
to such an extreme as to destroy the distinction, which the
Commerce Clause itself establishes, between commerce 'among
the several States' and the internal concerns of a State,"66 the
Court's attention was elsewhere. Rejecting the notion that it
even must consider whether the regulated practice was in the
"flow" or "stream" of commerce, the Court held that the question
was whether the activities "have such a close and substantial
relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential
or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and ob-
structions."67 The Court's opinion detailed at great length the
interstate nature of respondent's business, concluding that
"[ijn view of respondent's far-flung activities" the impact on in-
terstate commerce of any work stoppage "would be immediate
and might be catastrophic."68
The Court's shift in direction signaled the beginning of a
tremendous expansion in Congress's commerce power, an ex-
pansion so great that many came to believe the power was
without limit, or at least beyond judicially enforceable limits.69
ernment."); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272-73 (1918), overruled in
part by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) ("If it were otherwise, all
manufacture intended for interstate shipment would be brought under federal
control to the practical exclusion of the authority of the States, a result cer-
tainly not contemplated by the framers of the Constitution when they vested
in Congress the authority to regulate commerce among the States."); E.C.
Knight, 156 U.S. at 19 ("Undoubtedly, the preservation of the just authority of
the States is an object of deep concern to every lover of his country. No
greater calamity could befall our free institutions than the destruction of that
authority, by whatever means such a result might be accomplished.").
64. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
65. Of course, even before Jones & Laughlin there were decisions taking
account of national integration and its effect on the commerce power. See
Lessig, supra note 9, at 149-50 (arguing that the Court took an "organic" view
of the economy in the early part of the Twentieth Century, thus expanding
congressional power to regulate the national economy as a unified whole).
66. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 30.
67. Id. at 36-37.
68. Id. at 41.
69. See Jonathan L. Entin, Introduction to Symposium, The New Federal-
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Generations of constitutional law students were taught to
bootstrap argument upon argument to show how almost any-
thing Congress might seek to regulate constituted interstate
commerce. Relying on the "effects" test, the commerce power
came to include the power to regulate intrastate crimes such
loan-sharking,70 a farmer's growing of wheat for individual
use,7' and the practice of racial discrimination in an Alabama
barbecue stand.72 In mood and result these decisions all stood
in stark contrast to the pattern of the earlier part of the cen-
tury. For example, in upholding the Civil Rights Act as an ex-
ercise of the commerce power, the Court said: "That Congress
was legislating against moral wrongs in many of these areas
rendered its enactments no less valid.... [T]hat fact does not de-
tract from the overwhelming evidence of the disruptive effect that
racial discrimination has had on commercial intercourse."73
What is perhaps most important about these cases is not
what they said, but what they did not say. Nowhere in any of
the cases was there any theory as to why national regulation
was either necessary or appropriate, although in many cases
ism After United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 635, 636 (1996)
("The Court struggled with the tensions implicit in Gibbons for more than a
century before the New Deal transformation ushered in a doctrinal structure
suggesting that there were no judicially enforceable limits on the commerce
power."); see also Vincent A. Cirillo & Jay W. Eisenhofer, Reflections on the
Congressional Commerce Power, 60 TEMPLE L.Q. 901, 912 (1987) (stating that
during the New Deal, "the congressional commerce power emerged as a vir-
tually unlimited power and, in effect, became the national police power re-
jected by the Framers at the Constitutional Convention."); Richard A. Epstein,
The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1451 (1987)
(arguing that the New Deal Supreme Court "rejected the idea of limited fed-
eral government and decentralized power" in favor of a centralized govern-
ment acting for the public welfare); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and
Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1259 (1995) ("In addition, since the New
Deal 'switch', the Commerce Clause power in particular has been understood
to be remarkably inclusive. Consequently, the universe of legitimate ends has
expanded to such a degree that it now seems almost brazen to suggest that
there is anything Congress may not do.").
70. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971) (stating that even
wholly intrastate loan-sharking transactions directly affected interstate com-
merce).
71. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (holding that an ac-
tivity may be regulated by Congress "if it exerts a substantial economic effect
on interstate commerce").
72. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (finding racial
discrimination in local restaurants directly and adversely affected interstate
commerce).
73. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,257 (1964).
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such an explanation was available. In a sense the "substantial
effect" test was merely the substitution of one formalism for
another. Especially in an economy in which virtually anything
can be said to have some impact on commerce, the question
ought to be what constitutes an effect sufficient to justify na-
tional regulation. There must be some answer beyond the ad
hoc determination of whether a given effect is "substantial."
The Court's decisions traced out the effect in each case, relying
on congressional findings or the Congressional Record at times
when the nexus seemed thin, but this analysis still ducked the
important question. The issue was not only whether there was
an impact on commerce, but why national regulation was nec-
essary to address it.
Subsequent decisions have been no more illuminating re-
garding the value of federalism. Although seemingly beneficial
for state authority, the Supreme Court's 1995 decision in
United States v. Lopez 4 actually is symptomatic of the prob-
lem. Lopez was the first case since the New Deal in which the
Supreme Court struck a congressional enactment as beyond
the commerce power. The Lopez Court held that it was beyond
the commerce power to criminalize the possession of guns near
schools." In explaining why, the Court fashioned a three-part
test for when Congress might regulate a practice as within its
commerce power, the heart of which is an inquiry into whether
the challenged regulation has a "substantial effect" on inter-
state commerce:
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from in-
trastate activities. Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes
the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect in-
terstate commerce.
76
The problem is that this test is completely indeterminate
and boundless." In dissent, Justice Breyer made several en-
74. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
75. See id. at 567-68 ("The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in
no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, sub-
stantially affect any sort of interstate commerce.").
76. Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
77. See Lessig, supra note 9, at 200-206 (arguing that Lopez fails to pro-
vide courts with the tools necessary to fashion limits on governmental power);
see also Jesse H. Choper, Did Last Term Reveal "A Revolutionary States'
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tirely plausible arguments that guns in schools do have an
impact on interstate commerce. Guns in schools make for bad
schools, Breyer reasoned, providing disincentives for busi-
nesses to relocate, and turning out poorly educated children
who cannot compete in a global economy."8 The Chief Justice's
response was not that Breyer's reasoning was faulty, but sim-
ply that Breyer's logic placed no bounds on Congress's power.79
Yet, aside from holding that Congress loses, the Lopez Court's
decision lacked any coherent understanding of why it might be
appropriate for Congress to regulate one activity or another as
an exercise of its commerce power. Stating that a doctrinal
test must have bounds says nothing about what those bounda-
ries are or should be.
Notice also how the Lopez Court's test takes absolutely no
account of state authority. The only focus of attention is on
whether it is "commerce" that Congress regulated. There
might be little quarrel to be had on this score. After all, the
constitutional plan defines congressional power, leaving the
residue to the states, not vice versa.8" But in the face of an un-
bounded, indeterminate, and incoherent test, any concern
about preserving a role for the states is as likely to be ignored
as it is to be respected, absent some articulation of the values
furthered by state regulatory autonomy. 81
Rights Movement" Within the Supreme Court?, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 663,
668 (1996) (arguing the Lopez majority struggled unsuccessfully "to draw some
analytic line between what Congress may and may not regulate pursuant to its
commerce power" while Justice Thomas's "revolutionary" concurrence advo-
cated a return to the original understanding of commerce as buying, selling,
and transporting); Melvyn R. Durchslag, Will the Real Alfonzo Lopez Please
Stand Up: A Reply to Professor Nagel, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 679, 682
(1996) (noting Lopez "raises serious questions of judicially manageable stan-
dards"); cf Deborah Jones Merritt, The Fuzzy Logic of Federalism, 46 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 685, 693 (1996) (predicting Lopez will have little practical ef-
fect, but will ultimately "tell us more about constitutional theory, and how the
Court interprets constitutional text, than it tells us about what Congress can
regulate" because the case provides no guidance for analyzing the relation be-
tween the activity being regulated and commerce).
78. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 619-22 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing
findings that violence in schools is prevalent and adversely affects the quality
of education which in turn affects commerce).
79. See id. at 564-66.
80. See supra text accompanying note 24.
81. The concurring opinion of Justices Kennedy and O'Connor did discuss
these values. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581-83 (Kennedy, J., joined by O'Connor,
J., concurring) (advocating reserving powers to the states to further their role
as laboratories of democracy); cf. Lawson & Granger, supra note 37, at 330
(contending that one of the fimctions of the Necessary and Proper Clause is to
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Thus, we have an interpretation of Congress's most promi-
nent enumerated power that is sweeping and practically un-
limited. There is no serious doubt but that the commerce
power is a monster permitting Congress virtually unlimited
authority to regulate. Once, in sixty years, the Supreme Court
has had the wherewithal to strike a congressional enactment
as ultra vires. It is not likely to happen often, and given the
forces explained in Part H, the decision is not likely to have
even the in terrorem effect on Congress many commentators
ascribed to it. 2 The decisions defining commerce display no
serious understanding about the circumstances under which
Congress might need to exercise national power, or what ad-
vantages might adhere to retaining power in the states.
C. THE CREATION OF BROAD IMPLIED POWERS: THE
NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE
Not only are Congress's enumerated powers broad, but it
turns out Congress possesses almost unlimited implied powers.
This question was settled heavily in favor of national authority
in another great decision by Chief Justice Marshall, McCulloch
v. Maryland.3 In that case the question was whether Congress
had the power to incorporate the Bank of the United States.84
Conceding that "[a]mong the enumerated powers, we do not
find that of establishing a bank or creating a corporation,"85 the
Court also observed that "there is no phrase in the
confine the national government to its delegated sphere of jurisdiction be-
cause the Tenth Amendment simply restates that clause, indicating that
regulating subjects beyond the enumerated powers is not "proper"); McCoy &
Friedman, supra note 9, at 85 (arguing that the theory of delegated national
powers has been strained by expansive interpretation of congressional powers
to regulate by imposing conditions on federal grants).
82. See, e.g., Bednar & Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1450 (referring to
Lopez as "a wake up call"); Suzanna Sherry, The Barking Dog, 46 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 877, 877 (1996) (comparing the Lopez Court to a dog which must
bite someone occasionally for its federalism barking to be taken seriously); see
also Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce Clause: Life After
Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 801, 839-43 (1996) (noting that Congress
might view Lopez as a warning shot across the bow, but that the case's real
significance is symbolic); Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 674, 712 (1995) ("At its narrowest, Lopez can be viewed as a case staking
out the desperate position that some activity must fall beyond Congress's ken.
Having made that point and encouraged Congress to think more carefully
about its limited powers, the Court may be content to defer to most other ex-
ercises of congressional jurisdiction.").
83. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
84. See id. at 401.
85. Id. at 406.
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[Constitution] which, like the articles of confederation, ex-
cludes incidental or implied powers."86 To the contrary, in ad-
dition to the enumerated powers, Congress may pass "all laws
which shall be necessary and proper, for carrying into execu-
tion the foregoing powers."87 Rejecting calls for a narrow
reading of that clause premised precisely on concerns about in-
terference with state authority, the Chief Justice adopted an
extremely broad interpretation: "Let the end be legitimate, let
it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which
are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional."88
The McCulloch decision contained a limitation on con-
gressional authority that might have provided some basis for
distinguishing between powers commercial and police, but it
too was abandoned in the modern era. Aside from the obvious
constraint that Congress could not otherwise violate the Con-
stitution, Marshall assured that "[sihould Congress... under
the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accom-
plishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it would
become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requir-
ing such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was
not the law of the land."89 In other words, if Congress at-
tempted to regulate something not within its enumerated pow-
ers under the guise of exercising those powers, the Court would
put a stop to the practice. And in fact the Court did so in the
period prior to its New Deal switch, although likely employing
too narrow a conception of the commerce power itself.9° But in
the New Deal's aftermath the Court was quite explicit in reject-
ing the concept of pretextual regulation: So long as the regu-
86. Id.
87. Id. at 411-12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. Id. at 421.
89. Id. at 423.
90. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 69 (1935) ("The power of
taxation, which is expressly granted may, of course, be adopted as a means to
carry into operation another power also expressly granted. But resort to the
taxing power to effectuate an end which is not legitimate, not within the scope
of the Constitution, is obviously inadmissible."); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture
Co., 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922) ("[All that Congress would need to do... would be
to enact a detailed measure of complete regulation of the subject and enforce
it by a so-called tax upon departures from it. To give such magic to the word
tax! would be to break down all constitutional limitation of the powers of Con-
gress and completely wipe out the sovereignty of the States.").
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lation was itself of "commerce" the "motive and purpose of a
regulation" was irrelevant.9
Once again, Congress's powers were expanded, this time
by broad construction of the implied powers. Basically, implied
powers are governed by the same broad rules as enumerated
ones. And once again, the cases betray no understanding of
how to tell when the need for national authority arises, or why
it may make sense in some instances to preserve state author-
ity.
D. ELIMINATION OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ENUMERATED
POWERS AND THOSE RESERVED TO THE STATE: CONDITIONAL
SPENDING
Whatever the scope of Congress's enumerated and implied
powers, the one thing that seemed apparent from the constitu-
tional plan was that Congress was at least confined to those
specific powers. After all, what point would there be to enu-
merating specific powers and reserving all others to the states,
if the enumeration itself was meaningless as a limitation? The
enumeration might only have been an iteration of the types of
powers Congress possesses-sort of a constitutional ejusdem
generis-but no one ever has been heard to make such an ar-
gument with regard to Article I of the Constitution.
Nonetheless, in South Dakota v. Dole92 the Supreme Court
plainly permitted Congress to do indirectly what it could not do
directly, essentially eviscerating the difference between enu-
merated and unenumerated powers. Dole involved a question
regarding the scope of Congress's power to engage in
"conditional spending."93 Under generally accepted precedent,
Congress's taxing and spending powers are not limited to tax-
ing and spending in support of those powers enumerated in
Article I; rather, Congress may tax and spend for anything that
constitutes the "general welfare."94 Thus, in and of themselves,
91. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941). In upholding the
Fair Labor Standards Act, the Darby Court noted, "Whatever their motive
and purpose, regulations of commerce which do not infringe some constitu-
tional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred on Congress by the
Commerce Clause."
92. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
93. See id. at 276.
94 See Butler, 297 U.S. at 66 ("[Tlhe power of Congress to authorize ex-
penditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct
grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.").
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the taxing and spending powers add greatly to the other enu-
merated powers. Given the engine for revenue raising repre-
sented by the taxing power, Congress could spend to achieve
many, many things. But one thing remained important: The
power was to spend (i.e., buy things), not to regulate, and the
enumeration of specific regulatory powers still was relevant in
limiting congressional authority.95
In Dole, however, the Supreme Court held that Congress
could attach "conditions" (read: "regulations") to spending
grants, even if those conditions exceeded the scope of Con-
gress's otherwise enumerated regulatory powers.96 The specific
question in Dole, answered in the affirmative by the Court, was
whether Congress could condition the receipt of federal funds
on the recipient states raising their minimum drinking age.97
The question was raised in Dole because in light of the Twenty-
first Amendment Congress arguably lacked the authority to
regulate drinking ages directly.98 The Court appeared willing
to accept this, but upheld the law nonetheless: "Here Congress
has acted indirectly under its spending power to encourage
uniformity in the States' drinking ages.... [W]e find this legis-
lative effort within constitutional bounds even if Congress may
not regulate drinking ages directly."99
If Congress can circumvent limitations on its enumerated
power simply by purchasing compliance in areas it could not
regulate directly, then the enumeration of powers is practically
meaningless. Congress, through its taxing power, has a vir-
tually limitless source of wealth-enough, at any rate, to buy
compliance with the few things that otherwise exceed its grasp
under the already broad interpretations of the enumerated
powerslco Congress likewise, and correctly, has an extremely
broad power to spend. But if Congress can attach whatever
conditions it wishes to the receipt of funds, Congress may
95. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
96. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 211-12.
97. See id. at 206.
98. See id. at 205-06.
99. Id. at 206 (emphasis added).
100. This is especially the case given that the Supreme Court permits
Congress to leverage the grants, using small portions of them to fund large
regulatory conditions. In Dole, for example, Congress purchased a national
drinking age for five percent of the funds otherwise obtainable under specified
highway grant programs. See id. at 211; see also Vicki C. Jackson, Federal-
ism and the Uses and Limits of the Law: A Matter of Printziple? 47-48 (Aug.
4, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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achieve in that fashion what has been barred to it by limita-
tions on the enumerated powers. 01 At that point it becomes
fair to ask, "What is the point of enumerating powers?" °2
Like its Commerce Clause counterparts, neither the doc-
trinal test employed in Dole nor the Court's broader opinion
contained any indication of when congressional power ought to
be available, or any concern for the values of federalism jeopard-
ized by the Court's holding. The omission was particularly ap-
parent in this instance, because Justice O'Connor addressed
federalism concerns directly in dissent."3 Moreover, concerns
about eviscerating limitations on enumerated powers at the
expense of state authority had played a major role in Dole's
doctrinal predecessor, United States v. Butler."° Given this
context, the silence was deafening. Once again, nationalized
power was enhanced without any understanding of whether its
exercise was necessary or appropriate, and the concern for
state autonomy was virtually ignored.
E. CONGRESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL DISPLACEMENT OF STATE
LAW: THE POWER OF PREEMPTION
From the founding, there has been little doubt but that
federal law trumps state law. If Congress intended a specific
national law to displace a conflicting state law, the state law
101 See McCoy and Friedman, supra note 9, at 87.
102. The power to attach conditions was not left completely unlimited by
the Supreme Court, but the limitations do not address the concerns about fed-
eralism to which this Part is addressed. The expenditure must be in the
"general welfare" (a question the Court concedes is virtually nonjusticiable),
the condition must be unambiguous, the condition cannot violate another con-
stitutional prohibition such as the First Amendment, and the condition cannot
be coercive. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08. The dissent urged an additional
limitation which would have prevented expansion of the conditional spending
power into a limitless means of regulation-that conditions on spending
grants only be permitted if they were in effect specifications of how the money
should be spent. See id. at 213, 217 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See Lessig,
supra note 9, at 188-190 (suggesting that Justice O'Connor's rule is superior
to that of Chief Justice Rehnquist). The majority rejected this, however, in-
stead stating only that the condition must relate to the expenditure in some
very loose way. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208 n.3; McCoy & Friedman, supra note
9, at 106-07, 122-23 (arguing that the majority's germaneness requirement is
a contentless version of O'Connor's rule); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Un-
constitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1462 (1989) (discussing the
Court's divisions over the question of germaneness in Dole).
103. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 212-18 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
104. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
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must give way. The Supremacy Clause says as much,1" 5 and
harmonious relations require that one sovereign's law be
deemed supreme. This supremacy of federal law has not re-
ceived sustained challenge, other than at rare, if notable, junc-
tures in our nation's history.10 6
As history progressed, however, the Supreme Court came
to recognize an even broader power in Congress to displace
state law, the power of preemption.10 7 Preemption refers to the
ability of Congress to displace state lawmaking power in any
area in which Congress has regulatory authority,108 whether or
not Congress ever has exercised its authority." 9 Thus, not only
105. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (" Tis Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.").
106. The most prominent example, of course, is the Nullification Crisis.
The leading proponent of Nullification, South Carolinian John C. Calhoun,
theorized that the states could constitutionally veto federal law. See JOHN C.
CALHOUN, FORT HILL ADDRESS (1831), reprinted in THE NULLIFICATION ERA
140-47 (William W. Freehling ed., 1967). The theory met force in 1833, when
Congress authorized use of the military to enforce the laws of the federal govern-
ment. See generally RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE UNION AT RISK (1987) (discussing
the political and constitutional debates surrounding Jacksonian democracy,
federalism, and the Nullification Crisis).
107. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L.
REV. 767, 785 (1994) [hereinafter Gardbaum, Preemption] (arguing that no
state law was actually overturned on preemption grounds until 1912).
108. See S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican
Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 687 n.4 (1991) [hereinafter Hoke, Preemption Pa-
thologies] ("[Tihe term 'federal preemption' expresses the conclusion that
state or local law must be disabled from operation because it conflicts with
some aspect of a federal legislative scheme."); see also TRIBE, supra note 50, at
479 (stating that preemption occurs "[slo long as Congress acts within an area
delegated to it").
109. States have only permissive power to legislate in fields in which Con-
gress has inherent regulatory authority. See Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry.
Co. v. Hardwick Farmers Elevator Co., 226 U.S. 426, 435 (1913) ("[IThe State
may exert authority until Congress acts under the assumption that Congress
by inaction has tacitly authorized it to do so. . . ."). That power may be de-
stroyed by congressional action. In the early part of this century, any con-
gressional action would automatically destroy state regulatory authority
throughout an entire field, see id., a doctrine Gardbam calls "latent exclusiv-
ity". Gardbaum, Preemption, supra note 107, at 801-02. Today the scope of
preemption is determined by the extent of actual conflict between federal and
state law, or by congressional intent to occupy the field. See English v. Gen-
eral Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990); see also Gardbaum, Preemption, supra
note 107, at 805-07 (discussing the centrality of intent in modern preemption
doctrine).
1997] 343
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
do state laws fall in specific instances in which Congress in-
tended a federal rule to be supreme, but the Supreme Court
has held that Congress can-again, within its broad enumerated
or implied powers-decide that in any given area the state's
ability to regulate should be curtailed. This preemption may
be complete, i.e., Congress may choose to occupy the field of
regulation entirely, or it may be partial, preempting state law
only within given bounds. 1 ' Moreover, at times the Supreme
Court will infer preemption from a pattern of national regulation
even if Congress has expressed no intent on the subject."'
The various preemption doctrines mirror these concepts
precisely. Generally speaking, the Supreme Court applies a
three-part test in order to determine if state law has been dis-
placed.112 First, the Court looks to congressional enactments to
see if Congress has been explicit in its desire to preempt."3
Second, in the absence of express preemption, the Court ascer-
tains whether there is a direct conflict between the exercise of
state and federal authority." 4 Third, even if there is no direct
conflict and no express preemption, the Court might find that
state regulatory authority is preempted because it is clear from
the pattern of federal enactments that Congress has "occupied
the field."" 5
The rhetoric of preemption law is somewhat favorable to
state regulatory authority. Perhaps this is true because, at
110. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) pres-
ents a fairly straightforward example of complete preemption. Section 514 of
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994), "indicates Congress's intent to establish
the regulation of employee welfare benefit plans as exclusively a federal con-
cern." New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656 (1995) (citations omitted). Compare the
partial preemption of the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Educa-
tion Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-252, 100 Stat. 30 (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408 (1994)), which precludes state warning requirements but,
at the same time, preserves state law damage actions based on smokeless to-
bacco products. See id. § 4406; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,
518 (1992) (examining the partial preemption status of the Comprehensive
Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986).
111. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("The
scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.").
112. In a note to English v. General Electric Co., the Court remarked that
the three-category framework is not a rigid one, and that it is invoked largely
because of prior use. See English, 496 U.S. at 79-80 n.5 (1990).
113. See id. at 78-79.
114. See id. at 79.
115. Id.
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least in the absence of express preemption, and particularly in
the case of occupy-the-field preemption, the courts really are on
their own in deciding whether to displace state authority.
Moreover, in cases where no conflict is evident, a holding that
state authority is preempted leaves a regulatory vacuum. 116
Thus, the Supreme Court has stated that in deciding preemption
cases it must be respectful of not displacing state police power
inappropriately.1 7 The Court even has gone so far as to say
that given the necessary solicitude for state regulatory author-
ity, express congressional preemption of state authority must
be construed narrowly.'
Although this rhetoric seems favorable to state interests,
the reality is quite different. First, as Stephen Gardbaum has
explained so well, preemption-the practice of displacing state
law even when there is not a conflict-does not necessarily fol-
low at all from the idea of federal supremacy.'19 Instead, it is a
much greater intrusion wholly of the Coures making.120 Second,
116. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation &
Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 207-08 (1983) (eschewing a preemption holding to
avoid a regulatory vacuum); TRIBE, supra note 50, at 479, 497-98 (discussing
the legal vacuum created by field preemption); Hoke, Preemption Pathologies,
supra note 108, at 719-21 (noting that regulatory vacuums are especially
likely when preemption is imposed by judicial rulings rather than by Congress
or federal agencies, and citing judicial elaboration of the Federal Arbitration
Act as an example).
117. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("[We
start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and mani-
fest purpose of Congress.").
118. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2250 (1996) (declaring
that the presumption against preemption applies to the scope as well as to the
existence of congressional intent to invalidate state laws); Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) ("Congress' enactment of a provision de-
fining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that
reach are not pre-empted.").
119. See Gardbaum, Preemption, supra note 107, at 773-77; Gardbaum,
New Deal, supra note 50, at 532-40; see also S. Candice Hoke, Transcending
Conventional Supremacy: A Reconstruction of the Supremacy Clause, 24
CONN. L. REV. 829, 885-90 (1992) (arguing that preemption claims do not
arise under the Supremacy Clause, although they must retain a linkage to it);
Hoke, Preemption Pathologies, supra note 108, at 735 (arguing that the Su-
premacy Clause dictates that "any valid federal preemption decision must be
based upon some notion of proscribed state law conflict with a federal legisla-
tive scheme").
120. See Gardbaum, Preemption, supra note 107, at 803-04 (arguing that
the legal principles governing preemption analysis were introduced in South-
ern Railway Co. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424 (1912)); Gardbaum, New Deal, supra
note 50, at 532-35 (arguing that nascent preemption doctrine was a product of
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even if Congress is granted the affimative power to displace
state law (whether or not there are conflicting federal rules),
the Court could have limited such preemption to situations in
which Congress was express in its desire. As it is, however, occupy-
the-field preemption (admittedly rarely invoked in recent
memory) puts power in the courts to find state regulatory
authority preempted even when Congress is silent. 12' Third,
empirical studies of Supreme Court preemption decisions indicate
that even the Burger and Rehnquist courts, generally believed
to be friendly to state interests, have frequently found state
authority to be preempted.2 2
Not only is the preemption power quite broad, but as else-
where, the preemption decisions display no theoretical appre-
ciation concerning the appropriate allocation of national and
state authority. When the Court interprets potentially pre-
emptive enactments narrowly, it justifies the decision on the
ground of preserving the police power. Yet those decisions offer no
clue as to why such preservation is important. Rather, the
Court simply observes that the states have traditionally exercised
such power. 123 Likewise, preemption decisions demonstrate no
the Lochner Court).
121. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151
(1980) (holding that "comprehensive" federal regulation preempted state
authority to tax non-Indians on tribal reservations even though Congress had
offered no explicit statement on the subject); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 74 (1941) (holding state alien registration law preempted by the Alien
Registration Act of 1940, by virtue of the latter's uniform and national charac-
ter). The same is true of the branch of "conflict" preemption that does not de-
pend upon an actual conflict in laws, but only the existence of a state law that
would, in the Courts view, "frustrate" some more general "purpose" of Con-
gress. See, e.g., Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 462 U.S. 406, 411-12 (1983)
(holding that state law permitting oral sales of aircraft would "defeat the pur-
pose" of the Federal Aviation Act-"to create 'a central clearing house for rec-
ordation of titles'") (citations omitted); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 654
(1971) (holding that the Arizona Safety Responsibility Act had the purpose
and effect of frustrating federal bankruptcy law).
122. See David M. O'Brien, The Supreme Court and Intergovernmental Re-
lations: What Happened to "Our Federalism"?, 9 J.L. & POL. 609, 622-23
(1993) (showing that the Burger Court upheld preemption in 46% of cases and
the Rehnquist Court in 52%--rates not dramatically different from those of
earlier, less conservative Courts).
123. The mantra of Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)--"[Wle start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the
States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress"--is repeated without elaboration in the
following: California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham
Construction, NA, 117 S. Ct. 832, 838 (1997); New York State Conference of
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655
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coherent understanding of when and why national authority
ought to preempt state law, mirroring precisely the lack of under-
standing present in the enumerated powers decisions.
F. JUDICIAL DISPLACEMENT OF STATE LAWS: THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE
At least with regard to preemption there is the appearance
that Congress intended state law to give way to federal inter-
ests; in the final doctrinal area-the dormant Commerce
Clause-this appearance disappears entirely. Under the dor-
mant Commerce Clause courts strike down state enactments
on the ground that they interfere with the concerns underlying
the Commerce Clause, despite the fact that Congress has been
completely silent on the subject.124 In other words, in dormant
Commerce Clause cases the courts alone do the work of displacing
state law, in the name of furthering national interests.
125
The Constitution itself provides no indication that courts
are to strike state laws under the dormant commerce power.
The Constitution says only that "Congress shall have the
Power . . . [to regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States." 126 Congress not having regulated, one might conclude
(1995); Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516; English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S.
72, 79 (1990); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conserva-
tion & Development Commission, 461 U.S. 190, 206 (1983); and doubtless oth-
ers. Only in Medtronic does the Court add the unilluminating tag: "First, be-
cause the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have
long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of
action... That approach is consistent with both federalism concerns and the
historic primacy of state regulation of matters of health and safety." Med-
tronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2250.
124. See Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce
Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569,
570-71 (arguing that the dormant Commerce Clause has no basis in the text
or textual structure of the Constitution). The first use of the term "dormant"
in connection with the Commerce Clause was in Willson v. Black Bird Creek
Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829). See Julian N. Eule, Laying the
Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 425 n.1 (1982) (making
this point).
125. Dormant commerce cases are not the only ones that supplant state
authority in the name of national uniformity. Another example is federal
common lawmaking in the area of foreign affairs. For a critique of that na-
tionalizing authority that has an affinity with the approach developed here,
see Jack Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA.
L. REV. (1977) (forthcoming Nov. 1997).
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added). Redish and Nugent
examine the various textual and quasi-textual arguments for the dormant
Commerce Clause and conclude that courts should not rely on it to invalidate
state commerce legislation. See Redish & Nugent, supra note 124, at 582-90.
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the states are free to (as the Court itself would say) "occupy the
field." Moreover, Felix Frankfurter tells us that in the ratifi-
cation history of the Constitution, "[tihe conception that the
mere grant of the commerce power to Congress dislodged state
power finds no expression."127 Partly for reasons of history, and
partly because there is no coherent understanding of the val-
ues of federalism, the doctrine has evolved quite differently.
As we saw earlier, the dormant commerce power emerged
early in the nation's history, in part as an artifact of judicial
struggles to understand the shared nature of regulatory power.
In a world of dual sovereignty, such as that hinted at in Gibbons v.
Ogden,12 in which there is exclusive authority in each govern-
mental body, the dormant commerce power is a redundancy. If
the states cannot regulate "commerce" (just as Congress has no
police power), then of course states cannot act in the area of
commercial regulation, whether or not Congress has acted.
The Supreme Court would be correct in striking down a state
regulation of commerce as ultra vires. When the Supreme
Court turned away from notions of dual sovereignty in Cooley
v. Board of Wardens,12 9 states became free to regulate com-
merce, just as was Congress. It was then that the Supreme
Court clearly spelled out a rule for itself in policing the line be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate state regulation of commerce.
At the same time as it enabled states to regulate in the
commercial realm, the Cooley Court took a first-and in many
ways intelligent-stab at identifying the appropriate realms
for state or national decisionmaking. Under the Cooley doc-
trine states were not given free hand to regulate in the absence
of congressional regulation.13 ° Rather, the Court distinguished
between competing demands of uniformity and local diversity
in formulating commercial rules:
[T]he power to regulate commerce, embraces a vast field, containing
not only many, but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their
nature; some imperatively demanding a single uniform rule, operat-
ing equally on the commerce of the United States in every port; and
some, like the subject now in question, as imperatively demanding
Joining Professor Eule, they argue that the Privileges and Immunities Clause
could fulfill the function now served by the dormant Commerce Clause. See
id. at 605-10; Eule, supra note 124, at 446-55.
127. FRANKFURTER, supra note 45, at 12-13.
128. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
129. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
130. See id. at 319.
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that diversity, which alone can meet the local necessities of naviga-
tion. 13
1
Seeing these two categories as themselves separate, the
Cooley Court's solution was obvious: states could regulate
commerce when local diversity was appropriate, so long as
Congress did not displace state efforts, but if uniformity was
necessary, then the states were disabled from regulating.
Simply put, the Court would strike down state regulations that
interfered with necessary national uniformity.
For almost the next century the Court adhered to the
Cooley doctrine, seesawing on the key question of when na-
tional uniformity was necessary, and varying in the extent to
which state prerogatives were respected. The low point for the
states probably was Leissy v. Hardin,'132 in which the Court
took a very broad understanding of when commercial uniform-
ity was necessary, striking state laws regulating the sale of al-
cohol. 33  While mouthing platitudes about the state's police
power,134 the Leissy Court relied on a formal distinction between
commerce and the police power to find that laws regulating the
sale of alcohol were plainly in the former camp.13 5
The high point for the states may have been right before
the fall, in South Carolina State Highway Department v.
Barnwell Bros.136 The Barnwell Court upheld a state law
regulating the weight of trucks on state highways, the Court
stating that "[t]he fact that many states have adopted a differ-
ent standard is not persuasive."'37 Eschewing the formal ap-
131. Id.
132. 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
133. See id. at 124-25 (holding state laws regulating the sale of alcohol to
be unconstitutional and refusing to review congressional determinations of
the subjects of interstate commerce).
134. See, e.g., id. at 108-09. According to the Leissy Court:
The power to pass laws in respect to internal commerce, inspection
laws, quarantine laws, health laws and laws in relation to bridges,
ferries and highways, belongs to the class of powers pertaining to lo-
cality, essential to local intercommunication, to the progress and de-
velopment of local prosperity, and to the protection, the safety and
the welfare of society, originally necessarily belonging to, and upon
the adoption of the Constitution reserved by, the State ....
Id,
135. See id. at 113-114 ("[Wlhat does not belong to commerce is within the
jurisdiction of the police power of the State, but that which does belong to
commerce is within the jurisdiction of the United States ...
136. 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
137. Id. at 195.
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proach of the Leissy Court, and acting far more faithfully to the
Cooley doctrine, the Barnwell Court recognized the importance
of state regulatory authority even if it was commerce that was
being regulated: "It is not any the less a legislative power
committed to the states because it affects interstate commerce,
and courts are not any the more entitled, because interstate
commerce is affected, to substitute their own for the legislative
judgment."38
The modern doctrine of the dormant Commerce Clause,
born shortly after Barnwell, purports to accommodate both na-
tional and state interests. 139 Eschewing the earlier formalism
that divided the world into commerce on the one hand, and the
police power on the other, the modem-day doctrine focuses instead
on the evils that can arise when states regulate in a way that
affects the national market. The modern test comes in two
parts. First, the Court asks if a state law "discriminates"
against interstate commerce. 14° The concern here is protectionist
legislation, which can lead to retaliation and balkanization
among the states. 141 Discriminatory, or protectionist, legislation is
138. Id. at 191.
139. The modern approach was ushered in by Southern Pacific Co. v. Ari-
zona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), in which the Court remarked:
Hence the matters for ultimate determination here are the nature
and extent of the burden which the state regulation... imposes on
interstate commerce, and whether the relative weights of the state
and national interests involved are such as to make inapplicable the
rule, generally observed, that the free flow of interstate commerce
and its freedom from local restraints in matters requiring uniformity
of regulation are interests safeguarded by the commerce clause from
state interference.
Id. at 770-71. For a discussion of the case, see Gardbaum, New Deal, supra
note 50, at 529-31; Redish & Nugent, supra note 124, at 580-81; Robert A.
Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause as a Restriction on State Regulation
and Taxation: An Analysis in Terms of Constitutional Structure, 31 WAYNE L.
REV. 885, 946-49 (1985); Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 125, 142-43 (1979).
140. See Oregon Waste Sys. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93,
99 (1994) ("[T]he first step in analyzing any law subject to judicial scrutiny
under the negative Commerce Clause is to determine whether it regulates
evenhandedly with only incidental effects on interstate commerce, or dis-
criminates against interstate commerce.") (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441
U.S. 332, 336 (1979)) (citation omitted); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617, 626-29 (1978) (striking down a New Jersey statute which dis-
criminated against articles of commerce coming from outside the state); cf
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (holding that nondis-
criminatory legislation "will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits").
141. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 117 S. Ct.
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per se invalid." Second, if a state law does not discriminate
against interstate commerce, then the courts look further to
ensure that the burdens on commerce do not outweigh the
benefits to the state of regulating.14 3
Among the members of the Court and among commenta-
tors there is some confusion about this second step. Some see
it as a way only of smoking out more subtle protectionist legis-
lation: if the burdens are high and the benefits illusory, then
one suspects a protectionist purpose motivated the law.1"
1590, 1599 (1997) ("Avoiding... 'economic Balkanization' and the retaliatory
acts of other States that may follow, is one of the central purposes of our
negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence.") (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma,
441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979)) (citations omitted); Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 116 S.
Ct. 848, 855 n.3 (1996) ("[Piromotion of in-state markets at the expense of out-
of-state ones furthers the 'economic Balkanization' that our Dormant Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence has long sought to prevent.") (quoting Hughes,
441 U.S. at 325-26 (1979)); see also Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and
State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84
MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1112-25 (1986) (arguing that the purpose of the dormant
Commerce Clause is to foster the national interest in avoiding state protec-
tionism). But see Redish & Nugent, supra note 124, at 599-601 (critiquing
Regan's argument).
142. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392
(1994) ("Discrimination against interstate commerce in favor of local business
or investment is per se invalid, save in a narrow class of cases in which the
municipality can demonstrate, under rigorous scrutiny, that it has no other
means to advance a legitimate local interest."); Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 99
("If a restriction on commerce is discriminatory, it is virtually per se invalid.");
see also Regan, supra note 141, at 1134-36 (arguing that "we should just make
the per se rule absolute and have done with it").
143. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390 ("For this inquiry, our case law yields
two lines of analysis: first, whether the ordinance discriminates against inter-
state commerce, and second, whether the ordinance imposes a burden on in-
terstate commerce that is 'clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits.") (quoting Bruce Church, 397 U.S. at 142) (citation omitted); Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977) ("[A] find-
ing that state legislation furthers matters of legitimate local concern, even in
the health and consumer protection areas, does not end the inquiry ...
Rather, when such state legislation comes into conflict with the Commerce
Clause's overriding requirement of a national 'common market" we are con-
fronted with the task of effecting an accommodation of the competing national
and local interests.") (citing Bruce Church, 397 U.S. at 142). The classic work
encouraging adoption of the balancing part of the test is Noel T. Dowling, In-
terstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REv. 1, 20-21 (1940).
144. See Regan, supra note 141, at 1206-87 (arguing that although the
Court purports to employ a benefit-burden balancing test, it in fact engages in
review for discriminatory purpose). Justice Scalia has explicitly agreed with
Regan, and added that the balancing test is "ill suited to the judicial function
and should be undertaken rarely if at all." CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). Similarly, Justice Souter has objected to use of the term
1997]
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Others see true benefit-burden balancing, concluding that
when the burdens are too high, interstate commerce simply is
jeopardized to the extent that judicial invalidation of state law
is necessary.'45 As will be evident, the Court's weighing of in-
terests under the second step has not been uniform. 46
On its face, the doctrine of the dormant Commerce Clause
appears to be respectful of state authority. Protectionism is
construed simply to mean "differential treatment of in-state
and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former
and burdens the latter."'47 Under benefit-burden balancing,
the state regulation supposedly will be upheld so long as the
benefits to the state are not "illusory," the Court sometimes
taking the view that a nondiscriminatory state law with any
actual benefits will be upheld.'48 The opinions are rife with
language praising the importance of state regulation to protect
the health, safety, and welfare of state citizens. 49
"balancing test," and has remarked, "The analysis is similar to, but softer
around the edges than, the test we employ in cases of overt discrimination."
Carbone, 511 U.S. at 423 (Souter, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted); see also
TRIBE, supra note 50, at 417 ("[T~he negative implications of the commerce
clause derive principally from a political theory of union, not from an eco-
nomic theory of free trade. The function of the clause is to ensure national
solidarity, not economic efficiency.") (footnote omitted).
145. See Eule, supra note 124, at 446 (arguing that the Court is concerned
with "the flow of commerce rather than with the nature of the process that
produced the legislation") (footnote omitted); Tushnet, supra note 139, at 141-
43 (arguing that the Court properly considers efficiency in the dormant Com-
merce Clause area).
146. See infra text accompanying notes 166-185.
147. Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 99 (defining discrimination as used in the
phrase "discrimination against interstate commerce").
148. See CTS, 481 U.S. at 92 (holding that "possibility" of coercion in take-
over bids provided justification for law that conditioned acquisition of control
of a corporation on approval of a majority of the preexisting disinterested
shareholders); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670
(1981) (" lIf... justifications are not illusory, the Court will not second-guess
legislative judgment about their importance in comparison with related burdens
on interstate commerce.'") (quoting Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434
U.S. 429, 449 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
149. See General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 117 S. Ct. 811, 828 (1997)
(referring to "our traditional recognition of the need to accommodate state
health and safety regulation in applying dormant Commerce Clause princi-
ples"); Raymond, 434 U.S. at 443 (1978) ("[T]he Court has been most reluctant
to invalidate under the Commerce Clause state legislation in the field of
safety where the propriety of local regulation has long been recognized.")
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Huron Portland Cement Co.
v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1960) ("In determining whether the
state has imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce, it must be borne
in mind that the Constitution when 'conferring upon Congress the regulation
[Vol. 82:317
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Although the rhetoric of the dormant Commerce Clause
decisions sounds out favorably for state autonomy, in reality
this line of cases may be the most devastating to state author-
ity. While purporting to act with deference to the regulatory
authority of the states, in reality the Supreme Court pursues a
course of enforcing uniformity and a free market in trade, concepts
that have the potential to level state authority. As Justice Ste-
vens said in a somewhat different context, "uniformity is an
ungovernable engine."5 ' By its very nature an insistence on
uniformity has the potential to spell the end of state regulatory
autonomy. As both Stephen Gardbaum and Don Regan have
made clear, there is a significant difference between a prohibition
on protectionism and an insistence on free trade, the latter
necessarily running flat against countless state regulatory
choices.' 51
The Court's free-trade tendencies were evident in the recent
decision in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,152 in
which the Court struck down a city's flow-control ordinance. In
order to handle solid waste, Clarkstown had entered into a
contract with a company that would build and operate a trans-
fer station at which goods were separated into recyclables and
nonrecyclables. 153 Construction of the facility was financed by
a "tipping fee" charged at the transfer station.154 At the end of
a five-year period, the town would purchase the facility for one
dollar.1 55 In order to ensure the flow of goods sufficient to fi-
of commerce.... never intended to cut the States off from legislating on all
subjects relating to the health, life, and safety of their citizens, though the
legislation might indirectly affect the commerce of the country.' ") (quoting
Sherlock v. Ailing, 93 U.S. 99, 103 (1876)) (alteration in original).
150. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1070 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
15L See Gardbaum, New Deal, supra note 50, at 513-14 (borrowing from
international trade terminology and distinguishing between a free-trade area
(which abolishes tariffs and quotas between member states), a customs union
(which creates a common tariff policy on goods imported from non-member
states), and a common market (which creates a common regulatory regime
that prevents indirect as well as direct restrictions on the free flow of goods
among member states)); Regan, supra note 141, at 1096-97 (distinguishing
between regulations inconsistent with economic laissez-faire and protectionist
regulations). Gardbaum suggests that the Leissy decision constitutionalized a
common market. See Gardbaum, New Deal, supra note 50, at 512.
Don Regan's is perhaps the best developed, most forceful, and most cited
argument as to why the Court should limit itself to striking protectionist leg-
islation.
152. 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
153. See id at 387.
154. See id.
155. See id.
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nance the facility over the initial five-year period, Clarkstown
passed an ordinance requiring that all nonhazardous solid
waste in the town be brought to the transfer station.'56 The
ordinance was challenged by another waste processor when the
town sought an injunction enforcing the tipping law.57  The
question was whether the flow-control ordinance requiring all
waste to be tipped at the town facility violated the dormant
Commerce Clause.158
As the dissent in the case made clear, the Clarkstown or-
dinance did not follow the pattern of laws typically struck
down as protectionist. 159 The hallmark of protectionism, ac-
cording to the Court, is differential treatment of in-state and
out-of-state entities."6 ° Here, all were treated alike: every in-
dividual and company was required to tip waste at the municipal
facility. Indeed, the municipal ordinance clearly disadvantaged
one group of insiders more than it disadvantaged anyone else,
that being the people of Clarkstown who voted to impose the
tipping rule on themselves, thus raising their own costs for the
disposal of solid waste. As the dissent understood matters, the
law at issue was simply a nonprotectionist way for the munici-
pality to fund a solution to the solid waste problems facing all
communities.' 6'
The majority nonetheless struck down the law in an opinion
that clearly privileged the idea of free trade, rather than simply
eliminating protectionism. In the face of the dissent's careful
analysis, it is difficult to accept the majority's repeated asser-
tion that the flow-control ordinance discriminated against out-
156. See id.
157. See id. at 388.
158. See id. at 389.
159. See id. at 410-11 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The ordinance... falls out-
side that class of tariff or protectionist measures that the Commerce Clause
has traditionally been thought to bar States from enacting against each other,
and when the majority subsumes the ordinance within the class of laws this
Court has struck down as facially discriminatory... the majority is in fact
greatly extending the Clause's dormant reach.").
160. See Oregon Waste Sys. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93,
99 (1994) ("As we use the term here, 'discrimination' simply means differential
treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the
former and burdens the latter.").
161. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 411 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The town has
found a way to finance a public improvement, not by transferring its cost to
out-of-state economic interests, but by spreading it among the local generators
of trash, an equitable result with tendencies that should not disturb the
Commerce Clause and should not be disturbed by us.").
354 [Vol. 82:317
VALUING FEDERALISM
of-state interests in favor of in-state interests. It is true that
only one company benefited from the ordinance, to the exclusion of
out-of-state interests that might have sought to dispose of
Clarkstown's waste. But the same was true vis-a-vis in-state
interests, and as the dissent pointed out in a footnote, the record
was silent as to whether the owner of Clarkstown's facility was
from within or without the state.'62 Yielding better insight into
the Court's thinking were repeated references in the Carbone
decision suggesting that the Court saw the Commerce Clause
as guaranteeing a free national market.163 It particularly is
significant that in its central claim that the Commerce Clause
promotes the "free flow" of commerce, the Court cited not a
dormant Commerce Clause case, but the decision in Jones &
Laughlin Steel.'" Undoubtedly Congress could decide in favor
of an entirely free market, but it has not done so, and the
Court's limited antidiscrimination and antiprotectionism deci-
sions do not justify the result in Carbone.
For all its talk of deferring to state police regulations that
provide nonprotectionist benefits to the state, in recent decisions
the Court looks more toward ensuring national uniformity, a
quite different approach and one far more devastating to state
regulatory authority. This was evident in Kassel v. Consoli-
dated Freightways,65 in which the Supreme Court struck an
Iowa state law limiting the length of double trucks on its high-
ways. Kassel is best understood as a case in which uniformity
was the Court's primary concern. The law in Kassel was chal-
lenged by trucking companies because it forced those companies to
either divert shipments around Iowa or move them to smaller
trucks to ship through Iowa. 66 The record as to the safety of
the longer double trucks was distinctly mixed, and could been
seen in quite different ways, as the plurality and dissent made
162. See id. at 418 n.7.
163. See id. at 389 ("[A]ctions are within the domain of the Commerce
Clause if they burden interstate commerce or impede its free flow."); id. at 393
("The Commerce Clause presumes a national market free from local legisla-
tion that discriminates in favor of local interests."). Admittedly the second
quote speaks of discrimination, but (a) the assertion is unsubstantiated on the
record; and (b) in any event is not necessarily protectionist, since in-state in-
terests were burdened as well. See also Bednar & Eskridge, supra note 15, at
1489-90 (accusing the Court of "fetishize"-ing the free market in Carbone).
164. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 389 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1937)).
165. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
166. See id. at 667, 674.
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clear. 167 Yet, as the dissent demonstrates, the safety benefits
arguably achieved by the state regulation were far from
"illusory."168  Thus under the Court's own formulation of the
second step of its dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, the law
should have been upheld.
Despite its troubling facts, Kassel can only awkwardly be
viewed as a protectionism case.169 True, the Governor had vetoed
a law passed by the legislature to raise the length limit, ques-
tioning (in the veto message) why Iowa should subject itself to
additional through-state traffic. 170  In addition, the older law
did contain exceptions that seemed designed to favor longer
truck lengths for traffic that benefited Iowa, such as an exception
for agricultural vehicles, or a "border-cities" exception.17 1 The
problem with the protectionist rationale, however, was that
Iowa had clearly not enacted the law to frustrate interstate
commerce, it had simply failed to change its law to accommo-
date the interests of the trucking industry. The law at issue
was enacted long before it was challenged, at a time when it
imposed no disuniformity of regulation.172 Many other states had
167. The plurality concluded that the record showed that 65-foot double
trailers were as safe as 55-foot singles. See id. at 672-73. But as the dissent
correctly pointed out: "Conclusions that the double configuration is as safe as
the single do not at all mean the 65-foot double is as safe as the 60-foot dou-
ble, or that length is not relevant to vehicle safety." Id. at 696 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
168. The dissent contended that longer trucks increased the risk of acci-
dent, were more likely to clog intersections, posed greater problems at the
scene of an accident, and were more likely to jackknife or upset. See id. at
694-95 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
169. There were strong suggestions in Kassel, both in the plurality and in
Justice Brennan's concurrence, that the legislation at issue was protectionist
and hence invalid. The plurality complained that "Iowa's law tends to in-
crease the number of accidents, and to shift the incidence of them from Iowa
to other States," id. at 675, and that the laws contained exemptions that
"secure to Iowans many of the benefits of large trucks while shunting to
neighboring States many of the costs associated with their use," id. at 663.
Justice Brennan agreed with these sentiments, but concluded that the pur-
pose behind the law was protectionist in nature. See id. at 685 (Brennan, J.
concurring). As will be seen, there are serious problems with this conclusion,
which might explain why the plurality treated Kassel as a balancing case un-
der the second step of the dormant commerce analysis. See id. at 670-71.
170. Governor Ray remarked, "However, with this bill, the Legislature has
pursued a course that would benefit only a few Iowa-based companies while
providing a great advantage for out-of-state trucking firms and competitors at
the expense of our Iowa citizens." Id. at 677 (citation omitted).
171 See id. at 676-77.
172. The law was first enacted in 1947 and was entitled "An Act to promote
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laws similar to Iowa's.17 3 The trucking companies could have
gone to Congress to obtain a national uniform law, but appeared
to prefer picking the state laws off one by one in litigation.1
74
Moreover, the Iowa law should have fared pretty well un-
der some prior decisions of the Supreme Court. In Barnwell
the Court had upheld a differential weight limit for trucks on
state highways, stating that "[flew subjects of state regulation
are so peculiarly of local concern as is the use of state high-
ways."1715 And in Cooley the law at issue also was riddled with
exceptions that suggested some protectionist purpose, but the
Court there recognized that so long as the law generally
achieved its aim, some such exceptions were permissible.
7 6
The Cooley Court found these exemptions nothing but appro-
priate "legislative discretion." Deriving the benefits of the gen-
eral rule was appropriate in cases in which the harm followed,
but the legislature could also generalize about vessels that
might be exempted without causing such harm.7 7
On the other hand, Kassel closely resembles another dor-
mant Commerce Clause case in which the Court clearly chose
the benefits of uniformity over the protection of state regula-
tory authority. That case was Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona
uniformity with other states in the matter of limitations on the size, weight
and speed of motor vehicles ... ." Id. at 683-84 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
173. The dissent noted that 17 states and the District of Columbia, includ-
ing all of New England and most of the Southeast, prohibited the longer
trucks. See id. at 688 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
174. The truckers got the uniform law they wanted a year later, when
Congress passed section 411 of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-424, 96 Stat. 2097 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §
31111 (1994)). However, the law was the product of compromise; parts of sec-
tions 511 and 513 of the same act provide for increased taxes on gasoline and
diesel fuel and heavy-truck usage. See id. (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.
§§ 4041 & 4481 (1994)). For discussion of the legislation, see Steven C. Kohl,
Recent Development, 8 J. CORP. L. 543, 563-64 (1983); see also Bednar &
Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1488-89 (making the point that Congress is better
suited to deal with cases like Kassel).
175. South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177,
187 (1938).
176. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 313 (1851) ("[Flair
objects of a law imposing half-pilotage when a pilot is not received, may be
secured, and at the same time some classes of vessels exempted from such
charge.").
177. See id. (declaring it to be a "fair exercise of legislative discretion" to
relieve "from the charge of half-pilotage, such vessels as from their size, or the
nature of their employment, should be exempted from contributing to the
support of pilots").
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ex rel. Sullivan,"'8 in which the Court struck down a state law
limiting the length of railroad trains. 17 9 In Southern Pacific, as
in Kassel, the safety evidence was surely a matter of fair dis-
pute. Although the Court claimed the safety benefits were
small,' it was clear in Southern Pacific, as it was in Kassel,
that the real concern was the obstruction of commerce created
by disuniformity: "Enforcement of the law in Arizona, while
train lengths remain unregulated or are regulated by varying
standards in other states, must inevitably result in an impair-
ment of uniformity of efficient railroad operation because the
railroads are subjected to regulation which is not uniform in its
application."18'
These cases clearly suggest that the Supreme Coures dormant
commerce jurisprudence is tending toward requiring national
uniformity. It could be, as Donald Regan suggests, that Kassel
and Southern Pacific are transportation cases and should be
understood as sui generis.1 8 2 Regan distinguishes transportation
cases from movement of goods cases, arguing that the needs for
uniformity are greater in transportation, and that antiprotec-
tionism should be the only rule in movement of goods cases. 83
It is true that the courts have tolerated some greater disuni-
formity in movement of goods cases.8' Yet, the argument is
178. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
179. Justice Black called attention in his dissent to the failure of the train
companies to seek relief in Congress:
It is significant, however, that American railroads never once asked
Congress to exercise its unquestioned power to enact uniform legis-
lation on that subject, and thereby invalidate the Arizona law. That
which for some unexplained reason they did not ask Congress to do
when it had the very subject of train length limitations under consid-
eration, they shortly thereafter asked an Arizona state court to do.
Id. at 786-87 (Black, J., dissenting).
180. Justice Stone argued that shortening trains resulted in an increase in
the number of trains and train operations, with an attendant rise in risk of
accident. See id. at 775-79.
181. Id. at 773.
182. See Regan, supra note 141, at 1182-85.
183. See id. at 1098-1101.
184. Compare Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456
(1981), with Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959). In Clover
Leaf, the Court upheld a Minnesota statute banning the retail sale of milk in
plastic nonreturnable containers, despite the fact that the law burdened the
out-of-state plastics industry more heavily than the local pulpwood industry.
See Clover, 449 U.S. at 473. But in Bibb, a transportation case, the Court
struck down an Illinois statute requiring that trucks be equipped with a
specified type of mudguard. Justice Stevens specifically noted that the law
was nondiscriminatory, but still burdened interstate commerce unconstitu-
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not entirely persuasive, because increasingly, in contexts out-
side of transportation, the Court is coming to rely on the lan-
guage of uniformity and on a less-deferential balancing of bur-
dens and benefits.1 85
The dormant conierce cases represent a clear and ener-
getic effort by the Supreme Court to pursue a doctrinal line
that accords very little value to federalism.18 6 Unlike the other
doctrinal areas examined above, the Supreme Court is moving
on its own here, with little guidance from Congress. Moreover,
unlike the other areas, in which the Court has little sense of
why national regulation must be preferred over state regulation,
the Court here does advance strong national interests, cer-
tainly in antiprotectionism, but also in free trade and national
uniformity. Yet it is ironic, to say the least, that the Court evidences
no theory of national regulation when it reviews an explicit act
of the national Congress, but when it acts alone the Court
adopts a theory more aggressively nationalizing than any Congress
has pursued. 187 At the same time, the Court pays lip service to
tionally. See Bibb, 359 U.S. at 529.
185. See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336-37 (1989) ("[T]he
practical effect of the statute must be evaluated not only by considering the
consequences of the statute itself, but also by considering how the challenged
statute may interact with the legitimate regulatory regimes of other States
and what effect would arise if not one, but many or every, State adopted
similar legislation. Generally speaking, the Commerce Clause protects
against inconsistent legislation arising from the projection of one state regula-
tory regime into the jurisdiction of another state."); Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. New York Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 583 (1986) (noting that prolif-
eration of affirmation laws had increased the likelihood that a seller would be
subjected to inconsistent obligations in different states); Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982) (observing that if all states enacted similar legisla-
tion, "interstate commerce in securities transactions generated by tender of-
fers would be thoroughly stifled"); cf. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am.,
481 U.S. 69, 88-89 (1987).
186. In response to a reading of this section, David Shapiro offered the in-
sightful point that to the extent the line between antiprotectionism and free-
trade principles is not clear, the dormant Commerce Clause decisions could be
seen as more helpful than hurtful to the states, simply because the greater
danger for states is unreasonable trade barriers, not limitations on state
regulatory authority. See Letter from David L. Shapiro to Barry Friedman
(July 11, 1997) (on file with author).
187. This is especially ironic in light of the fact that the Constitution does
not adopt a free-trade principle, at least as the Court is coming to understand
the idea of free trade. See Eule, supra note 124, at 429-34 ('The commerce
clause thus cannot be said to establish and protect free trade or a national
marketplace as a fundamental constitutional value."); Sedler, supra note 139,
at 986-91 (arguing that there is no evidence that a major historic purpose for
the Commerce Clause was to create a free-trade area among the states).
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the police power, but strikes down many state laws that come
its way.
G. THE STATE AUTONOMY EXCEPTION: THE "AFFIRMATWE
LIMITATION" CASES
In fairness to the Supreme Court, concerns about state
regulatory authority are not without some attention in the
cases. There is another, smaller body of cases in which the Su-
preme Court's focus has been on the value of state autonomy.188
From these cases, in fact, it is possible to begin to identify the
values of federalism that register on the state side of the bal-
ance. The impact of these cases in the broader scheme of
things is quite small, however, although it is not without some
significance.
The seminal case in this line was National League of Cities
v. Usery,'89 in which the Supreme Court held that Congress's
commerce power was limited insofar as Congress sought to
regulate the states directly (as opposed to regulating individu-
als and entities within them). National League of Cities was a
clear attempt to find some limit on the commerce power, in the
face of its dramatic expansion since the New Deal. In National
League of Cities, the Court struck down the minimum-wage
and maximum-hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
188. In addition to the cases discussed here, there is another recent trend
in the case law to protect state autonomy, albeit in a different way. That is
the Eleventh Amendment precedent holding that Congress may not rely on
the Commerce Clause to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity. See Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131 (1996). The Eleventh
Amendment doctrine mirrors other recent trends in (a) siding with the states
over the national Congress, and (b) basing the decision on fairly formalist
considerations. Although the Seminole Tribe decision overruled Union Gas v.
Pennsylvania, 491 U.S. 1 (1989), Union Gas was itself but a plurality and of
recent vintage. In reality the result in Seminole had long been the one obtain-
ing under the Eleventh Amendment. Nonetheless, there is a wide body of lit-
erature that would read the Eleventh Amendment differently than does the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Akbil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96
YALE L.J. 1425, 1473-84 (1987) (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment em-
bodies no general principle of state sovereign immunity); John J. Gibbons, The
Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1890 (1983) (labeling the Courts interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment "repressive and historically inaccurate"); Jackson, su-
pra note 26, at 500 ("The great weight of contemporary scholarship concludes
that the Eleventh Amendment does not require that states enjoy a jurisdic-
tional immunity from suits in federal courts by their own citizens on federal
claims....").
189. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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Act, to the extent those provisions were applied to state em-
ployees. 190 The strategy of National League of Cities was to
carve out an area of state autonomy-of traditional state func-
tions-in which Congress could not interfere with the essential
attributes of state sovereignty.19' The National League of Cit-
ies decision did not develop comprehensively the reason why
states should be left alone, although it seems clear the Court
felt that states should be able to deliver certain basic services
to their citizens.
192
National League of Cities was quickly overruled, however,
both because of serious structural flaws in the theory of that
case, and on the basis of an odd assessment of the role of the
states in the political process. After a decade of trying to tell a
"traditional" state function from one that was not, in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 93 the Court threw
in the towel, holding that insofar as the states sought protection
from direct congressional regulation, the proper forum was
Congress, and not the courts. 194 In part the Garcia Court rec-
ognized that it is impossible and perhaps also unwise to at-
tempt to identify a list of "traditional" state functions. 195 Times
change, and state regulatory authority must change with them.
Similarly, the Court candidly faced up to the fact that the con-
190. See id. at 852.
191. See id ("We hold that insofar as the challenged amendments operate
to directly displace the State's freedom to structure integral operations in ar-
eas of traditional governmental functions, they are not within the authority
granted Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.").
192. See Frank I. Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permuta-
tions of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J.
1165, 1172 (1977) (suggesting the Court used sovereignty to stand for the
state's role of providing important social services for its citizens); Laurence H.
Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Af-
firmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065,
1076 (1977) (arguing that National League of Cities may be read to suggest
the existence of rights to basic government services).
193. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
194 See id. at 556 (holding that although federal action is limited by the
position of the states in our federal system, "the political process ensures that
that laws that unduly burden the States will not be promulgated").
195. See id. at 546-47 ("We therefore now reject, as unsound in principle
and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal regulation
that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental func-
tion is 'integral' or 'traditional.' Any such rule leads to inconsistent results at
the same time that it disserves principles of democratic self-governance, and
it breeds inconsistency precisely because it is divorced from those princi-
ples.").
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stitutional plan clearly envisages that the states only retain
that authority not delegated to Congress.196 Thus, the correct
constitutional question is not whether Congress has infringed
state authority, but whether Congress in fact possesses the
authority to regulate in a given area under the Commerce
Clause (or any other power). Finally, the Court concluded that
in the constitutional scheme the states are protected against
burdensome legislation by their representation in Congress. 197
Thus, complaints about congressional regulation should be di-
rected there. On this last point the Court essentially deemed
challenges of congressional infringement of state autonomy
nonjusticiable. 198
Although there are aspects of the Garcia decision that
make sense, it is deeply flawed in some other ways. First,
while the Court correctly explained the workings of the consti-
tutional plan with regard to the division of authority between
the state and national governments, that explanation is trouble-
some given the Court's own abdication of its responsibility to
decide whether Congress has exceeded the bounds of its enu-
merated powers. Garcia was decided even before Lopez, and as
such any reliance on the existence of judiciously enforceable
limitations on Congress's delegated powers was hardly credible.
Second, and more troubling, the Court's claim that state inter-
ests were adequately protected in the political process was
highly idealized and likely bad political science. Numerous
196. See McCoy & Friedman, supra note 9, at 97 ("If constitutional federal-
ism is to survive, the overruling of National League of Cities in Garcia must
be seen as a return to the delegation construct. If the constitutionally based
federal structure is to have meaning, it must find an accommodation of inter-
ests by resolving questions with reference to Congress's delegated powers.").
197. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556 (noting that although the states occupy a
special position that must be recognized in Congress's Commerce Clause
authority, that authority is limited only by the political process inherent in
the federal system).
198. See id. at 546 ("Any rule of state immunity that looks to the
'traditional,' 'integral,' or 'necessary' nature of governmental functions inevi-
tably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which
state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes."); id. at 550 ("In short, we
have no license to employ freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty when
measuring congressional authority under the Commerce Clause."); id. at 552
("State sovereign interests, then, are more properly protected by procedural
safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially
created limitations on federal power.").
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commentators have questioned the soundness of the Court's
reasoning."'
Garcia was not the last word, however. Although it has
not been explicitly overruled, it apparently has been so tac-
itly,2 °° in part by new cases that are more forthcoming regard-
ing the benefits of federalism. The first case was New York v.
United States,20 1 which held that Congress may not comman-
deer the regulatory authority of the states to further national
purposes. 0 2 The New York decision, following suggestions in
other opinions, began to articulate some of the reasons for pre-
serving state autonomy in the federal system: the accountabil-
ity of states to their citizens, democracy operating best at the
lowest level of government, the ability of states to serve as
regulatory innovators, and the corrupting effect of consolidated
national authority. 3 New York was explicitly followed in the
199. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 9, at 790-99; Chemerinsky, supra note
17, at 508-13; Robert H. Freilich & David G. Richardson, Returning to a Gen-
eral Theory of Federalism: Framing a New Tenth Amendment United States
Supreme Court Case, 26 URB. LAW. 215, 215 (1994); Kramer, supra note 5, at
1488-90, 1503-14; Pittenger, supra note 22, at 1; Andrzej Rapacynski, From
Sovereignty to Process: the Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985
SuP. CT. REV. 341, 368; Alan R. Arkin, Comment, Inconsistencies in Modern
Federalism Jurisprudence, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1569, 1586-89 (1996); William W.
Van Alstyne, Comment, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REv.
1709, 1723-27 (1985).
200. See Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 515 (arguing that the Court later
rejected Garcia's conclusion); Entin, supra note 69, at 637 (arguing that sub-
sequent cases "suggest the continuing allure of Court-policed federalism doc-
trines"); Kramer, supra note 5, at 1486 n.3 (suggesting that the Court's recent
decisions may pose a serious threat to Garcia).
201. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
202. See id. at 188.
203. See id. at 169 ("[Wihere the Federal Government directs the States to
regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disap-
proval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may
remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision. Account-
ability is thus diminished when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials
cannot regulate in accordance with the views of the local electorate in matters
not pre-empted by federal regulation."); id. at 187 ("[The Constitution pro-
tects us from our own best intentions: It divides power among sovereigns and
among branches of government precisely so that we may resist the temptation
to concentrate power in one location as an expedient solution to the crisis of
the day."); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-60 (1991)
(cataloguing the benefits of federal structure); Garcia, 469 U.S. at 575-76
(Powell, J., dissenting) (discussing how state and local governments are better
able than the national government to perform activities that affect the every-
day lives of citizens); id. at 578-79 ("State and local officials of course must be
intimately familiar with [traditionally local] services and sensitive to their
quality as well as cost. Such officials also know that their constituents and
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recent decision Printz v. United States,2" which held that the
"anti-commandeering" principle of New York applies as well to
state executive officials.205 Notice, however, that these opinions
do not assess the relative merit of exercising national or state
authority. Rather, they simply fashion rules to protect state
authority.
Despite their rhetorical significance, the impact of the New
York line of cases is extremely limited. The rule is not without
benefit, however. It frees a state up to perform its own regulatory
and administrative tasks while Congress pursues its own
agenda. But the New York rule applies only when Congress
regulates states directly, a relatively rare event. Moreover,
given the broad power in Congress to preempt and buy state
compliance, as well as the largely unsupervised breadth of
Congress's substantive powers, these cases taken as a whole
recognize some, but little, value in federalism.
In sum, constitutional doctrine undervalues federalism.
National power has been expanded enormously, with state
regulatory autonomy concomitantly narrowed. The cases for
the most part provide no coherent theory of when national
authority may be exercised, nor do they display much in the
way of understanding what values might support a respect for
state authority. In the one area in which the Court has any
theory of national authority (the dormant commerce cases), the
primary actor is the judiciary itself, and the impact of that ju-
dicial policy could be devastating to state autonomy. Curiously
absent from the doctrine of federalism is any assessment of the
specific weight of state interests, any understanding of when
the press respond to the adequacy, fair distribution, and cost of these services.
It is this kind of state and local control and accountability that the Framers
understood would insure the vitality and preservation of the federal system
that the Constitution explicitly requires.").
204. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
205. See id. at 2384. At issue in Printz was a provision of the federal gun
control legislation commonly known as the Brady Bill that required state and
local law enforcement officials to conduct background checks on those pur-
chasing handguns. See id. at 2369 (presenting the question of the constitu-
tionality of the Brady Bill). This requirement of federal law was held invalid
because it conscripted state and local officials to administer a federal pro-
gram. See id. at 2384 (stating that the mandates of the Brady Bill were
"incompatible with our constitutional system of sovereignty."). Professors
Inman and Rubinfeld suggest that Printz "overturned the use of unfunded
mandates on the states." Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 9 (manuscript at 12
n.13). This may overread Printz, but it is an intriguing perspective.
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national authority properly is exercised, or any attempt to bal-
ance state and national interests in a theoretically coherent
fashion.
H. CENTRIPETAL FORCES
The doctrinal tour in Part I establishes that the Supreme
Court's federalism decisions have had a nationalizing effect.
But the Court is not necessarily leading; it also is mirroring, or
even following, events of much larger scope.2 6 The process of
centralization is occurring in many of the federal democratic
countries of the world, such as Australia and Germany.0 7
Similarly, the forces at work in regional organizations such as
the European Union are operating to displace national authority
in many areas.20 8 Some hint of the same process has just be-
gun to emerge under the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA).2 9 Globally, it is already clear that adherence
to the new World Trade Organization (WTO),21° which replaced
206. Even as centripetal forces operate to centralize authority, similar
forces are permitting states to operate more vigorously in areas once reserved
to the national government, such as foreign relations. See Julie Blase, Is U.S.
Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold-War World Still Foreign? How U.S. States
Are Developing Their Own Foreign Policy 3-4 (1997) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author) (discussing low-level foreign policy operating across the
Texas/Mexico border).
207. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing the trend to-
ward centralization).
208. Commentators point to such centralizing factors in the European
Union (EU) as Court of Justice doctrines of supremacy, direct application, and
direct effect, and to jurisdictional and procedural provisions in the Single
European Act and Maastricht Treaty. See, e.g., George A. Bermann, Taking
Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the
United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 332, 348-66 (1994) [hereinafter Bermann,
Taking Subsidiarity Seriously] (examining the factors that account for the ur-
gent evolution of subsidiarity in the European Community (EC)); George A.
Bermann, Subsidiarity and the European Community, 17 HASTINGS INT'L &
Comp. L. REV. 97, 99-103 (1993) [hereinafter Bermann, Subsidiarity and the
ECI (discussing the rationale for subsidiarity); Edwards, supra note 29, at 542
& n.21.
209. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-
U.S., reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993). See Early H. Frey, Sovereignty and
Federalism: U.S. and Canadian Perspectives Challenges to Sovereignty and
Governance, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 303-314 (1994) (noting that implementation of
NAFTA will "definitely" impact on the sovereignty of the United States and
Canada); Horacio A. Grigera Naon, Sovereignty and Regionalism, 27 LAw &
POL'Y INTL. Bus. 1073, 1162 (1996) (suggesting that NAFTA dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms involve a substantial delegation of sovereign jurisdiction).
210. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilat-
eral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF
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the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),"' will
have the effect of moving some regulatory authority to the na-
tional and global level.212
This Part describes the centripetal forces213 that account
for the tendency toward centralization of regulatory authority.
The centralizing forces are not the same in every country, or under
each regional organization or international agreement.214 Differ-
THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
211. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct.
30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
212. The WTO Dispute Settlement Body prompted centralization concerns
with its first ruling, Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States-
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. 274 (1996).
The Panel held that U.S. environmental restrictions on gasoline imports vio-
lated WTO commitments. The decision consummated a strange marriage be-
tween political conservatives and environmental activists, both of whom
claimed that the ruling jeopardized U.S. sovereignty. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff,
"Trade and": Recent Developments in Trade Policy and Scholarship-And
Their Surprising Political Implications, 17 Nw. J. INVL L. & BuS. 759, 767
n.31 (1996-97) (quoting statements by Sen. Bob Dole and the Director of the
Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch). See generally Jennifer Schultz, The
Demise of "Green" Protectionism: The WTO Decision on the U.S. Gasoline
Rule, 25 DENV. J. INVL L. & POLY 1 (1996) (analyzing the first ruling of the
new WTO Appellate Body from a trade/environmental standpoint).
213. There are similar centrifugal forces that move regulation to the low-
est level of government. See Calabresi, supra note 9, at 766-69 (detailing
"centrifugal and devolutionary" forces); Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference
to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-
Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 274-90 (1990) (discussing
why Congress leaves some regulatory matters to the states). For this reason,
much of the everyday work of governance-police, fire, education-is left to
state and local governments. Even as to these matters, however, there is fed-
eral intervention. See Some Say "Thanks Anyway" to Federal Police Funding,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 10, 1997, at S1 (describing fimding re-
quirements built into federal police force grants); Students Put to Test: Clin-
ton proposes national education standards, NEWSDAY, Sept. 9, 1997, at A23
(discussing presidents proposal for national tests to measure education stan-
dards).
214. See, e.g., George A. Zaphiriou, Unification and Harmonization of Law
Relating to Global and Regional Trading, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 407, 418
(1994) (characterizing the European Union as quasi-federal, but NAFTA as
largely contractual). It is obvious that as some democratic government fed-
erations are centralizing, still others (albeit without, or with less well-
established, democratic traditions) are splitting apart. Perhaps the most
tragic example is the 1991 demise of Yugoslavia. See generally SABRINA P.
RAMET, NATIONALISM AND FEDERALISM IN YUGOSLAVIA, 1962-1991 (2d ed.
1992) (exploring the reforms which lead to the fall of Yugoslavia's centralized
government and the rise of a international "balance-of-power" system);
YUGOSLAVIA, A FRACTURED FEDERALISM (Dennison Rusinow ed., 1988)
(focusing on the feasibility of a multinational community in an age of national-
ism).
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ences in culture and national governmental structure suggest that
change will occur for different reasons, and in different ways. The
primary, but not exclusive, focus here is on the United States.
A. HISTORY
Without question, one of the forces underlying the shift in
power from the states to the national government has been
widespread discontent with the choices made by the states at
some critical moments in American history. Calhoun's nullifi-
cation movement in response to the tariff, slavery, the Civil
War followed by Reconstruction, Jim Crow, and the struggle
over civil rights are all events in which southern states made
choices that ultimately led the national government to take
power from the states.215 But the South is not alone: through-
out history the states seem to have been hard at work earning
a reputation that they are hostile to civil liberty and favor pa-
rochial interests.216 Much of this conduct has vindicated James
Madison's intuitions about factions operating at the state
level.217
Repeated reactionary state conduct has had its effect on
the American psyche, leaving some Americans-particularly
elites-with the idea that problems are best solved at the na-
tional level and states are not to be trusted. It is difficult to
know the precise weight of these feelings in terms of their na-
tionalizing influence, or whether the trend can be reversed.
Certainly, the Fourteenth Amendment and much civil rights
215. See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 52-54 (1995)
(tracing the states' record on the issue of racism).
216. See Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 499-501 (making the point that
federalism is associated with conservatism); SHAPIRO, supra note 215, at 55-
56 (discussing state treatment of individual and group rights).
217. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 358-59 (James Madison) (Benjamin F.
Wright ed., 1961) ("[I]n exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be
formed into more circumscribed Confederacies, or States, oppressive combi-
nations of a majority will be facilitated; the best security, under the republi-
can forms, for the rights of every class of citizens, will be diminished; and con-
sequently the stability and independence of some member of the government,
the only other security, must be proportionally increased.... It can be little
doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy
and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of govern-
ment within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated op-
pressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the
people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule
had proved the necessity of it.").
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legislation has served to reduce state authority,218 reflecting a
national consensus that at least when individual rights are at
stake the correct level of government is the national one.
Recent devolutionary trends suggest greater faith in state
government, but the signals are decidedly mixed. For example,
the devolution accompanying welfare reform may reflect the
failure of a national consensus about welfare, in which the
states merely are beneficiaries of widespread national indiffer-
ence.219 Moreover, much of the devolutionary legislation is
"field office federalism," in which the national government dictates
the terms of the transfer of power and retains substantial
power to see that its will is done.221 In an important article,
Edwin Rubin and Malcolm Feeley distinguish between true
federalism and the decisions of an all-powerful national gov-
ernment to decentralize certain functions.221 Given the condi-
tions attached to the transfer of power in recent legislation, it
is at least plausible to understand what is happening in terms
of the latter model, i.e., that the current trend toward devolution
is a national decision to transfer some control to the states in
limited areas, not true federalism.
B. TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE
Technology brings us together, but it also tends to central-
ize the authority that governs us. Much of the doctrine dis-
cussed in Part I was fashioned to deal with technological ad-
vances in transportation, communications, industrialization
and the like. National industrialization sparked the transfor-
mation of the commerce power.222 Transportation develop-
218. See SHAPIRO, supra note 215, at 55-56 ("[The Bill of Rights'] most
significant use since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment has been to
limit the exercise of state power against unpopular individuals or groups.");
id. at 55-56 nn.146-53 (providing a useful catalogue of Fourteenth Amend-
ment cases and congressional civil rights legislation which have served to
limit state authority).
219. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Noble, Welfare Revamp, Halted in Capital, Pro-
ceeds Anyway, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1996, at 1 (reporting state advances in
welfare reform while federal efforts languish).
220. See supra note 9 (citing example).
221. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 910-11 (1994) (classifying federal-
ism as a structuring principle and decentralization as a managerial concept).
Their article is discussed at length infra Part III.
222. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 583
(1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Industrialization, coupled with advances in
transportation and communications, has created a national economy in which
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ments have given rise to seminal dormant Commerce Clause
cases,n3 just as new communications technology has placed
strains upon existing doctrines, such as the rules governing in-
terstate taxation.2
4
None of this is a coincidence. These doctrinal changes
mirror what is happening in the nation and world at large.2 5
The conventional story sees the New Deal response to the
Great Depression as forcing the Supreme Court's hand, leading
to greater doctrinal tolerance for nationalization.26  Although
the New Deal may have been the immediate catalyst, the forces
at work ran much deeper. Rapid advances in communications,
transportation, and industrialization brought us together as a
nation and forced reconsideration of the rules by which we gov-
erned ourselves. In 1787 it took days to travel from Boston to
Philadelphia. Today the same journey takes less than two
virtually every activity occurring within the borders of a State plays a part.
The expansion and integration of the national economy brought with it a co-
ordinate expansion in the scope of national problems. This Court has been
increasingly generous in its interpretations of the commerce power of Con-
gress, primarily to assure that the National Government would be able to deal
with national economic problems.").
223. The "explosion in interstate truck traffic" at the expense of railroads
furnishes one example. See TRIBE, supra note 50, at 419-22. Tribe suggests
that this development was one of the factors that prompted more rigorous ju-
dicial scrutiny of state transportation safety laws in cases like Kassel and
Raymond. See id.
224. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 260-65 (1989) (holding that
a tax imposed on the gross charge of interstate telephone calls was fairly ap-
portioned, despite appellants' contention that precedent required an appor-
tionment formula based on mileage or some other geographic division of indi-
vidual telephone calls). The Court remarked that such a traditional formula
would "produce insurmountable administrative and technological barriers"
because modem communications technology makes it "virtually impossible to
trace and record the actual paths taken by the electronic signals which create
an individual telephone call." Id. at 255, 264-65. See also Christina R. Edson,
Quill's Constitutional Jurisprudence and Tax Nexus Standards in an Age of
Electronic Commerce, 49 TAX LAW. 893, 893 (1996) (discussing how advances
in technology have challenged the tax concept "jurisdiction to tax").
225. Indeed, for these reasons it is becoming difficult to tell which areas of
regulation relate to foreign affairs, and which are domestic. See Goldsmith,
supra note 125 (manuscript at 34-41).
226. The architect of the conventional wisdom was Edward Corwin. See
EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION 123-24 (1938) (arguing that
Jones & Laughlin presented an overnight constitutional revolution which al-
lowed Congress to regulate productive industry). For a critique of Corwin's
position, see Barry Cushman, A Stream of Legal Consciousness: The Current
of Commerce Doctrine From Swift to Jones & Laughlin, 61 FORDHAm L. REV.
105 (1992) (contending that Jones & Laughlin was congruent with the Courfs
modern jurisprudence).
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hours, and the trip from Boston to Tokyo itself takes less than
one day. Similar advances obviously underlie globalization.
It only seems evident that as technology permits us to in-
teract across distances on a regular basis, rules become neces-
sary to regulate that interaction. The greater our interaction,
the greater our need for regulation.227 Law follows society, it
does not precede it. Nationalizing law followed national inter-
action facilitated by nationalizing technology, and globalizing
law inevitably will follow on the heels of even greater techno-
logical advancement.228
C. THE DEATH OF LEGAL FORMALISM
Just as technology forced the hand of doctrine, doctrinal
collapse itself served as a nationalizing force. As the country
expanded and interstate traffic increased, the courts were hard
put to retain old categories that gave definition to competing
state and federal regulatory authority.229 At one time the
states' "police power" and the national government's "commerce
power" were each thought to be exclusive. Once this division
broke down, courts attempted to assign to the national gov-
ernment the task of governing when "uniformity" was neces-
sary, while local governments were left in charge when
"diversity" was appropriate. The courts subsequently tried,
through a series of formal dichotomies, to distinguish "direct"
from "indirect" regulation of commerce, and things in the
"stream of commerce" from those without. Today we still try to
tell what has a "substantial effect" on commerce from what
does not.
Doctrinal categories repeatedly crumble in the wake of
nationalizing advances. The regulatory world simply cannot be
227. See Kramer, supra note 5, at 1497 (arguing that technological devel-
opments "made national solutions necessary for problems that had previously
been handled at the state level"); Lessig, supra note 9, at 137-144 (arguing
that integration of social and economic force results in changes in the scope of
federal and state power).
228. Technology also can serve as the impetus for national or global rules,
to the extent it yields information that calls for or permits regulation, such as
in the area of environmental protection. See Robert W. Hahn & Kenneth R.
Richards, The Internationalization of Environmental Regulation, 30 HARV.
INTVL. L.J. 421, 425, 433 (1989) (arguing that greater scientific consensus
about environmental problems increases the likelihood of international
agreements).
229. The various formal tests employed by the Court are discussed supra
text accompanying notes 55-63.
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explained, let alone cabined, by outdated and unworkable doc-
trinal boundaries.2 30 As these categories have collapsed, power
has been consolidated nationally, which itself is a direct function
of the constitutional plan. The constitutional plan enumerates
Congress's powers, leaving the residue to the states.2 31 Doctrinal
limitations were an attempt to cabin growing national authority,
preserving a realm for state regulation. Once the doctrinal
boundaries between state and national authority failed, Con-
gress's powers grew larger, and the residue evaporated.3
Formalism may have been an illusion, but it was one that
permitted the courts to hold certain state functions immune
from national intervention. As it became gradually impossible
to separate the police function from commerce, the courts ac-
quiesced in the transfer of power to Congress. Everything was
commerce, and Congress controlled commerce. Hence, state
power dried up.
D. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO POLITICAL ACTORS
Accompanying the death of formalism was the judiciary's
retreat from review of most matters touching on the economy.
One lesson the courts seemed clearly to learn from the New
Deal struggle was that they should keep their hands off of eco-
nomic legislation. Following the New Deal, judicial deference
to political decisions in the economic realm became the norm.233
Because many of the sharpest nationalizing forces were eco-
230. See Lessig, supra note 9, at 161-63, 176-77 (discussing the effects of
legal culture and politicization on the Coures formal tools); Kramer, supra
note 5, at 1497 (arguing that integration decreases the utility of formal dis-
tinctions).
23L See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
232. See Lessig, supra note 9, at 154-55 (noting the partial collapse of lim-
its on the commerce power imposed to preserve a sphere of state regulatory
authority).
233. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era: Prog-
ress, Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 1101, 1157-58 (1988) (arguing that courts continue to apply
the New Deal doctrine of deference to agency decisions in economic contexts);
Steven H. Kropp, Reflections on Law, Economics, and Policy in Public Sector
Labor Relations in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom, 27
LAW & POL'Y INtL Bus. 825, 849 (1996) (book review) ("Ever since the New
Deal's Wagner Act was upheld through a series of cases as being within the
federal power to regulate interstate commerce, the Court has broadly deferred
to federal economic regulation.").
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nomic, judicial patrolling of the boundaries between nation and
state became rather lax.234
For a very brief time this judicial deference over the eco-
nomic realm worked to the advantage of the states. As Ste-
phen Gardbaum has pointed out, in the period immediately
following the New Deal, courts deferred to both national and
state political actors.235 This explains, for example, the very
deferential dormant Commerce Clause decision in South Carolina
v. Barnwell.236 Eventually, however, other nationalizing forces
took over. Although courts continued to defer to the national
political authorities, deference toward state authority waned,237
creating even more of a movement towards the center.
Although deference to political actors has had its greatest
impact in the economic realm, the same phenomenon presented
itself in the area of civil rights. Only here, the deference was to
national actors,238 and the source of the deference was the
states' own conduct. The states, by the 1950s and 1960s, had
sullied their reputations as protectors of civil rights enough
that courts were glad to defer to national decisionmakers.239 As
234. See Kramer, supra note 5, at 1497-98 (arguing that between 1937 and
1942, "for all practical purposes the era of judicially enforced federalism came
to an end"); Lessig, supra note 9, at 154 (arguing that the New Deal "essentially
ended judicially enforceable limits in the most important federalism do-
mains").
235. See Gardbaum, New Deal, supra note 50, at 509-10 (describing the
courts' approach as less nationalist).
236. 303 U.S. 177 (1938). For a discussion of this case see supra text ac-
companying notes 136-138.
237. See Eule, supra note 124, at 425-26 & n.4 (noting a resurgence in de-
cisions concerning the validity of state regulations beginning in the mid-
1970s).
238. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968)
(holding that Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment to
define slavery and to enact effective legislation on the basis of its definition);
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (holding that Congress has
the power to determine "whether and what legislation is needed to secure the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment"); United States v. Mississippi, 380
U.S. 128, 138, 140-41 (1965) (upholding the Civil Rights Act of 1960); United
States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 26 (1960) (upholding the Civil Rights Act of
1957). But see City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (relying on con-
cerns about division between state and national authority to invalidate the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act as an impermissible exercise of Congress's
power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
239. See SHAPIRO, supra note 215, at 52 ("[T]he states do not appear to
have served as a bulwark of individual and group rights and interests.");
MARK V. TUsHNET, MAKING CIvIL RIGHTs LAW 232-71 (1994) (discussing
states' resistance to Brown v. Board of Education in the period 1955-1961).
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the Heart of Atlanta Motel240 and Katzenbach v. McClung241
decisions made clear, the line between economic and civil liberties
regulation was often a thin one, and in either event the courts
were ready to defer to national actors.
E. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CENTRALIZATION
The forces identified thus far demonstrate that courts of-
ten would defer to national authority, creating incentives for
individuals and entities to seek national regulation. With
those incentives in place, some groups certainly were willing to
move their rent-seeking efforts to the national regulatory forum.
And the legislators at work there were only too glad to accom-
modate. On both the demand and supply side of legislation,242
regulatory battles increasingly were fought out in Washington,
D.C., instead of in the fifty states.
243
Legislative losers never being content to let bygones be by-
gones, it became commonplace for those who had not prevailed
in the state legislatures to leapfrog over their head to Con-
240. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964)
(holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited racial discrimina-
tion in places of public accommodation affecting interstate commerce, was a
valid exercise of the commerce power).
241. 379 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1964) (upholding the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as
applied to a restaurant solely because it received food which had moved in in-
terstate commerce).
242. See, e.g., Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L.
REV. 339, 343 (1988) (referring to the legislative process as one of "supply-
demand").
243. For an elaboration of the public choice argument about why this is so,
see Reiner Eichenberger, The Benefits of Federalism and the Risk of Overcen-
tralization, 47 KYKLOS 403, 413 (1994) (arguing that incentives for delegation
of tasks to higher levels of government can result in overcentralization); see
also WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 54-56 (2d
ed. 1995) (discussing supply and demand patterns in legislative markets). See
generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE
(1991) (examining how public choice influences legislation and policy). Even
though it "often" makes sense to play out regulatory battles in Washington,
D.C., this is not always the case, as recent regulatory challenges to FCC rules
governing phone competition make clear. See Iowa Util. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d
753, 821 & n.39 (8th Cir. 1997) (vacating FCC pricing rules and "pick and
choose" rule promulgated pursuant to the Telecommunications Act of 1996);
California v. FCC, Nos. 96-3519 et al., 1997 WL 476529, at *1 (8th Cir. Aug.
22, 1997) (holding that the FCC exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction in issu-
ing dialing parity rules); Competitive Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 117 F.3d 1068,
1075 n.5 (8th Cir. 1997) (vacating the FCC's attempt to regulate temporary
recovery of access charges for intrastate calls).
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gress. These groups had every incentive to do so, hoping for a
more favorable outcome. 2' But then, why even bother with the
state legislatures? Over time it became clear that it simply
was much easier to fight a regulatory war in one central loca-
tion, rather than in fifty state fora.24 Many groups with public
interest causes-environmentalism, civil rights, consumerism-
found a more sympathetic ear in Washington, whether or not
the specific subject matter at issue actually was appropriate for
national regulation.
It was not only those who sought regulation that preferred
Washington. Regulated entities ironically also might prefer
regulation to emanate from the center. Even if in some in-
stances the regulatory scheme that emerged from Congress
was stricter than what the states might have adopted, the
transaction costs of fighting fifty legislative battles, only to
comply with fifty different legislative schemes, made it attractive
to submit to national control.246
On the supply side, national politicians were only too glad
to accommodate those who came to them asking for regulatory
assistance,247 further displacing state regulatory authority.
Campaign support follows those with regulatory authority, as
do national media attention and increased stature. The vast
cost of national office on today's market is emblematic of the
extent to which regulatory authority has shifted to the national
government. The money has both followed the importance of
the office and had a hand in creating it. 248
244 See Macey, supra note 213, at 271-73 (identifying four reasons why
interest groups seek federal laws). For a critique of Macey's work in this re-
gard, see Kramer, supra note 5, at 1521-22.
245. This is Macey's first factor. See Macey, supra note 213, at 271
(claiming that "[ilt is simply less expensive to obtain passage of one federal
statute than to obtain passage of fifty state statutes because a different state
legislature must be lobbied in each state").
246. See id. ("Even if interest groups would benefit marginally by having a
myriad of local statutes, the benefits may not outweigh the transaction costs
associated with obtaining passage of all those statutes.").
247. See id. at 269-90 (arguing that "politicians maAize the aggregate
political support that they receive from interest groups by supplying the legal
rules that result in the highest net receipt of support").
248. Similar public choice analysis can influence the formation of interna-
tional agreements. National leaders will pursue those agreements when the
benefit to them exceeds any costs. See Hahn & Richards, supra note 228, at
436 (arguing that short-term political benefits influence the likelihood of
achieving an international environmental agreement).
[Vol. 82:317374
VALUING FEDERALISM
In addition to interest group politics motivating federali-
zation, there are "apple pie" issues that legislators cannot re-
sist moving to the federal arena.24 9 Perhaps the most common
such example in recent years has been crime. Critics of Con-
gress's apparent zeal to federalize what had been seen as a local
matter are numerous.250  Nonetheless, members of Congress
are quick to be seen as addressing matters that concern con-
stituents, and hesitant to be characterized by an opponent as
"doing nothing" about such matters. Thus, there is regulation
of some matters that makes little or no sense coming from the
national government.251
F. TRADE: THE UNGOVERNABLE ENGINE
Perhaps no force has played or is likely to play more of a
role in the future in centralizing regulatory authority than
trade, both domestic and international. Local legislation is the
antithesis of free trade. Trade thrives on uniformity
("harmonization"252 in global-speak). In part, trade law is de-
signed to seek out and eliminate protectionist legislation-
those local laws designed specifically to give insiders trading
advantages over outsiders.253 The problem extends far beyond
protectionist legislation, however. State laws enacted with
protectionist motive in order to protect public safety, health,
and welfare nonetheless are likely to run afoul of free-trade
principles if they diverge from standards adopted elsewhere.254
249. See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONsTI-
TUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONsTrTUTION's THIRD CENTURY 965 (1993)
(arguing that members of Congress will legislate on "consensual" issues, inter
alia, in order to be reelected).
250. See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief- The Federalization
of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1166-72 (1995) (arguing
that Congress must exercise restraint in federalizing criminal law); Thomas
M. Mengler, The Sad Refrain of Tough on Crime, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 503, 506
(1995) (expressing the belief that "many matters of 'local concern' are pres-
ently being federalized by Congress").
251. A good example of this phenomenon is the law at issue in Lopez. See
supra text accompanying notes 74-82.
252. See Stephen Zamora, NAFTA and the Harmonization of Domestic Le-
gal Systems: The Side Effects of Free Trade, 12 ARIZ. J. INTL & COMP. L. 401,
403-05 (1995) (discussing the concept of harmonization).
253. See G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations
Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 845
(1995) (noting the general desire by all nations at the Uruguay Round nego-
tiations to eliminate protectionist trade rules).
254. For a strong and strident statement to this effect, discussing the ef-
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Indeed, any state or local law, whatever its purpose, runs the
risk of imposing novel requirements that inhibit the easy
movement of goods and people.
255
Increasingly, trade law is designed not only to ferret out
protectionist legislation, but also to eliminate regulatory dif-
ferences of all sorts that inhibit trade.256 Today, judicial inter-
pretation of Article Thirty of the Treaty of Rome,25 7 new WTO
accords (such as those on services, and sanitary and phytosanitary
regulations),258 and recent United States Supreme Court dormant
fect of recent trade accords on the law of copyright, see David Nimmer, The
End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1385, 1416-19 (1995); see also Barry
Friedman, Federalism's Future in the Global Village, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1441,
1448-65 (1994) [hereinafter Friedman, Global Village] (analyzing the impact
of globalization on state law); J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Component of the
GATT's Uruguay Round: Competitive Prospects for Intellectual Property Own-
ers in an Integrated World Market, 4 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 171, 263-66 (1993) (discussing the potential effect on national competition
law of an Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights).
255. Larry Lessig makes .the valuable point that the more integrated the
economy, the more significant are state regulations that interfere with uni-
formity. See Lessig, supra note 9, at 143. Within the U.S. economy, we may
expect to see collisions between state law and trade law in the areas of secu-
rities, banking, insurance, and antitrust. See Friedman, Global Village, supra
note 254, at 1448-53. There has been some suggestion that the promise of
trade retaliation will lead the federal government to pressure states to change
laws that international organizations such as the WTO consider an impedi-
ment to trade. See Nimmer, supra note 254, at 1418 n.195 (quoting 140
CONG. REC. S15302 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1994) (statement of Sen. Kempthorne)).
256. Even foreign policy disputes are framed in terms of trade. See, e.g.,
EU, U.S. Work Toward Cuba Sanctions, TENNESEAN, Apr. 13, 1997, at 16A
(discussing the Helms-Burton Act, which the EU contends violates WTO rules
but the United States characterizes as a foreign policy dispute).
257. TREATY ESTABLISHNG THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNrrY, Mar.
25, 1957, art. 30, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. See Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Das-
sonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, 852 (holding that Article 30 prohibits "trading rules
enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indi-
rectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade"). But see Joined Cases
3-267/91 & C-268/91, Keck and Mithouard, 1993 E.C.R. 1-6097, 6131 (holding
that national provisions restricting certain selling arrangements do not hinder
trade "so long as those provision apply to all relevant traders operating within
the national territory and so long as they affect in the same manner, in law
and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those from other Mem-
ber States"). See generally Gardbaum, New Deal, supra note 50, at 518-19
(discussing Dassonville and Keck).
258. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Dec. 15, 1993, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 44
(1994); Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Meas-
ures, Mar. 1993, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol.
1 (1993), 32 I.L.M. 377 (1993); see also Friedman, Global Village, supra note
254, at 1453-59 (discussing impact of the GATT on the regulatory role of the
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commerce decisions 9 are all aimed at routing out regulatory
differences that make it more difficult for free trade to operate.
Any law that has the effect of discriminating against trade is
suspect, even if not protectionist. These agreements all pur-
port to respect "appropriate" state regulation of the health,
safety, and public welfare of citizens. But what is appropriate
often is defined in terms of standards that have obtained in-
ternational or regional acceptance, with the burden of proof
resting on governments that seek to impose stricter require-
ments.20 Thus, free trade levels the protection states may of-
fer, sweeping away innovative or stringent measures.261
More and more the police authority of governments runs
afoul of free-trade principles, including in areas traditionally
believed to be the domain of more localized government. A
classic case abroad is the recent litigation concerning a French
states).
259. Dormant Commerce Clause decisions are discussed supra text accom-
panying notes 124-187. For a comparison of the dormant Commerce Clause
with the GATT legal system, see Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free
Trade and the Regulatory State: A GATT's-Eye View of the Dormant Com-
merce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401 (1994).
260. See Farber & Hudec, supra note 259, at 1410 (arguing that emphasis
on international standards can pressure countries with stricter regulations to
"harmonize down"). As anyone familiar with scientific uncertainty can ap-
preciate, burdens of proof may well be determinative here. See DANIEL A.
FARBER, EcO-PRAGMATISM (forthcoming 1998) (on file with author); see also
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Fed-
eral Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REv. 815,
846-47 (1997) (arguing that the norms of the international community, as in-
terpreted by federal courts, can transfer constitutional power away from the
states).
261. Concerns about the impact of WTO decisions on environmental and
health laws dogged implementation of the WTO. See Farber & Hudec, supra
note 259, at 1409-11 (discussing criticisms of present and prospective GATT
rules); see also Schultz, supra note 212, at 3-5 (discussing tension between
trade rules and environmental rules).
The first WTO panel decision is an example of the threat to domestic
health, safety, and public welfare regulations in the face of free-trade chal-
lenges. At issue was a U.S. regulation designed to eliminate smog-producing
products from gasoline. The law required domestic refiners to see that gaso-
line in 1995 was 15% cleaner than that sold in 1990. The EPA regulation
applied a statutory baseline to foreign producers because of concerns about
data availability and enforcement, but the WTO panel held against the regu-
lation on the ground that it discriminated against foreign producers, and was
not the least GATT-inconsistent measure available to protect United States
health interests. See Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States-
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. 274, 297-
300 (1996). For a discussion of the political commentary on the case, see su-
pra note 212.
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law requiring the use of the native tongue in a number of contexts,
including the marketing of goods.262 Although it is easy to see
how such a law can inhibit free trade, it also is easy to see why
it makes sense to require goods to be marketed in the tongue
spoken by purchasers. Yet rulings of the European Court of
Justice call such laws into question.263 The effects of national-
izing forces based on free trade are felt in the United States as
well. The Supreme Court is calling the tune on the financing of
local solid waste facilities in the name of free trade,26 and even
state alcoholic-beverage laws have been subject to regulation in
accord with an international GATT panel decision.265
III. VALUING FEDERALISM
Part II examines the centripetal forces that account for the
centralization of regulatory authority. Occasional movement in
the other direction, however, suggests some latent concern for
local police legislation and local choice. In a recent decision, the
European Court of Justice upheld French legislation prohibiting
underprice selling in the face of a challenge on free-trade
grounds.266 In that decision the court commented disapprov-
262. On July 24, 1994, the French Constitutional Council struck down sev-
eral provisions of the Toubon Law, which regulated use of the French lan-
guage in commerce and industry. See Judgment of July 29, 1994, Con. Const.,
1994 D.S.L., No. 94-345. For discussion of the ruling, see Stacey A. Feld,
Language & the Marketplace: The Regulation of Language as a Barrier to
Trade, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. (forthcoming 1997-98) (manuscript at 9, on
file with author); Leila Sadat Wexler, Official English, Nationalism and Lin-
guistic Terror:A French Lesson, 71 WASH. L. REV. 285, 326-31 (1996).
263. Feld, supra note 262 (manuscript at 17-29), suggests that the Toubon
Law is incompatible with such Article 30 cases as Dassonville, Case 8/74, Pro-
cureur de Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, and the Casis de Dijon case,
Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmopolverwaltung fUr Branntwein,
1979 E.C.R. 649.
264. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994)
(holding that a local solid waste ordinance regulated and impermissibly dis-
criminated against interstate commerce). Carbone is discussed supra text ac-
companying notes 152-164.
265. See United States Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages,
June 19, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 206, 297-299 (1993) (concluding
that various state laws according imported beverages less favorable treatment
with respect to excise taxation, transportation, licensing, and price affirma-
tion were inconsistent with Article III of the GATT). But see U.S. CONST.
amend. XXI, § 2 ("The transportation or importation into any State, Territory,
or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.") (emphasis
added).
266. See Joined Cases 3-267/91 & C-268/91, Keck and Mithouard, 1993
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ingly on what it saw as the current fashion of challenging any
undesirable national legislation on the basis of free trade.267
Similarly, widespread popular concern about the centralizing
trend of the European Union has caused at least some rhetorical
fealty to the idea of "subsidiarity."2 68 Here in the United States
as well, some politicians claim to see increased support for
devolution of authority to the states.269 Many of these anti-
nationalizing movements are native ones, reflecting unease
among the people about the extent to which governmental
authority is slipping from their grasp.
The thesis of this Article is that we might be more confi-
dent about the values federalism promotes, and thus value fed-
E.C.R. 1-6097; Gardbaum, New Deal, supra note 50, at 519 & n.121
(discussing Keck).
267. See id. at 6131 ("In view of the increasing tendency of traders to in-
voke Article 30 of the Treaty as a means of challenging any rules whose effect
is to limit their commercial freedom even where such rules are not aimed at
products from other Member States, the Court considers it necessary to re-
examine and clarify its case-law on this matter.").
Also illustrative is the January 16, 1996 resolution of the European Par-
liament which defended national legislation banning the use of additives in
the production of traditional foodstuffs. Among the protected food products
was German beer. See Additives in Certain Foodstuffs, 1996 O.J. (Annex 4-
473) 8-12 (Jan. 15, 1996) (Debates of European Parliament). Eleven years
earlier, the European Commission had successfully challenged German rules
banning additives in beer. See Case 178/84, Commission v. Germany, 1987
E.C.R. 1227, 1276. The European Parliaments greater concern for local
choice might very well stem from the fact that it is a representative body,
while the Commissioners are appointed. See TREATY ESTABLIsHING THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY arts. 137, 157, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C224) 1 (1992),
[19921 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992).
268. "Subsidiarity" refers to the idea that governance should occur at the
lowest level at which it is expedient. See Bermann, Subsidiarity and the EC,
supra note 208 (explaining the principle of subsidiarity and its development);
Edwards, supra note 29 (expressing skepticism about subsidiarity as a limit-
ing principle, but arguing that it should be justiciable). One of the most com-
pelling works on subsidiarity is George Bermann's contrasting of the princi-
ple's workings in European and United States federalism. Bermann
concludes that although it will be difficult to make subsidiarity an operative
principle in Europe, the effort should be made because there are fewer con-
straints on centralization in the European Union than there are in the United
States. See Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously, supra note 208, passim.
269. See, e.g., William J. Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of the
Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 24, 1995), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1, 78 (1996) ("Taking power away from
Federal bureaucracies and giving it back to communities and individuals is
something everyone should be able to be for."); CONTRACT WITH AMERICA 66,
133, 165 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds. 1994) (claiming that "the ideas in
the Contract are shared by the vast majority of the American people"-ideas
which include devolution of welfare and reform of unfunded mandates).
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eralism more, if we devoted more effort to assessing the tangi-
ble benefits of a federalist system. This Part seeks to introduce
more rigor into the study and application of the principles of
federalism, with the premise that there is value to federalism,
albeit value that still needs to be quantified.2 70  After stage-
setting observations about the baselines and perspectives that
should be used to approach federalism questions, Part Ill
catalogues some of the factors that ought to motivate federalism
decisions. First, there is an enumeration of the very tangible
questions the academy should be studying in order to assess
the worth of leaving regulatory authority at the sub-national
level. Intuition certainly suggests that governance at the state
and local level will have its benefits. Next, there follows a dis-
cussion of the reasons political economists have developed for
exercising power at the national level. If indeed there is worth
in retaining state and local autonomy, then a way must be
found to cabin national authority. Political economics provides
a theoretical basis for addressing questions of national authority,
but constitutional law remains relatively impervious to the les-
sons of political economy in this regard. The overarching point
of this Part is that sound constitutional doctrine should take
account of both sides of the federalism calculus.
A. PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS
In a provocative piece entitled Federalism: Some Notes on
a National Neurosis, Professors Edward Rubin and Malcolm
Feeley argue that there is no particular benefit to a federalist
system.271 In making their argument, Rubin and Feeley compare
federalism to a model of decentralized national decisionmaking.7
Federalism is a system in which government units actually
have autonomy in decisionmaking, while in a decentralized
system of government ultimate authority rests at the top, or
center, and the center makes the strategic decision to delegate
270. Taking quite another approach, Vicki Jackson seeks to reconcile de-
velopment of a pragmatically sound doctrine of federalism with "rule of law"
concerns that require judicial decisions to be based on principle. See Jackson,
supra note 100 passim. Jackson's concern that rule of law considerations be
satisfied bears some relationship to Lawrence Lessig's critique of federalism
doctrine as violating the Frankfurtarian constraint, i.e., that the doctrine is so
judicially malleable that it fails to constrain judges in any meaningful way.
See Lessig, supra note 9, at 174-80.
271. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 221, at 907 ("In our view, federalism
in America achieves none of the beneficial goals that the Court claims for it.").
272. See id. at 910-11.
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decisionmaking authority or administration to the lower levels
of government. 273 Rubin and Feeley believe that, in effect (if
not in design), our system more closely resembles the latter
sort, and that in any event, most of what we commonly think of
as the benefits of federalism are actually benefits of a decen-
tralized system of national government.274 Thus, Rubin and
Feeley argue that courts should not act to protect state autonomy
but should allow centralization to go its happy way.275 In a
sense Rubin and Feeley follow others in arguing that federal-
ism questions should be nonjusticiable.276
National Neurosis is one of the most important and pro-
vocative pieces written about federalism in recent years. The
value of the piece lies in the aggressively critical line it takes
toward extant doctrines of federalism. In a sense, Feeley and
Rubin develop the best case that can be made against federalism.
If they are right in much of what they say, then perhaps-as
they indeed argue-we should not value federalism at all.277
There are some very real difficulties with the argument
advanced in National Neurosis, however, despite the force and
eloquence with which the argument is presented. First, al-
though there is good sense to many of the points made in Na-
tional Neurosis, the argument begins from an unrealistic base-
line.2 7 Even if it were true that decentralization would better
273. See id.
274. See id. at 914-26.
275. See id. at 909.
276. See id. ("The Supreme Court should never invoke federalism as a rea-
son for invalidating a federal statute or as a principle for interpreting it....
Our rationale for this conclusion, however, is not that states are capable of
protecting themselves... but that there is no normative principle involved
that is worthy of protection."). Professors Herbert Wechsler and Jesse Choper
have made this argument quite explicitly. See CHOPER, supra note 22, at 171-
259; Wechsler, supra note 22, at 558-60.
277. What follows is in large part a response to Rubin and Feeley. For an-
other such response, in many ways more thorough, see Jackson, supra note
100, at 54-69.
278. Rubin and Feeley might disagree with this, arguing that the very first
question on the table must be that of government structure. In a "sequel" to
the Rubin and Feeley article, Edward Rubin argues forcefully that the ques-
tion of allocation of governmental authority transcends any question of the
benefits of federalism, for those benefits themselves assume the existence of
certain political choices such as federalism. Thus, it makes no sense to argue,
according to Rubin, that federalism furthers values such as "democratic par-
ticipation" that are inherent in the Constitution, because the question of what
values matter is one made by the political entities established by the Consti-
tution. See Edward L. Rubin, The Fundamentality and Irrelevance of Fed-
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achieve certain benefits than does federalism, federalism is the
system that we (and many other countries and regional and
global organizations) have had for a very long time. It is not
easy to sweep away two hundred years of history 7 9 Federalism
may be a historical artifact, but historical artifacts do not
wither and die easily.2 8° Although Rubin and Feeley's ap-
proach is a useful heuristic, as a practical matter, we do not
now have a choice between the federalism we have and a system
of unitary national authority, with the latter having the option
to decentralize when it makes sense.281 The real choice is be-
tween the current trend of making federalism decisions in an
ad hoc manner that tends to nationalize authority with no
rhyme or reason, and a system in which there is some sense
brought to the problem of allocating responsibility. The question
that should have our attention is whether there are benefits
that can be achieved within our system, and how we best can
achieve them.282 National Neurosis surely contributes to that
eralism 16 (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("The consti-
tution cannot decide issues of federalism because federalist issues determine
the moral authority of the constitution.").
279. In making this point, I echo Richard Briffault and Dan Rodriguez.
See Richard Briffault, "What About the "Ism'?" Normative and Formal Con-
cerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1348 n.161 (1994)
("Federalism, or, more accurately, the federal structure, just is. It does not
need an argument. The structure exists and defines our government.");
Rodriguez, supra note 8, at 152-53 (emphasizing the centrality of federalism
as an element of American constitutional ideology in response to Rubin and
Feeley); see also Calabresi, supra note 9, at 787 ("Rubin and Feeley completely
overlook the difference between our constitutionally mandated system of de-
centralization and a system like France's where decentralization is merely a
policy option easily reversed-a matter of temporary national legislative
grace.").
280. Rubin and Feeley concede that they do not see state boundaries being
eroded anytime soon, but seem equally content for states, within those
boundaries, to be mere administrative units of the national government. See
Rubin & Feeley, supra note 221, at 951.
281. See, e.g., id. at 908-09 ("States fulfill the important governmental
functions of facilitating decentralization .... Yet there is no policy reason
why other subdivisions of the nation could not fulfill this function, or why
state lines could not be redrawn on a functional rather than historical basis.").
282. See Briffault, supra note 279, at 1349-53 (arguing that courts should
focus on federal structure rather than on more nebulous questions of the
norms of federalism); Rodriguez, supra note 8, at 153 ("The proper question is
not: If we were starting from scratch and designing a system of government,
would we construct the national government and the states and distribute
power to them as the Constitution of 1787 does? Rather, it is: How does the
existence of the fifty states construct the argument about the allocation of
power?").
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discussion, though its arguments must be recognized as some-
what idealized.
Even where they see benefits in the existing structure,
Rubin and Feeley are quick to deny that these are benefits of
federalism. They attribute them instead to localism,283 as
though the two can be so easily divided. As others, most nota-
bly Richard Briffault, have observed, many of the benefits of
federalism actually occur at a lower level of government.2  Yet
again it is important to keep straight the baseline from which
we begin. There is no serious proposal to eliminate states and
constitutionalize local government. Instead, under the system
of government we actually enjoy, cities, counties, townships
and the like all derive whatever authority they have from the
nation-state system of federalism.28 5 Arguments about local
government are important, and they may be useful in suggesting
to states how they in turn should arrange their internal affairs.
But it is important to bear in mind that all of this discussion
occurs in the context of our actual federal system.
Moreover, even if we could adopt Rubin and Feeley's ideal-
ized system, it is less than clear that the system of decentralized
authority is as rosy as it is painted. Rubin and Feeley devote
virtually no time or thought to the problems that might accom-
pany the system they describe. No political system is perfect.
Political theory is in many ways the search for the second best.
Given their approach, it is understandable that Rubin and
Feeley would focus on federalism's flaws.286 A centralized sys-
283. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 221, at 915-26 (arguing that public
participation, citizen choice, state competition, and experimentation are
benefits of decentralization rather than federalism).
284. See Briffault, supra note 279, at 1312-17 (suggesting that the small
size and multiplicity of local governments allows them to advance the values
of federalism more effectively than the states).
285. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1990) ("The local government is a
delegate of the state, possessing only those powers the state has chosen to
confer upon it. Absent any specific limitation in the state constitution, the
state can amend, abridge or retract any power it has delegated, much as it can
impose new duties or take away old privileges."); Gerald E. Frug, The City As
a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1057, 1062-67 (1980) (discussing how fed-
eral and state law defines and limits cities' power).
286. See, e.g., Rubin & Feeley, supra note 221, at 909 ("[Flederalism does
not diffuse power in our system, but may actually act as an impediment to its
diffusion."); id. at 949 (TFederalism, as opposed to decentralization, acts as a
constraint on our ability, as a nation, to achieve the policies we want, includ-
ing policies of participation, local variation, and experimentation.").
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tern has its own possible difficulties, however, including agency
problems, lack of local initiative resulting from overly central-
ized control, or the compounded cost of errors.287
Indeed, the very tone of National Neurosis highlights a
problem of perspective that taints much of the academic and
popular discussion about federalism. There is a reason that
the authors of National Neurosis, like many others, are quick
to ignore the potential benefits of the American federalist system.
That reason is history. It is commonplace that perspective de-
termines how we see things, and how we see things influences
how we think about them. Those who came of age with pictures of
foaming segregationists cursing civil rights marchers, or African-
American students trying to enter schools desegregated by order
of national courts, are likely to be enamored of national
authority and skeptical of leaving matters to the states to
solve.288 Nonetheless, there are those who look at the corrupt-
ing influence of interest groups and money in the national
Congress, at the stasis that takes hold in that body, and at the
clear loss of faith in democracy many in this country feel, and
believe that there are disadvantages to overweening national
authority-disadvantages that perhaps could be ameliorated
by a vibrant federal system.289 Caution requires that we con-
sider federalism not only with a clear understanding of history,
287. See Jackson, supra note 100, at 56 (arguing that "a national govern-
ment unhappy with decisionmaking in its centrally defined administrative
units could simply reorganize the political boundaries of the provinces to create
more compliant decisionmaking, or to isolate troublemakers") (footnote omitted).
288. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 221, at 916 ("Actual alignments are
likely to depend on the correspondence of substantive policies. For example,
the white-dominated governments of the southern states undoubtedly fos-
tered the autonomy of white-dominated towns against federal intervention; on
the other hand, the federal government was correspondingly more solicitous
of black communities, at least during the Reconstruction and Civil Rights
eras."); see also Rubin, supra note 278, at 48 ("Ever since the South's defeat,
there has been an ongoing moonlight-and-magnolia, gone-with-the-wind, lost-
but-glorious-cause mentality that conceals the deep and inherent racism be-
hind the facade of nostalgia.").
289. See, e.g., Linda Feldmann, Ballot Initiatives Rise As a Route Around
Legislative Gridlock, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 23, 1996, at 1 (discussing
state ballot initiatives as a response to legislative gridlock); Judy Keen, States
a Testing Ground for Campaign Finance Reform, USA TODAY, May 2, 1997, at
IA ("The states are the laboratories that will lead us to reform on Capitol Hill.
... What's happening in the states proves that people want reform. It proves
reform works.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Becky Cain,
president of the League of Women Voters).
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but with an equally clear understanding of the biases we bring
to the problem.
Professional training also impacts perspective. Those trained
in economics are likely to see efficiency as the only desired out-
come, measuring systems of government against this norm just
as they would measure competition between firms.29  On the
other hand, those whose training has been in government and the
law are likely to disdain the sole concern for efficiency, seeing
other values that perhaps are not so easily measured, or values
that appear incommensurable with concerns for efficiency.
291
Just as the discussion of baselines suggests we must begin
somewhere, differing perspectives suggest we ought to be sen-
sitive to where we begin. The starting point of analysis has an
uncanny way of affecting its end. It ought to be our task to
take these differing perspectives into account in assessing the
American federal system. We ought to try to influence the
workings of our federal system to avoid the negative aspects of
parochialism while at the same time maximizing the advan-
tages of localized democracy. We ought to care about efficiency,
but also about values that are not so easily measured. When
valuing federalism, we ought to try and take all values into ac-
count, doing our best to accommodate them.
290. See, e.g., DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 1 (1992) ("While there are economists evaluating law
from all political perspectives, many take the traditional or neo-classical per-
spective that allocates the benefits and burdens of a legal rule according to a
single principle, economic efficiency."); RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIc
ANALYSIS OF LAW 23-24 (4th ed. 1992) (discussing efficiency as a norm in eco-
nomic analysis of law).
291 See, e.g., Jane B. Baron & Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against Market Rational-
ity: Moral Critiques of Economic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CARnOzO L.
REV. 431, 432 (1996) ([W]e also have a range of preferences (and attributes
and qualities) that markets cannot satisfy-preferences that are not self-
interested, but other-regarding; preferences about our own preferences, as
well as the public good. To submit these latter preferences to market trad-
ing-to speak of them in market rhetoric-is not just mistaken but ethically
wrong, because it denies the reality of, and fails to nurture, the important as-
pects of our humanity that markets are incapable of expressing."); Gregory
Scott Crespi, The Mid-Life Crisis of the Law and Economics Movement: Con-
fronting the Problems of Nonfalsiflability and Normative Bias, 67 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 231, 234-37 (1991) (discussing the inadequacy of efficiency cri-
teria).
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B. THINKING ABOUT THE VALUES OF FEDERALISM
Valuing federalism means making a serious attempt to
identify and measure the values on both sides of the federalist
balance. 292 As it happens, constitutional lawyers have spent a
fair amount of time discussing the values of state autonomy,293
but political economists and other social scientists have done
surprisingly little work testing these ideas to determine
whether they actually bear fruit. On the other hand, political
economists have developed fairly sophisticated arguments as to
why centralization is efficient in certain circumstances, 294 yet
constitutional lawyers have made little effort to apply this
theoretical understanding to real federalism problems. Look-
ing first to the benefits of state decisional autonomy, and then
to the arguments for nationalization, this section offers an
agenda for further study and a plea for better understanding of
the values of federalism.
1. Re-evaluating State Authority
The question of why we care about retaining authority in
the states has received inadequate attention. The arguments
of constitutional lawyers are shopworn, uttered so often they
no longer are heard when spoken. It will not suffice simply to
utter shibboleths like "accountability" or "states as laboratories"
and expect to win an argument (or anticipate that, as usual, the
argument willbe lost). At some level Rubin and Feeley's criticism
is devastating, yet there has not been a sustained response.295
Political economists have developed their own theories to
support federalism, but ground those theories almost exclu-
sively in efficiency, creating some serious pitfalls. There are
essentially two common, related theories of federalism based
upon efficiency.2 96 The first theory, "decentralization," makes
292. See Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 534 ("[F]ederalism requires a
functional analysis as to how power should be allocated between the federal
and state governments. That is, the critical question is: When is it necessary
or preferable to regulate at the national level rather than on a decentralized
basis?"); Kramer, supra note 5, at 1502-03 (noting the two sides of federalism).
293. See infra text accompanying notes 303-367 (cataloguing reasons in
favor of maintaining independent state authority).
294. See infra text accompanying notes 368-386 (discussing the benefits of
centralized authority).
295. But see Jackson, supra note 100, at 54-60.
296. See Alan P. Hamlin, Decentralization, Competition and the Efficiency
[Vol. 82:317
VALUING FEDERALISM
the point that when power is diffused, different governments
can adopt a mix of policies that meet the preferences of differ-
ent citizens, thus maximizing the way in which government as
a whole satisfies individual preferences.297 The second theory,
"competition," argues that citizens will vote with their feet by
moving to jurisdictions that maximize their individual prefer-
ences.298 Thus governments can compete with one another to
attract firms or individuals in the most efficient manner. Much
of the debate about local tax incentives, for example, centers on
whether this latter sort of competition always is economically
efficient and should be permitted by the national authority.299
Despite the obvious utility of these models, intuition suggests
that they suffer from deep flaws. For example, at the core of
each theory is a presumption of mobility, that citizens and
firms can and will vote with their feet. Yet, focusing for a moment
on individuals, there is every reason to question whether this
mobility is nearly as great as the models would suggest.
300
People can and do move, but inertia is a large factor in why
each of us lives where we do. Even when moves occur, they
of Federalism, 67 ECON. REC. 193, 194 (1991). Hamlin argues that these two
theories may be somewhat at odds, and that federalism may not work to fur-
ther either of them. Rubin and Feeley discuss this tension in the context of
citizen choice. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 221, at 917.
297. See Hamlin, supra note 296, at 194-99 (discussing the decentraliza-
tion thesis).
298. A powerful case for the competition model is made by Dye. See DYE,
supra note 39, passim; see also Hamlin, supra note 296, at 201-03 (discussing
competition). Ideas of competition are also explored in COMPETITION AMONG
STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds.,
1991).
299. See, e.g., Melvin L. Burstein and Arthur J. Rolnick, Congress Should
End the Economic War Among the States, THE REGION, March 1995, at 3
(arguing that Congress should exercise its Commerce Clause power to end
preferential state taxes that misallocate resources and cause states to provide
too few public goods); Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States From Themselves:
Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 377, 423-24 (1996) (arguing that the Commerce Clause should be un-
derstood to constrain state business tax incentives because they divert busi-
ness activity from its economically most efficient location); Kary L. Moss, The
Privatizing of Public Wealth, 23 FORD. URB. L.J. 101, 140 (1995) (discussing
proposals to curb state tax incentives at the federal level).
300. See Eichenberger, supra note 243, at 406 (arguing that the assump-
tion of high mobility of the citizenry is not borne out by evidence from Swit-
zerland); Ann Markusen, American Federalism and Regional Policy, 16 INT'L
REGIONAL SCI. REV. 3, 9 (1994) (stressing the high transaction costs involved
in household moving); Rubin & Feeley, supra note 221, at 918 (calling the
mobility argument "a bit fanciful"). But see DYE, supra note 39, at 15-6
(arguing that there is sufficient mobility to make the model work).
19971
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tend to be for reasons largely unrelated to government policy
decisions: We move because our work takes us elsewhere, or
because of marriage or some other personal need, or perhaps
because of climate and health. Thus, mobility may be overstated
and poorly understood, and yet it is central to economic theo-
ries of federalism.
Perhaps more significantly, political economists' single-
minded focus on efficiency may miss all that is most important
about federalism. American democracy rests explicitly on the
idea that there is a benefit to inefficiency. Liberty, the Framers
felt, was best achieved if power was diffused. 0 1 It seems odd to
test a system designed to some extent to defeat efficiency solely
against efficiency's metric. If efficiency were the sole goal, the
optimal arrangement might be government by a benevolent
dictator. The dictator could then orchestrate many of the
benefits of the economic modeling of federalism by structuring
whatever jurisdictional differences made most sense. We could
have low-tax regions in the mountains where the skiing is
good, and higher tax regions with strong educational systems
that 'appealed to those who also like beaches. The Framers,
however, had enough dictated to them to favor political principles
of an entirely different sort, principles not adequately acknowl-
edged in efficiency-based models.
Political economists and constitutional thinkers ought to
work together to bring to life the other values of federalism.
The reason for the lack of sustained attention to the tangible
benefits of divided government may well be that those values are
difficult to assess or to measure. But the work must be done.
Rubin and Feeley argue that there is no substance to the "airy,
flag-waving-in-the-breeze rhetoric" of federalism. 0 2 Intuition
301. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59 (1983) ("[It is crystal clear
from the records of the Convention, contemporaneous writings and debates,
that the Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency."); Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
("[Tihe Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty."); Inman &
Rubinfeld, supra note 9 (manuscript at 12) (in addition to economic efficiency,
federalism allocations implicate values of "political participation" and
"protection of individual rights and liberties"); cf THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at
336 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961) ("The accumulation of all
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of
one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.").
302. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 221, at 915.
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suggests otherwise, despite the strength of their arguments.
Intuition alone does not win arguments, however; substance does.
What follows is a catalogue of some of the reasons federalism
might matter. The catalogue necessarily is incomplete, and
others have catalogued similar reasons in different ways. 0 3
What is important about this catalogue is that it seeks to give
substance to frequently uttered rhetoric about federalism, to
develop intuition as to why retaining authority in the states
may be important and to suggest clear areas for study.
a. Public Participation in Democracy
States, and their substate local governments, are closer to
the people and provide an opportunity for greater citizen in-
volvement in the functional process of self-government. 3°4 We
have a system of democracy, one that welcomes and privileges
the voice of the people. The founders may not have intended
it, 305 but as the system evolved, the franchise consistently was
expanded. When we despair of the operations of our national
government, we tend to criticize special-interest influence and
bemoan the apathy and lack of participation of average citizens.306
303. The very best catalogue may be found in David Shapiro's wonderful
"brief' on both sides of the federalism question. See SHAPIRO, supra note 215,
at 76-106.
304 See id. at 92-94 (arguing that a smaller electorate brings the govern-
ment closer to the people); Kramer, supra note 5, at 1498 (acknowledging the
argument that state governments protect liberty because they are smaller and
closer to the people).
305. See THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 417 (James Madison) (Benjamin F.
Wright ed., 1961) (noting the 'total exclusion of the people, in their collective
capacity" from the American system of government); Arthur S. Miller, Myth
and Reality in American Constitutionalism, 63 TEY. L. REV. 181, 189 (1984)
(book review) ("The framers of the Constitution were not at all interested in
creating a democracy; the word 'republic,' with all its vagueness, more closely
describes what they had in mind True democracy was abhorrent to the fram-
ers. Only in this century has the word come to 'describe' American govern-
ment.").
306. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Roberts, Senate Seat a Fixer-Upper Hopefuls Seek
to Reform, DENVER PosT, Feb. 18, 1996, at A01 ("A culture of lobbyists, special
interests, political action committees and political financiers has distorted the
legislative process and excluded ordinary Americans from participation.")
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gene Nichols, 1996 candidate for
U.S. Senate); Stephanie Stetson, An Open Letter... on Leadership, THE
VIRGINIAN-PILOT AND Tm LEDGER-STAR (Norfolk), Oct., 6, 1996, at J1, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File ("Frustrated by the perception that
the public good has been sold out to the special interest groups ... citizens
wonder whether their participation in the political process even makes a dif-
ference.").
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Although the distinction between ordinary citizens and special
interests may well be overstated, state and local government
does provide many more avenues for citizen participation than
does the national government.
Rubin and Feeley, among others, doubt that states will
serve the function of promoting democracy, but in doing so they
repeat the two baseline errors discussed above. They argue
that states are unnecessary to preserve democracy (just as they
argue that the Guarantee Clause is unnecessary today), be-
cause democracy is so ingrained that it will not be disturbed. °7
But states also are embedded deeply in the system we enjoy
today, and it is possible that the two-states and democracy-
have become ingrained together such that eliminating the
autonomy of states would weaken our democracy. Indeed, in-
tuition suggests that disenchantment with government and
anemic levels of citizen participation in democracy positively
correlate with nationalizing trends. Second, Rubin and Feeley
argue (somewhat in tension with their first point) that local
participation by definition occurs locally, not at the state
level.30 8 This may or may not be the case, and likely varies
from state to state.30 9 But even if so, again, under the system
that we have local governments are creatures of and fostered
by the state governments.
Intuition suggests that more people would and could par-
ticipate in smaller levels of government, and common experience
seems to bear this out.310 Some commentators look primarily to
307. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 221, at 916.
308. See id. at 915.
309. Rubin and Feeley live in California, as does Professor Chemerinsky,
who also doubts that democracy will be promoted at the state level. As Pro-
fessor Chemerinsky asks, "is a state the size of California, or for that matter,
a city the size of Los Angeles, sufficiently more homogenous than the United
States so as to increase the likelihood of responsive government?" Chemerin-
sky, supra note 17, at 528. But California may not be typical of the rest of the
country in this regard, although it do~s make sense that one's perspective is
going to be influenced by one's experience. It at least bears considering
whether what is true in Los Angeles is true in Bozeman, Nashville, Macon,
Nashua, and the like, and whether what is true in California is necessarily
true in Montana, Wyoming, New Hampshire, Alabama, or North Dakota.
310. For an economic argument supporting this intuition, see Eichen-
berger, supra note 243, at 410-12. See also Stephen Hansen et al., The Down-
sian Model of Electoral Participation: Formal Theory and Empirical Analysis
of the Constituency Size Effect, 52 PUB. CHOICE 15, 19-32 (1987) (concluding
that voter turnout for school budget referenda is lower in larger communi-
ties).
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electoral turnout and argue to the contrary, pointing out that
important national elections rouse far more interest than elections
for state and local offices.311 But a single-minded focus on voter
turnout misses the point that participation can and should
stretch well beyond electoral participation. The fact is that
many Americans can call their state and local officials on the
phone-and do-and have those phone calls returned by the ac-
tual officeholder, not a staffer tallying opinions in a polite voice.
The fact is that countless citizens attend city council and state
legislative sessions, watching to see some matter of interest re-
solved.312 The fact is that interest groups at the state and local
level all tend to be more grass roots, less mechanized, and more
responsive to the efforts of concerned individuals. There is
work to be done to test these assertions,313 but they are easily
observable in many states and communities.
Moreover, state and local governments appear to serve as
breeding grounds for democracy.31 4  They provide a way for
many people interested in public service to step on to the lad-
der in a manageable way. National office has become fright-
fully and frighteningly expensive.315 It does not matter how
many of these officials actually make it to (or even vie to get to)
the "top" of the ladder, the part of the ladder that academics
31L See, e.g., D. Bruce La Pierre, Political Accountability in the National
Political Process-The Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80
Nw. U. L. REV. 577, 631 & n.310 (1985) (arguing that state and local govern-
ments are farther from the democratic ideal than the national political proc-
ess on the basis of voter participation).
312. See Markusen, supra note 300, at 8 ("It is not unusual for dozens of
people to attend a school board meeting when controversies arise or for hun-
dreds to pack legislative galleries when bills important to them are under
consideration."). As with many students of federalism, Markusen cites little
data. But she makes a number of stimulating observations, among them that
local politics have more to do with policy than with party affiliation. See id.
313. Rubin and Feeley argue that the idea of local participation is "one of
many unproven assumptions that fester in this field without either theoretical
or empirical support." Rubin & Feeley, supra note 221, at 916. I agree, cer-
tainly, about the lack of empirical support.
314. See Markusen, supra note 300, at 8 (arguing that local levels of gov-
ernment provide a "training ground for citizens, potential politicians, and ac-
tivists").
315. In 1992, the average seat in the Senate cost about $3.9 million, while
seats in the House of Representatives were a comparative bargain at $543,000
each. See Robert Peck et al., Constitutional Implications of Campaign Fi-
nance Reform, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 161, 175 (1994) (citing Jamin Raskin &
John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 273, 297 (1993)).
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seem to be watching. For democracy to function it may matter
only that someone starts as a city council member and ends up
in the state legislature. Numerous other citizens serve on local
and state boards and commissions, school boards, or even the
PTA
The simple fact is-and this has been a subject of far more
study abroad than here at home-there is a "democracy deficit"
in our society, one that is bound to get larger. Most good work
on this subject focuses on Europe. As the EU takes over func-
tions once performed by member states, the balance of author-
ity in Europe is shifting from elected parliamentary bodies to
executive officers and unelected bureaucrats.316 The same sorts
of problems are already present in the United States and
bound to get worse. Congress often shirks important decisions
by foisting them off on bureaucratic officials.31 7 The impact of
international treaties like the WTO likely will mirror the de-
mocracy deficit emerging as Europe unifies, with executive of-
ficials representing state and national interests in WTO panels,
316. Good basic discussions of the democracy deficit in the EU can be
found in J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403,
2466-74 (1991), and in Shirley Williams, Sovereignty and Accountability in the
European Community, in THE NEW EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 155, 162-64
(Robert 0. Keohane & Stanley Hoffmann eds., 1991). Responses to the de-
mocracy deficit problem have included strengthening the role of the European
Parliament, increased regionalization, and the doctrine of subsidiarity. See
Edwards, supra note 29, at 560-61 & n.78 (discussing subsidiarity and the
European Parliament); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Committee on the Regions
and the Role of the Regional Governments in the European Union, 20
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 413, 440-56 (1997) (discussing subsidiarity
and the devolution of power to subnational governments).
317. See FARBER ETAL., supra note 249, at 966-67 (arguing that legislators
delegate powers of standard creation to agencies in order to avoid conflictual
issues). In the United States, concern about the democracy deficit has been
expressed frequently in the context of environmental law. See, e.g., Richard
B. Stewart, United States Environmental Regulation: A Failing Paradigm, 15
J.L. & COM. 585, 590 (1996) ("By regulating vital decisions about environ-
mental risk management through a remote, arcane, and piecemeal bureau-
cratic process, the command and control system necessarily runs a serious
democracy deficit."); Michael P. Vandenbergh, An Alternative to Ready, Fire,
Aim: A New Framework to Link Environmental Targets in Environmental
Law, 85 KY. L.J. 803, 849-54 (1996-97) (noting that the public is largely ex-
cluded from environmental decisionmaking and that decisionmaking is vul-
nerable to control by special interests). But see Esty, supra note 4, at 648-52
(1996) (arguing that the participation of uninformed citizens in environmental
regulatory judgments is of dubious value).
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and then deciding upon compliance with such decisions in an ad
hoc process of negotiation largely removed from the public eye.31 8
Although the direction of trade and decisionmaking may
well prove a good thing for international harmony and eco-
nomic stability, it is also well worth paying attention to,
learning about, and preserving the institutions we care about
most. Democracy is one of them. We ought to be studying the
extent to which important decisions are made remote from the
public, and whether local and state governments can and do
help solve the deficit we are creating elsewhere.
Rubin and Feeley are skeptical about the entire concept of
public participation, in part because it favors elites. 19 Of
course, elites often are the primary participants in govern-
ment.32 0 But if elitism is the concern, it likely is far more of a
problem at the national level. In many communities, diversity
among non-elite voices-those of school parents, minorities,
churches, and unions-far exceeds that at the national level.321
318. The events leading up to World Trade Organization Report of the
Panel in United States--Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gaso-
line, 35 I.L.M. 274 (1996), make this clear enough. When Venezuela filed a
complaint alleging that U.S. gasoline standards discriminated against im-
ports, the U.S. dispatched bureaucrats from the EPA, Energy Department,
and office of the U.S. Trade Representative to negotiate a deal. See EPA An-
nounces Fuel Plan for Venezuela: Threatened GATT Complaint is Shelved, 11
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 504 (Mar. 30, 1994). The discussions were
secret; the public did not learn of them until the Secretary of State leaked de-
tails to the U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela. See id. For discussion of the
abortive settlement attempt, see Schultz, supra note 212, at 12; Aubry D.
Smith, Note, Executive-Branch Rulemaking and Dispute Settlement in the
World Trade Organization: A Proposal to Increase Public Participation, 94
MICH. L. REV. 1267, 1267-68 (1996); see also Friedman, Global Village, supra
note 254, at 1478 (discussing the democracy deficit in the context of GATT);
Hahn & Richards, supra note 228, at 441 (discussing the role of bureaucrats
in advocating international agreements).
319. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 221, at 915 ("[P]articipation.. . is as
likely to exclude and disadvantage less fortunate citizens as it is to help
them.").
320. Members of financial elites, for example, appear to dominate the U.S.
Senate. See Debra Burke, Twenty Years after the Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendments of 1974: Look Who's Running Now, 99 DIc. L. REV. 357,357
(1995) ("Today... over half of the Senators who serve in Congress are mil-
lionaires, and no Senator prior to election earned anywhere near the median
level of personal income in the United States."); Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note
315, at 289 ("At least fifty-one out of one hundred senators are millionaires,
compared to less than one-half of one percent of the general population.").
321. See Merritt, Guarantee Clause, supra note 3, 8-9 (arguing that state
governments provide political and cultural diversity).
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Again, this is a question that has received insufficient empiri-
cal attention.
b. Accountability
Closely related to the idea of local participation is the no-
tion that government officials should be held accountable to the
electorate for decisions that they make.3" One might agree
that federalism in and of itself is bad for accountability because
it blurs or confuses the lines of responsibility.323 Although
there is some truth to this, in part the blame rests not with
federalism, but with a failure of the courts and legislative bodies
to come to grips with what federalism entails.
Those who doubt that federalism fosters accountability
tend to equate accountability with electoral participation.324
Any meaningful understanding of accountability must, how-
ever, look deeper. There are many problems with notions of
electoral accountability. Among them is the fact that we are
forced to buy our representation wholesale, yet most govern-
ment officials who have an impact on our lives do not run for
office.32 5  The discussion about federalism and accountability
often overlooks the fact that there are many other ways to
think about accountability that transcend these immediate
problems.
Accountability in a democracy means responsiveness on
the part of those petitioned. Perhaps this is why participation
at the national level seems depressingly low to some.3 26 People
322. See SHAPIRO, supra note 215, at 111-12 (discussing the tension be-
tween the accountability of state officials and coercive federal legislation);
Merritt, Guarantee Clause, supra note 3, at 7 (suggesting that participation
fosters accountability among elected representatives).
323. Professor Lessig argues that today no one has a clear sense of what
tasks should be performed by the national or state governments. See Lessig,
supra note 9, at 125.
324. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 528 (linking voter respon-
siveness to electoral turnout).
325. Commentators especially point to actors in administrative agencies.
See John Devlin, Toward a State Constitutional Analysis of Allocation of Pow-
ers: Legislators and Legislative Appointees Performing Administrative Func-
tions, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1205, 1268 (1993) (arguing that the ability of legisla-
tors to appoint administrative officials "raises obvious problems of lack of
electoral accountability"); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New
Deal, 101 HARv. L. REv. 421, 447 (1987) (noting that agency actors are "not
responsive to the public as a whole").
326. The American Bar Association may be among them. The title of a re-
cent symposium was "The Disappearance of the American Voter Re-Visited."
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seem to feel the national government is beyond our control.2
It is at least not crazy to suggest that if state and local officials
were merely bureaucratic arms of the national government (as
Rubin and Feeley seem to suggest they ought to be),328 they too
would be less responsive to the people's needs.
Accountability entails much more than periodic elections.
Officials, elected and appointed, should be available for public
comment, anger, approval, suggestions, and ideas about the
course of public affairs. They should be accessible, by phone,
by fax, by e-mail. Of course, the fewer layers of staff one has to
go through, the better. Indeed, accountability also ought to
imply something bordering on moral approval. We should be
able to convey to our officials what kind of a job it is we think
they are doing. Officials ought to look their constituents in the
eye on the street and see them in the grocery store. In its
broadest sense, officials should live the lives of those they gov-
ern, for then they are likely to make good choices about how
those lives should be lived.
From this perspective, it is obvious that federalism pro-
vides for broadened accountability. Officials at the local level
are likelier to be available, and thus are likelier to be held ac-
countable.3 29  Local officials actually responsible for making
policy live in the localities where the impact of their policies
are felt. This would not be the case under the Rubin-Feeley
model, because even decentralized power is just that; it is ulti-
mately accountable to some authority far away.330
STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAW AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS, ABA, THE
DISAPPEARANCE OF THE AMERICAN VOTER REVISITED (1989); see also KEVIN P.
PHILLIPS & PAuL H. BLACKMAN, ELECTORAL REFORM AND VOTER PAR-
TICIPATION: A FALSE REMEDY FOR VOTER APATHY, 1 (1975) (noting that the
U.S. electoral participation rate is "easily the lowest among free democratic
countries").
327. See, e.g., Jim Haynes, Despite Clinton, Election Held Blessings for
Arizona, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Nov. 10, 1996, at H3 (inveighing against
"this out-of-control colossus we call the federal government").
328. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 221, at 951 (arguing that the use of
the states as a mechanism for decentralization "does not convert the states
into political communities; citizens can make the decisions necessary to carry
out state functions, but their political identity is formed by their membership
in the nation as a whole").
329. See Merritt, Guarantee Clause, supra note 3, at 7 (suggesting that
greater accessibility of local government enhances participation); see also
Calabresi supra note 9, at 778 (arguing that the smaller size of state govern-
ments "makes it far easier for citizens to exercise a greater and more effective
degree of control over their government officials").
330. One might think, for example, of the relationships between the colo-
nial legislatures and the Crown. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL
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This question of accountability has played a larger role in
Supreme Court doctrine of late, and it should play a larger one
yet.33" ' The reason the Court prohibited the commandeering of
state and local government in New York v. United States332 was
in part a problem of accountability. One government should
not be permitted to act on the citizens through the facade of
another government, for this serves to confuse lines of author-
ity, blurring in the minds of citizens and officials just who is
responsible for what. Authority becomes no more than a giant
shell game, and it becomes increasingly difficult to know under
what shell the seed of responsibility lies.
333
Moreover, as other commentators have recognized, ac-
countability poses a problem for reasons that go beyond those
identified in the Supreme Court's decisions. Even if citizens
are aware that the specific law with which they disagree is a
product of choices made by the national legislature, they will
have a much harder time connecting the failure of state and local
regulation in other areas to the resource drain from national
commandeering. 334  The most important problem with the
Brady Bill challenged in Printz was not that citizens angry
about background checks would blame state rather than na-
tional officials. Rather, it was that state citizens whose calls to
police officials went unanswered would have no way of knowing
that those officials were distracted by the work the national
government had imposed.335
A concern for accountability should spill over to other doc-
trinal areas. The Supreme Court should be far more attentive
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 203 (enlarged ed. 1992) (describing
powers retained by the crown over the colonial legislatures).
331. See Jackson, supra note 100, at 94-103 (arguing that particularly
stringent limits on commandeering are justified).
332. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (overturning take-title provisions of the Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act); see also supra notes 201-
203 and accompanying text (discussing New York).
333. But see Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 517 ("Voters, however, surely
can understand that the state is acting under federal compulsion."). One
might have considerably less confidence than Chemerinsky on this point.
334. See Garrett, supra note 9, at 1134 ("Unfunded mandates force other
officials to raise taxes or make cuts in government services. This ability to
engage in 'iability-shifting' may lead members of Congress to impose more
mandates on states and localities than they think is consistent with a robust
federal system.") (footnotes omitted); see also Evan H. Caminker, State Sover-
eignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Imple-
ment Federal Law, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1065 (1995) (arguing that this is
a unique accountability concern of federal mandates).
335. Beth Garrett deserves credit for insisting this point be stressed.
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than it was in South Dakota v. Dole336 to the problem of condi-
tional spending. In many ways the greatest threat to state
autonomy follows from the problem of conditions attached to
spending grants, yet both the Supreme Court and Congress
generally have left this area unregulated.337  Conditions on
spending grants, when permitted to stray far beyond the pur-
pose of the expenditure, allow the national government to
regulate by pulling strings from behind a veil while remaining
invisible to all but a few.338 Similarly, the very failure to de-
velop a coherent understanding of when national or state
authority is appropriate blurs the lines of accountability,
making it impossible for the governed or the governors to know
who bears responsibility for what.
c. States as Laboratories for Experimentation
Intuition suggests that with fifty different parallel state
governments, and countless substate governments as well, in-
novations in governing or problem solving will occur that will
inure to the benefit of the entire populace in the long run.339
Intuition may be incorrect, however, and counterarguments
have been raised. In an important and oft-cited paper Professor
Susan Rose-Ackerman argues that in fact states will not serve
as laboratories for experimentation, largely due to the risk
aversion of those who govern.34' For most public officials, Rose-
336. 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding Congress's power to condition highway
spending upon a state's adoption of a 21-year-old drinking age).
337. This obviously is the impact of the Dole decision. See supra notes 92-
103 and accompanying text (analyzing the case). Congress also left most
conditions attached to spending grants uncovered by the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995. See Garrett, supra note 9 at 1138-39 (explaining the Sig-
nificance of this omission).
338. See supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text (discussing the dan-
gers of conditional spending).
339. The classic statement is by Justice Brandeis. See New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country."); see also SHAPIRO, supra
note 215, at 85-88 (supplementing Brandeis's argument with the recognition
that different solutions may be best for different states); Kramer, supra note
5, at 1499 (arguing that capital and taxpayers act as incentives for local gov-
ernments to experiment); McConnell, supra note 3, at 1498-1500 (exploring
economic arguments underlying state innovation).
340. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federal-
ism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUn. 593, 594 (1980) ("[Low-level gov-
ernments remain flawed mechanisms to rely on in the search for new ideas.").
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Ackerman argues, it is better to pursue a known course than
run the risk of committing resources to ideas that might fail or
prove unpopular. 4' Professors Rubin and Feeley pursue a
somewhat similar line, but take it a step further by arguing
that good experimentation means a willingness to try a variety
of options, some unappealing, and to control the experiments in
order to obtain meaningful data. 42 Thus, they argue, decen-
tralization will promote experimentation; federalism will not.
Although there may be merit to these arguments, they
misunderstand the idea of "experimentation" in the actual
world of governing. Rose-Ackerman's point is an interesting
one, but it seems to presume a governor sitting at a desk care-
fully calculating whether to try out a novel ideal someone has
concocted.3 43 In reality what governments do is solve immedi-
ate and pressing problems. Those who govern do not always
have a choice. Experimentation is not an option, it is a way of
life. It may be better if there were more well-considered ex-
periments, but some of what happens just happens as govern-
ments try to solve problems. Similarly, Rubin and Feeley seem
to imagine a giant boardroom where great national thinkers
develop novel ideas and try them out on the states (or whatever
decentralized bodies we then have) in controlled experi-
ments.3'" But necessity is the mother of invention, and the
spirit of state experimentation is one of creative response to
immediate necessity, often addressed to solving a real problem
staring the official in the face.
34L See id. at 594 ("[Slecure incumbents are likely to behave as if they
were 'risk averse' even if their underlying preferences are risk neutral. In a
multiple government system the overall incentive to take risks is reduced if
the politician hopes to free ride on the activities of other governments.").
342. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 221, at 923-26 (analogizing the central
control necessary for governmental experimentation to the control exercised
by a medical researcher over her subjects).
343. McConnell makes the important point that Rose-Ackerman's model
considers only a single decentralized constituency: "[Tihere will be more inno-
vation in a decentralized system as a whole, both because there are more ac-
tors and because individual constituencies will perceive risk and reward dif-
ferently." McConnell, supra note 339, at 1498 n.58.
344. See, e.g., Rubin & Feeley, supra note 221, at 924 ("[T]he argument for
experimentation, like the argument for participation, citizen choice, or com-
petition, supports only managerial decentralization. A unitary manager can
experiment with different policies for achieving the same goal, just as it can
encourage different sub-units to compete against each other in pursuit of that
goal.").
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"Innovation" might have been a better word choice for
Justice Brandeis than "experimentation," saving us all a lot of
bother.3 45 It seems apparent that government officials can and
do innovate, and that good ideas are picked up by other gov-
ernmental units and replicated. Welfare reform was born in
the states, as a response to inadequate funding.34 6 So was Social
Security for that matter.347 But those are only the most promi-
nent examples. What about bookmobiles, pre-election day
"early" voting, town meetings, televised court proceedings,
greenways, community agenda programs, leadership programs,
and the like?348 Common intuition suggests that the vast majority
of techniques used today to govern were developed at the state
and local level.
Indeed, the best model to describe what is at stake here
may be an understanding of innovation as an evolutionary
process.349 Countless state and local governments, remote from
345. See Deborah J. Merritt, Federalism as Empowerment, 47 FLA. L. REV.
541, 551 (1995) [hereinafter Merritt, Federalism as Empowerment] ("Despite
his pseudo-scientific language, it is doubtful that Justice Brandeis expected
states to engage in controlled social experiments. Instead, experimentation in
a federal system is akin to natural selection.").
346. Section 1115 of the Social Security Act allowed the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to waive a state's compliance with many re-
quirements of the AFDC in order for the state to run experimental projects.
See Public Welfare Amendments of 1962 § 122, 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (1994). In
the mid-1980s, the Reagan administration began granting large numbers of
waivers to revamp the AFDC through "state-sponsored, community-based
demonstration projects." See Lucy A. Williams, The Abuse of Section 1115
Waivers: Welfare Reform in Search of a Standard, 12 YALE L. & POLY REV. 8,
16-17 (1994) (citation omitted). Wisconsin was one of the first states to under-
take significant reforms. See id. at 17-18.
347. See Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion: The Role of Disability
in the Social Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. REV. 361, 373 n.27 (1996) ("Most of
the programs in the Social Security Act had antecedents in earlier state pro-
grams. In fact, the public assistance programs in the Act were structured to
provide federal funding to pre-existing state programs.").
348. To this list Deborah Merritt adds: unemployment compensation,
minimum-wage laws, public financing of political campaigns, no-fault insur-
ance, hospital cost containment, and prohibition against discrimination in
housing and employment. See Merritt, Guarantee Clause, supra note 3, at 9.
Professor Shapiro would not have us forget state experiments in public edu-
cation, health care, taxation, penology, and environmental protection. See
SHAPIRO, supra note 215, at 87-88.
349. Kobayashi and Ribstein argue that competition will cause state laws
to evolve toward uniformity. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein,
Evolution and Spontaneous Uniformity: Evidence from the Evolution of the
Limited Liability Company, 34 ECON. INQuIRY 464, 465 (1996). For analyses
of spontaneous evolution of laws, see Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evo-
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one another but facing similar problems, develop numerous
twists on solving them."' At conferences, and through obser-
vation, governments learn of techniques employed elsewhere.
The ones that seem sensible, that work, survive; many other
ideas die on the vine.35' This evolutionary process works best
precisely because many governments concoct ideas on their
own, not a few of which prove to be unsuitable in the long run.
One might doubt whether so much creative thinking would
emanate from Rubin and Feeley's national boardroom or labo-
ratory.
Of course, just how much of this innovation occurs, and
under what conditions, remains unclear. What sort of national
behavior chills innovation, or encourages it, remains equally
unclear. These are all areas for more study. As presently con-
figured, however, the doctrine of federalism pays only lip serv-
ice to the idea of state innovation, thereby ensuring that we
will not make the most of it.
d. Protecting Citizens' Health, Safety and Welfare
State and local governments can work to protect the safety,
health and welfare of their citizens. We all too often forget that
governments exist for this very purpose. State and local gov-
ernments are the ones that make the myriad decisions that
really matter to our lives. How many police shall there be, how
shall they conduct themselves, and where shall they be sta-
tioned? Where shall schools be, and what shall they teach?
Should we have light rail, or other means of assisting commuters?
The easy response is that if there was no federalism these
decisions would be made at the national level, but it is unclear
lution of Commercial Law, 55 S. ECON. J. 644 (1989); Lisa Bernstein, Opting
Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond In-
dustry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992). For a discussion of evolutionary theory
and law, see J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to De-
scribe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democ-
racy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1406 (1996).
350. In the field of welfare reform, for example, states have pursued many
different strategies aimed at achieving similar goals. For a description of the
various solutions developed by some states, see Welfare Reform Success Sto-
ries: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the Comm. on
Ways and Means, 104th Cong. 37 (1996).
351. For instance, Virginia's 1995 welfare reform plan incorporated the
experiences of pilot projects from other states. See John E. Littel, Comment
on Edward Wayland's Welfare Reform in Virginia, 3 VA. J. Soc. POLY & L.
311, 317 (1996); cf Calabresi, supra note 9, at 777 (emphasizing competition
as a motive force behind innovation).
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that these are questions better answered at the center, or even
that they would be answered at all if authority over them was
transferred. Recall that federalism decisions do not always pit
national versus state authority. Under the dormant Commerce
Clause,352 and with regard to some forms of preemption, 353 the
courts make the decision to strike a state law even when there
is no national legislation necessarily on point. Thus, certain
decisions create a regulatory vacuum, leaving interests tradi-
tionally protected by the police power in jeopardy.
This is a problem likely to be exacerbated by governing in-
ternational agreements, under which laws having a negative
impact on free trade are vulnerable. 354 It is true that those
agreements often expressly acknowledge the interests pro-
tected by the police power, but those same agreements also
presume against the validity of regulation more protective than
international standards suggest is necessary. Thus, a government
which decides to be more protective of the health or safety of its
citizens may find its power to act in such a fashion diminished.
As the importance of trade grows, governments will lose
control over many of the decisions that truly matter to their
citizens. It is unclear whether we have adequately studied the
extent to which this is possible. Yet, if any lesson is clear, it is
that power lost is not easily regained; power gained is not eas-
ily relinquished. These questions deserve careful attention.
e. Cultural and Local Diversity
Similarly, cultural and local diversity are threatened by
uniformity, whether legislatively enacted or judicially im-
posed.355 This is a point that might meet initial resistance.
One of the arguments brought in most troubling fashion to the
defense of federalism has been the idea of "local conditions,"
language all too reminiscent of the rhetoric used to defend
something like Jim Crow.356 Indeed, to the extent that local di-
352. See supra Part I.F.
353. See supra Part I.E.
354- See supra Part I1F.
355. See Feld, supra note 262 (manuscript at 17-29) (describing how EU
trade policy threatens legislation designed to protect French language and
culture); Merritt, Guarantee Clause, supra note 3, at 9 n.44 (arguing that the
incentives for uniformity in a centralized government may overwhelm the de-
sire for diversity).
356. See, e.g., Sam J. Ervin, Jr., The Case for Segregation, LooK, Apr. 3,
1956, at 32 (criticizing desegregationists for lack of familiarity with "Southern
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versity was a sensible justification for state regulatory author-
ity at the time of Cooley, it may be less so now. Nonetheless,
there is some substance to this idea of diversity, substance that
cannot be taken into account through national legislation.
Drinking ages, speed limits, and gun usage all are examples of
subjects that have played out on the national stage in recent
years despite good arguments in each instance that state cul-
tures differ in important ways that justify decisions being
made at a more local level.35 7
The more intriguing argument about diversity is not that
federalism permits localities to regulate in accordance with local
differences, but that federalism enhances our lives by preserving
and creating diversity.358 This surely is a proposition that is
testable. The fact is that the ease and efficiency of uniformity
is fast turning our lives into a parade of McDonald's, Walmarts,
and cookie-cutter amusement parks. Obviously it overstates
matters substantially to attribute such changes to governmen-
tal centralization, but the greater the centralization of regula-
tion the greater the impetus to regulate all aspects of our lives
in a way that crushes local differences.
f. Diffusing Power to Protect Liberty
A common argument brought to the defense of federalism
is that divided government will protect liberty.3 9 This also is
an argument that meets with much scoffing. As Rubin and
Feeley point out, if national authority threatened our liberty,
who would stand up to the Marine Corps? The states? It
conditions").
357. See supra notes 97-99 (drinking ages), 172 (speed limits), 205 (gun
control laws) and accompanying text; see also Calabresi, supra note 9, at 775(arguing that "social utility can be maximized if governmental units are small
enough and powerful enough so that local laws can be adapted to local condi-
tions").
358. See A.E. Dick Howard, Garcia and the Values of Federalism: On the
Need for a Recurrence to Fundamental Principles, 19 GA. L. REV. 789, 795(1985) ('[F]ederalism both reflects and encourages pluralism, allowing indi-
vidual idiosyncracies to flourish."); Merritt, Guarantee Clause, supra note 3,
at 8 (arguing that federalism provides political and cultural diversity).
359. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (noting that the federal balance plays a vital role in securing
freedom); THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (arguing that federalism
provides a double security for the rights of the people); Calabresi, supra note
9, at 787; William T. Coleman, Jr., Federalism, The Great Vague Clauses and
Judicial Supremacy: Their Constitutional Role in the Liberty of a Free People,
49 U. PITT. L. REV. 699, 703 (1988) ([F]ederalism has provided the impetus
for many of our basic liberties.").
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seems unlikely that the states could generate the necessary
military might.3 60
Yet, there is more to this argument than often is under-
stood. Whatever the shifts in regulatory authority from the
states to the national government, the fact is that the states
remain independent political fora, with popular assemblies ca-
pable of expressing popular sentiment. The states have per-
formed this function throughout history. Sometimes it has
been exercised in regrettable fashion. Some of them have stood
up and opposed desegregation of schools, 61 or the elimination
of the institution of slavery.362 But some states also stood up
against the Alien and Sedition Acts. 363 It was the states that
first called for balanced budgets and fiscal responsibility, 3' and
many recent state government decisions afford greater liberty to
citizens than they receive under the federal constitution.
The point is that the states serve as an independent means
of calling forth the voice of the people, if and when this is nec-
essary. Despite well-meaning arguments about how govern-
ment operates best from the national level, the people's voice is
not always heard there. The continued existence of the states
360. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 221, at 928-29.
361. Governor Talmadge of Georgia, for example, said in the wake of the
Brown decision, "Georgians will not tolerate the mixing of the races in the
public schools or any of its public, tax-supported institutions." Talmadge
Urges Georgians to be Calm, THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, May 18, 1954, at 9.
For discussion of tactics used by southern state legislatures to evade integra-
tion, see Arthur S. Miller, The Strategy of Southern Resistance, THE RE-
PORTER, Oct. 2, 1958, at 18.
362. Delaware and Kentucky, for instance, would not voluntarily abolish
slavery after the Civil War. See J.G. RANDALL & DAVID DONALD, THE CIVIL
WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 395 (2d ed. 1969). After passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment, these two states refused to ratify. See id. at 396.
363. Larry Kramer points out that as a political movement emanating
from state legislatures, the fight against the Alien and Sedition Acts met with
limited success. See Kramer, supra note 5, at 1519. But he goes on to explain
how this momentum carried over into the national party fight between the
Federalists and the Republicans. See id. Kramer's observation, which is
surely correct, does not diminish the point. It only serves to show that popu-
lar governance involves a complex interaction among many of the extant insti-
tutions of American democracy.
364. In 1985, the General Accounting Office wrote, "Significant interest
has surfaced for a balanced federal budget, similar to those which many states
employ." U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BUDGET ISSUES: STATE
BALANCED BUDGET PRACTICES: BRIEFING REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, TASK
FORCE ON BUDGET PROCESS, COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 12 (1985). By that time 49 states already had balanced
budget requirements. See id. at 2.
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ensures that there is an entirely separate forum in which the
people can work to develop consensus. For this very reason
there is sense in those Supreme Court decisions that have
maintained the political integrity of the states, even while
permitting growth of national authority.
It is all too easy to become complacent regarding threats to
our personal liberty, and it would be wonderful if such compla-
cency were as warranted as Rubin and Feeley seem to think it
is. Perhaps we have been so successful in creating the institu-
tions that protect us that our liberty will never again be
threatened. Perhaps, on the other hand, the dispersion of po-
litical voice represented by federalism is part of this protection.
Before assuming the contrary, we might at least attempt to
study the question and arrive at some conclusion.
Several points should emerge from this brief enumeration
of the values of federalism. First, this has been but a small
sample of possible reasons to protect a vibrant federalism.
Others have been offered that make additional sense, such as
Erwin Chemerinsky's idea of federalism as "empowerment,"365
encouraging governments at every level to work to solve the
problems their citizens face.366 Second, even familiar arguments
365. Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 538-39. Chemerinsky's central point
is that federalism should be seen as a way of enabling government at all levels
to solve social problems. In making this argument, he does not believe that
federalism should "be seen as a basis for limiting the powers of either Con-
gress or the federal courts." Id. at 504. At least as to Congress, there is a ba-
sis for serious disagreement. Power is not infinite, and in its exercise differ-
ent levels of government are bound to trip over one another. See Friedman,
Signals, supra note 9, at 793 (arguing that the law at issue in Lopez interfered
with effective state programs to rid schools of guns). As to the courts, despite
the rhetoric of federalism, the Supreme Court often actually uses jurisdic-
tional theory to allocate cases sensibly between state and federal govern-
ments, albeit at times with limited success. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, A Re-
visionist Theory of Abstention, 88 MICH. L. REV. 530, 550-54 (1989)
(suggesting that "federal jurisdiction lie[s] when necessary to vindicate federal
rights, but that abstention is appropriate when significant state interests ex-
ist and the federal interest is minimal, or could be protected by Supreme
Court review").
366. See Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 538-39; Merritt, Federalism as
Empowerment, supra note 345, at 552-54 (arguing that the cumulative effect
of many federal commands to states might "disempower" state governments).
Federalism also is seen as furthering values of communitarianism, which may
or may not differ from the participatory goals described above. See, e.g., Kraig
James Powell, The Other Double Standard: Communitarianism, Federalism,
and American Constitutional Law, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 69, 89 (1996)
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for federalism are remarkably poorly developed in the litera-
ture. Instead, we tend to utter these reasons as slogans, with-
out thinking through them or testing them. Thus, they become
vulnerable to criticism, such as that offered by Rubin and
Feeley. What is needed is careful and sustained study of how
our federalism can and does enhance the lives of our citizens.
It is more than a little ironic that at a time when many parts of
the world are studying our federalism as a way to bring diverse
peoples together,3 67 we give that system so little credit our-
selves.
2. Evaluating National Authority
This has been half of the story about valuing federalism.
It establishes only that there is some weight on the state
autonomy side of the scale. In order to gain the benefits of
regulation at varying levels, there also must be some idea of
when national power should be exercised.
After substantial study, political economists have provided
us with a ready catalogue of reasons for exercising national
power, of situations in which the exercise of centralized gov-
ernment power is efficient. The doctrine of federalism takes
account of very little of this, however. Before turning to that
catalogue, therefore, it is useful to pause and think about why
this body of work largely has been ignored by judges, constitu-
tional lawyers, and constitutional theorists in the legal acad-
emy.368 The most likely answer (observations regarding lack of
professional expertise to one side) is that the constitutional
plan does not seem to require the question be answered, or
even to be asked at all. As explained above,369 under the con-
stitutional plan Congress possesses plenary authority in all the
(arguing that "communitarian federalism" fosters tolerance, diversity, and
pluralism). But see Rubin & Feeley, supra note 221, at 940-48 (arguing that
federalism protects neither affective nor political communities). Also, in ad-
dition to those items in the catalog, Steven Calabresi argues that federalism
provides an outlet for minority viewpoints. See Calabresi, supra note 9, at
770.
367. See Kramer, supra note 5, at 1487-88 (suggesting that American
scholars study the workings of federalism before advising other nations to
adopt it).
368. A notable exception is Jacques LeBoeuf, who argues that precisely
these factors should inform the scope of the commerce power, and also argues
this was the Framers' intention. See Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Fed-
eralism and the Proper Scope of the Federal Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 555, 559-65, 592-607 (1994).
369. See supra text accompanying note 24.
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enumerated areas, while the residue is left to the states. The
Framers rejected a formulation that explicitly would have
permitted Congress to act only when central authority was es-
sential, ironically believing that would not sufficiently protect
against undue centralization.370
In light both of doctrinal developments since the founding,
and of what political economists have taught us about public
choice, such complacency about the appropriate sphere of na-
tional authority is no longer warranted. We have seen the
commerce power stretched almost into a national police power,
limited only (and barely) by a doctrinal formulation that is it-
self incoherent and depends upon an extraordinary act of will
of judges to implement. By the same token, public choice the-
ory has taught us to have grave skepticism regarding the mo-
tives of those who hold legislative power, suggesting at the
least that we cannot trust them to decide the bounds of their
own power.371 It thus becomes essential to develop a sense of
when it is appropriate to exercise national power-the more
coherent and testable the better. Without necessarily provid-
ing an entire list, these reasons include the following:
1. Public Goods: Public goods are those that would not be
provided if it were not for the existence of some central
authority to fund them.372 That is because their cost often is
high, and yet it is relatively costless for each individual to take
advantage of them. Thus, left to their own devices, individuals
will free-ride, not paying their fair share of the cost of these
goods.373 Common examples are lighthouses, or a national
370. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28 (discussing the Framers'
delegation of specific enumerated powers to the federal government rather
than a general mandate to act where the states were incompetent).
371. See generally FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 243 (analyzing the accu-
racy of public choice theory's criticisms of the American political process);
JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOvERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE
TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997) (discussing the problem of transforming pub-
lic choice theory into useful principles for change).
372. On public goods and federalism, see generally VINCENT OSTROM, THE
MEANING OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 163-97 (1991); SHAPIRO, supra note 215,
at 39-40.
373. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 12-16 (1971)
(arguing that states must resort to taxation in order to fund public goods be-
cause of the free-rider problem); SHAPIRO, supra note 215, at 39 (discussing
the free-rider problem); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurispru-
dence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REV. 873, 892 (1987) ("[A]lthough every
American presumably benefits from improved national security, a single in-
dividual's actions in support of national security normally has only an infini-
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military. Political economists often agree that government,
and in some logical cases national government, should be given
the responsibility of providing these public goods.374
2. Externalities: When states regulate, it sometimes is the
case that the benefits of regulation are felt within the borders
of the state, but the burdens or costs are exported. These ex-
ported costs are called externalities, 375 and political economists
generally agree that it is appropriate for the national govern-
ment to restrict regulation by the states that may impose great
negative externalities on sister states.376 A common example
here is environmental protection. For example, a state may
regulate a factory in a manner that protects its citizens, but
causes pollution to be thrown off to people in bordering states.
This same kind of reasoning arguably underlies the discrimi-
nation prong of the Supreme Court's dormant Commerce
Clause analysis.3
77
tesimal effect. Hence, a rational individual will try to 'free ride' on the efforts
of others, contributing nothing to the national defense while benefiting from
other people's actions.").
374. See Burstein & Rolnick, supra note 299 (arguing that government
power is used appropriately only in the provision of public goods); Bednar &
Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1469 ("The most obvious role for the national gov-
ernment is to provide public goods that the states are unlikely to provide
through ordinary cooperation: a unified foreign policy, the interstate highway
system, and the hydrogen bomb."); see also Melvin L. Burstein, Comments on
Walter Hellerstein at the Conference on the Law an Economics of Federalism(May 2, 1997) (transcript on file with author) (arguing that courts should ap-
ply the economic distinction between public and private goods to dormant
Commerce Clause analysis).
375. The classic definition of externalities is Pigou's: "[T]he essence of the
matter is that one person A, in the course of rendering some service, for which
payment is made, to a second person B, incidentally also renders services or
disservices to other persons ... of such a sort that payment cannot be exacted
from the benefited parties or compensation enforced on behalf of the injured
parties." A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMIcs OF WELFARE 183 (4th ed. 1948). Ex-
ports of costs like those described in the text are negative externalities.
States can export positive externalities as well, although these are less of a
concern for national regulation. See SHAPIRO, supra note 215, at 40
(furnishing examples of positive and negative externalities); LeBoeuf, supra
note 368, at 567-73 (distinguishing between positive and negative externali-
ties).
376. See, e.g., WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 65-75 (1972)
(advocating intergovernmental grants to correct externalities); Roger H. Gor-
don, An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism, 98 Q.J. ECON. 567,
581-84 (1983) (proposing federal remedies for problems of externalities caused
by individual state decisionmaking).
377. See LeBoeuf, supra note 368, at 556 ("[T]he exercise of federal com-
merce power is appropriate only where state regulation of commerce would be
inefficient due to the presence of externalities."); Emerson H. Tiller, Putting
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3. Race to the Bottom: Closely related to the problem of
externalities, but perhaps not precisely the same, is the problem of
the race to the bottom.378 The theory of the race to the bottom
is that in enacting otherwise sensible regulations, states may
disadvantage themselves by raising the cost of doing business
in the state, thus driving the business to states that regulate
less rigorously. Yet, the more stringent regulation may be de-
sirable for gross reasons of efficiency, or for other reasons of
social welfare."9 An example of this is the struggle to elimi-
nate child labor. In such situations political economists often
agree that centralized regulation makes sense. 80
4. Uniformity: It may sometimes be the case that disuni-
formity is inefficient, raising the cost to those firms that must
do business in several jurisdictions.3 8' Thus, uniformity may
Politics into the Positive Theory of Federalism: A Comment on Bednar and
Eskridge, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1493, 1501 (1995) (arguing that the Court selec-
tively uses the dormant Commerce Clause to impose constitutional review in
cases involving externalities).
378. The phrase was coined by Professor William Cary in 1974. See Wil-
liam L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974). Justice Brandeis inspired the expression with his
dissent in Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 559 (1933) ("The race was one not
of diligence but of laxity.").
379. See Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There
a "Race" and Is It "to the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 274 (1997) (defining
race to the bottom as a progressive relaxation of standards spurred by inter-
state competition to attract industry that occasions a reduction in social wel-
fare); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking
the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1213-19 (1992) (defining the elements of a race to the
bottom).
380. See, e.g., James A. Brander, Economic Policy Formation in a Federal
State: A Game Theoretic Approach, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 33,
47-54, 60-65 (Richard Simeon ed., 1985) (arguing that interjurisdictional com-
petition in industrial policy results in net welfare cost which may be resolved
by a central government or binding code of conduct); Wallace E. Oates & Rob-
ert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency En-
hancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. PUB. EcoN. 333, 335, 350-51 (1988)
(arguing that competition between state-sized jurisdictions with mixed com-
munities and positive tax rates on capital results in suboptimal public out-
puts). But see Revesz, supra note 379, at 1233-44 (arguing that competition
between states for industry will not always lead to a race that decreases social
welfare).
381. See SHAPIRO, supra note 215, at 49 ("In areas not preempted by fed-
eral law, multistate companies must have the resources to search out and
comply with the laws of every state in which they do business. To paraphrase
a recent comment by an attorney, it would often be far better to have one bad...
federal rule on a particular topic than to have fifty less burdensome but sig-
nificantly different state rules."); see also Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and
Federalism: Whatever Happened to Devolution?, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 429, 448,
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be a reason for exercising national authority, for there may be
no other way to achieve it. However, considerable caution is
necessary before relying on the argument concerning uniform-
ity, because-as explained earlier-uniformity can be a great
leveler.382 In addition, it is not entirely clear the states cannot
obtain uniformity by acting together without the imposition of
national authority. Numerous uniform laws, such as the Uni-
form Commercial Code, stand as a testament to this.383 At the
very least, disuniformity alone seems a bad reason for permitting
the courts to strike state laws under the dormant commerce
power, despite the contrary suggestion in some Supreme Court
decisions?' Even in the area of congressional regulation, how-
ever, it seems that more work is needed in order to tell appro-
priate regulation in the name of uniformity from situations in
which disuniformity should be tolerated. The answer may well
depend on the values of leaving power in state hands, as dis-
cussed above.
These may not be the only reasons to exercise national
authority, and efficiency may not be the only appropriate
goal.385 For example, there is a broad consensus (although not
451 (1996) (arguing that federal legislation may be warranted when enter-
prises conducting business in several states are encumbered by a lack of uni-
formity among states).
382. See supra text accompanying note 150; see also Catherine L. Fisk, The
Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption? A Case Study of the
Failure of Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 95 (1996) (characterizing the
phrase "national uniformity equals regulatory efficiency" as an "unexamined
and perhaps erroneous" assumption).
383. See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Uniform Laws, Model
Laws and Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 947, 950 (1995)
(arguing that National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
proposals are uniformly adopted in areas of the law in which uniformity is ef-
ficient); Norman Silber, Why the U.C.C. Should Not Subordinate Itself to Fed-
eral Authority: Imperfect Uniformity, Improper Delegation and Revised Sec-
tion 3-102(c), 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 441, 456-57 (1994) ("Because each state has
adopted its own version of the 'model' and 'uniform' Code, the Code remains
subject to legislative modification and judicial interpretation by state
authorities. 'Rough' uniformity has resulted in greater efficiency without
eliminating the responsiveness of the law to changing local conditions and
without entirely diminishing the well-recognized potential of the states as
'laboratories' in the federal system. Indeed, several important Code revisions
and a number of federal consumer protection initiatives of the past decade
might not have occurred without the state law experimentation made possible
by limited federalization.") (footnotes omitted).
384. For discussion of these cases, see supra text accompanying note 185.
385. As with the catalogue of reasons for state autonomy, the best collec-
tion of arguments along these lines is in SHAPIRO, supra note 215, at 39-56. A
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unanimous by any measure) that most questions of fundamental
rights should be resolved at the national level.386 There may be
other matters for which an argument could be made that na-
tional commitment or consensus is necessary. This suggests
there is more work to be done, both in identification and as-
sessment. But the lack of complete understanding does not ex-
cuse the failure to try to implement some sensible regime for
identifying when the exercise of national authority is appropriate.
United States v. Lopez387 is a perfect example of the failure
to take any of this understanding into account, and of the fail-
ure of the legal academy in trying to value federalism. Al-
though the Supreme Court was correct to strike down the Gun
Free Schools Zone Act,38  that Court's opinion failed to support
its doctrinal analysis regarding the substantiality of the effect
of that law on commerce with any understanding of the values of
federalism. As Justice Breyer's dissent established,389 in today's
world virtually anything can be said to affect commerce, and
the concept of "substantial effect" is entirely indeterminate.
Yet, that is about all the case offers us as an understanding of
when Congress properly may regulate.
The real answer is that Lopez was correctly decided be-
cause there was virtually no serious argument why guns in
schools should be regulated at the national level. The only ar-
gument from the list above that supports national regulation-
an argument actually suggested by a few39°--is that a state's
shorter, but pointed, examination of these arguments is found in Calabresi,
supra note 9, at 779-84.
386. See SHAPIRO, supra note 215, at 52-56 (criticizing the states' record in
protecting individual and group rights); Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sul-
livan, Abortion Politics: Writing for an Audience of One, 138 U. PA. L. REv.
119, 151 (1989) ("[F]undamental liberties are not occasions for the experimen-
tation that federalism invites."). Even among those who favor vigorous en-
forcement of civil rights, there has been some question whether, in light of
conservatism at the national level, some of these questions should not be left
to the states. See SHAPIRO, supra note 215, at 97-99 (citing examples of states
going further than the national government in protecting minority or individ-
ual rights); Charles F. Abernathy, Foreword: Federalism and Antifederalism
as Civil Rights Tools, 39 How. L. REV. 615, 617-620, 627-32 (1996) (discussing
this commentary); Calabresi, supra note 9, at 817-23 (questioning whether
there is a strong case for a national role in criminal procedural rights and so-
cial and cultural rights).
387. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
388. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994).
389. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 615-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
390. See id. at 623 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Congress could have found
that gun-related violence near the classroom poses a serious economic threat
(1) to consequently inadequately educated workers who must endure low
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underregulation of the problem creates negative externalities
because students educated in fear of gun violence will be less
well educated, and then will be exported to the national labor
market. But this argument is an extremely vulnerable one.
First, as an empirical matter, one suspects that the students
are likelier to remain in the state than to leave for an out-of-
state labor market. Second, the immediate concern of guns in
schools is of crime and carnage, of injury and death among stu-
dents. It is cynical and ignorant of reality to fail to recognize
that parents care deeply enough about this issue that they will
want to solve the problem as quickly and well as possible,
without some perverse goal of exporting uneducated children.
Lopez was not a case about national competition. It was a case
about how best to stop carnage and violence among our youth,
and it is highly dubious that this could be done better at the
national, rather than the local, level.391
None of this is to suggest that by taking a more reasoned
approach all questions will become easy or all answers clear.
Even in the realm of political economy scholars can and do differ
as to proper outcome, as Richard Revesz's provocative work on
the race to the bottom in the environmental area makes
clear.392 But it does seem that some attention to the problem is
warranted to keep us from tumbling to the conclusion that
Congress can, and should, do whatever it wishes.
paying jobs.... and (2) to communities and businesses that might (in today's
'information society') otherwise gain, from a well-educated work force, an im-
portant commercial advantage.... ."); Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, The Under-federalization of Crime, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL1 247, 297 n.205 (1996)
(arguing that the interstate mobility of students produces a need for national
uniformity in education).
39L See Abernathy, supra note 386, at 620 (arguing that local authorities
should have the power to deal with school problems in a noncriminal manner);
Lewis B. Kaden, Courts and Legislatures in a Federal System: The Case of
School Finance, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1205, 1205 (1983) ("Throughout nearly
two centuries of debate over the meaning of federalism, there has been a gen-
eral consensus that elementary and secondary education are primarily the
responsibility of state and local government....-).
392. Compare Revesz, supra note 379, at 1244-47 (arguing that the race to
the bottom rationale is an unsound reason for environmental regulation at the
federal level) with Stewart, supra note 317, at 586 (noting the current para-
digm which states that the race to the bottom does justify federal regulation).
Revesz is in some sense a "second generation" of scholarship on the question
of whether to nationalize environmental policy. For a "third generation"
piece, see Esty, supra note 4, at 613-52 (making an argument in response to
second generation scholars and examining nationalization of some environ-
mental regulation).
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There has got to be a way to bring arguments about the
scope of national authority to bear on constitutional doctrine.
Largely, however, lawyers and judges ignore the sound lessons
political economists take for granted. This is the other half of
the story of how we presently fail to value federalism.
CONCLUSION
It is easy to write off those who defend federalism, seeing
them as antiquated relics of an era perhaps best bygone. 393
Many of us enjoy the global community, the ease of interna-
tional travel, and goods made cheaper by international compe-
tition. Perhaps most important, interweaving of the peoples of
the earth, through trade and otherwise, holds out some hope
for greater global harmony.
These are all good things-the question is, "At what
price?" Are there values that, in our zeal to nationalize and
globalize, we run the risk of losing? We cannot know the an-
swer to this question unless we identify those values and make
some effort to assess their worth. This Article has argued that
we do not value federalism because we have not devoted enough
attention to understanding how a federal system actually furthers
values we hold dear. The solution is to study the real and sup-
posed benefits of federalism, and to incorporate what is learned
into the actual business of governing, including the constitu-
tional law of federalism.
393. See Powell, supra note 366, at 70 (MTe consensus thus seems to be
that federalism is an antiquated concept whose risks outweigh its rewards in
modem constitutional interpretation.").
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